By: Simran Sodhi, Guest Author, GSDN

The visit of the Taliban foreign minister Amir Khan Muttaqi to India, has been an opportunity for India to re-define relations with the Taliban regime, who have been in control of Afghanistan since 2021. For India it was a strategic outreach to a regime that they have yet to officially recognize. But the optics of the visit turned into something else.

It all began with the Taliban minister holding a press conference in the Afghan embassy in New Delhi where only male journalists were invited. To make matters worse, some female journalists who wanted to cover the press interaction were turned away from the embassy gates. This led to a sharp critique of the Taliban regime, who many felt were trying to impose their regressive views about women in India. While the Indian government stated that it had nothing to do with this press interaction, the optics nevertheless sparked an outrage. The image of only male journalists sitting around the table with the Taliban foreign minister saw social media break out in an angry storm. It was not only the women in Indian media who were outraged, but women from all walks of life were, rightfully, livid.

Two days after the all-male press interaction, the Taliban minister held another interaction where women journalists were also invited. People in the know indicate that it was the Indian government that intervened for this second presser. The press conference also saw the Taliban minister getting some tough questions from the women present regarding women’s education and their rights in Afghanistan. In response, Muttaqi, a UN-sanctioned leader and senior minister in the Taliban regime, claimed that education of girls and women was not “haram”, or forbidden under laws governing Islam, and has only been postponed until the next order of the country’s supreme leader Hibatullah Akhundzada.

Muttaqi also, during the press interaction, said that the exclusion of women from the first press conference was a “technical issue” and that their list for “selected journalists” had been curated at a short notice. However, the world has watched in dismay as the Taliban have driven women out of public life in Afghanistan and how basic rights like education are being denied to girls and women.

According to a Human Rights Watch (HRW) report of 2024, “There is broad consensus that the situation in Afghanistan is the most serious women’s rights crisis in the world. The country is ranked last on the Women, Peace and Security Index and the UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in Afghanistan has referred to ‘the unprecedented deterioration of women’s rights.’ Afghan women—and officials at the UN and elsewhere—have called it ‘gender apartheid.’ Since the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 75 years ago, there may never have been anything like it—except once, from 1996 to 2001 when the Taliban previously controlled Afghanistan.”

It is significant here to point out that the second press interaction was a much-needed course correction. Since the Taliban take-over of Afghanistan, women have been totally excluded from the public sphere. In fact, Afghanistan today is the only country in the world where girls and women have been denied their basic rights, including being seen in public parks, gymnasiums, mosques, markets and salons. So, while the first presser kind of re-enforced their outlook on women, the second press interaction was a clear signal that this would not be tolerated in other countries.

For India specifically, while geopolitics would dictate closer ties with the Taliban, there should be no compromise on the basic values that India respects and follows. One of the most basic rights is then gender equality. The Indian Constitution guarantees that right to Indian women and every foreign entity ought to respect that on Indian soil.

The one lesson for all going forward is that women today, supported by many of their male colleagues, in many spheres of life are not okay with being discriminated against. Even in delicate, diplomatic situations like what one witnessed during the Taliban minister’s visit, respect for a woman’s dignity and rights cannot be ignored. It is a strong statement that India and its women have sent out and the message has reverberated globally. Some can argue that this is unlikely to get the Taliban to change. But that would be missing the point. Allowing anyone to ignore women in a secular, democratic society is unacceptable, is the message here. And it was heard loud and clear.

About the Author

Simran Sodhi is a Delhi-based journalist and foreign affairs analyst. She holds a Masters in International Relations from the American University in Washington DC. In 2009, her book ‘Piercing the Heart- Untold Stories of 26/11’ was published. She has written for a number of leading national and international publications. She tweets at @Simransodhi9

• Twitter
• LinkedIn
• Instagram
• WordPress

By: Gayathri Pramod, Research Analyst, GSDN

In 2025, the United States sharply escalated trade pressure on India through a series of tariff measures that culminated in tariffs of up to 50 per cent on many Indian goods, followed by a later U.S. announcement of a 100 per cent tariff on imports of branded or patented pharmaceutical products. These measures — justified by Washington as reciprocity and, in the case of the oil-linked tariffs, as punishment for India’s purchases of Russian oil — have immediate economic consequences for Indian exporters and financial markets, medium-term effects on growth and competitiveness, and longer-run political and strategic implications for the U.S.–India partnership. This paper examines the multidimensional impacts across economic, political, strategic, technological, and defence domains, assesses Indian policy responses and corporate adjustments, and discusses plausible future trajectories and associated risks. The U.S. decision to substantially raise tariffs on imports from India began in late August 2025 when President Donald Trump announced an additional 25 per cent tariff on top of existing trade barriers, bringing duties on many Indian exports to as high as 50 per cent. The White House framed this move as reciprocity and, in a separate step, imposed higher levies intended as punishment for India’s continued purchases of discounted Russian oil; U.S. officials tied the punitive element to geopolitics. The tariffs affected a wide array of labour-intensive manufactured goods, where India had a large U.S. market share, including textiles, garments, gems and jewellery, footwear, furniture, and certain chemicals. The levies took effect promptly, after five rounds of bilateral trade talks had failed to produce a comprehensive agreement. The tariff escalation was followed in late September 2025 by a U.S. announcement that, starting October 1, imports of “branded or patented pharmaceuticals” would be subject to a 100 per cent tariff — a move described by Washington as a policy to incentivize onshore manufacturing and reduce the U.S. pharmaceutical industry’s reliance on foreign supply. These measures, by design and by effect, have strained economic ties and tested the resilience of the wider strategic partnership between the two democracies.

Effects on Economy: Trade, Firms & Macroeconomy

The most immediate and measurable channel through which the tariff war impacts India is trade flows and firm profitability. The increase in tariffs to 50 per cent on many product lines represents an acute and sudden rise in the effective tax on Indian goods entering the U.S. market. For firms that export to the United States, the choices are stark: absorb the tariff and accept substantially smaller margins, pass the cost to U.S. buyers and risk losing market share, or attempt to reroute goods to alternative markets. Despite these challenges, Indian exporters have shown resilience and adaptability. For many small and medium-sized enterprises in India’s export ecosystem — particularly in textiles, leather goods, and other labour-intensive sectors — margins are thin, and access to alternatives is limited. Consequently, the ability to absorb tariff costs without layoffs or insolvency is constrained, but not impossible.

Several reputable analyses and market reports documented swift reactions in the weeks after the announcement. Exporters accelerated shipments to beat the tariff deadline where possible, and some segments reported order cancellations or re-pricing pressure as buyers shifted to suppliers not subject to such steep levies. Financial markets priced in the disruption: Indian equity indices experienced sectoral weakness, with particular pressure on pharmaceutical and export-oriented stocks when the pharma tariff news broke. Reuters reported that Indian pharma shares and broader indices slid on news of tariffs, reflecting investor concerns about revenue and profit exposure in the United States, where pharmaceuticals remain a key market for Indian producers. Currency markets also reacted: the rupee saw downside pressure against the dollar and required central bank intervention at times to stabilize volatility. These market moves are early indicators of contagion: tariffs affect expectations, which in turn condition capital flows, corporate financing costs, and investor risk premia.

At the sectoral level, the impact of the tariff war is not uniform. Labour-intensive sectors, such as apparel and footwear, are particularly vulnerable due to their significant exposure to the U.S. market. Gems and jewellery, where India is a global processing hub, also faced substantial tariff increases. The value chain in these sectors, characterised by many small players operating on thin margins, is at risk of rapid job losses and capacity contraction. In contrast, sectors where India competes on value-added, technology, or intellectual property are less directly affected by commodity tariffs but can suffer through second-order channels, including lower external demand, investor caution, and potential reductions in export orders.

Pharmaceuticals require special attention because India is a major global supplier of affordable generic medicines and APIs. The U.S. announcement of a 100 per cent tariff on branded and patented pharmaceuticals is aimed at protecting the domestic pharma industry and compelling foreign multinationals to invest in U.S. production. However, much of India’s exports to the U.S. are generics, which initial reporting suggested might not be directly targeted by the branded/patented tariff — the announcement substantially increased uncertainty and market risk. Policymakers, analysts and industry observers warned that any ambiguity in tariff scope or future expansion to complex generics or biosimilars could broaden the damage to one of India’s most valuable export sectors. The immediate stock market reaction — a sell-off in pharmaceutical equities — reflected both the probability of near-term disruptions to U.S. revenues and the longer-term risk of a policy that could gradually erode categories of India’s export strength.

Macroprudentially, a significant and prolonged hit to exports will depress manufacturing output, slow employment generation in export states, and reduce aggregate demand through income effects on workers and SMEs. Early economic commentary suggested possible modest downgrades to growth trajectories if tariffs persist; some macroeconomists forecast a measurable drag on GDP growth in the range of a few tenths of a percentage point, depending on the duration and scope of the tariffs, as well as the effectiveness of India’s mitigation measures. The potential for growth downgrades if the situation persists underscores the urgency of finding a resolution. The rupee’s weakness, while partly policy-driven, also reflects tighter external financing conditions that could make foreign debt servicing costlier for corporations and the sovereign. A depreciating currency can somewhat cushion exporters by lowering local currency costs, but it increases the burden of dollar-denominated liabilities and can accelerate inflation by making imports more expensive. Policy trade-offs therefore become acute: monetary easing to support growth risks exacerbating currency and inflation concerns, while tight monetary policy to defend the currency can deepen a downturn in the hit export sector.

India’s government response has been to mobilize targeted relief and to accelerate measures intended to diversify markets. Official announcements indicated the government planned and rolled out relief packages for exporters, including financial support, credit facilitation, and temporary subsidy schemes, to reduce immediate distress and prevent mass closures. These relief programs help in the short run but pose fiscal tradeoffs: the government must balance relief against fiscal consolidation priorities and long-term competitiveness measures, such as investing in quality upgrades, logistics, and technology. The effectiveness of assistance depends on speed, targeting accuracy, and whether the support helps firms pivot to alternative markets or product upgrades rather than perpetuate uncompetitive business models. The imposition of tariffs acts as a shock to supply chain location decisions and corporate strategy. Multinational firms, large exporters, and contract manufacturers must reassess their sourcing and routing strategies. Three strategic responses are typically employed: accelerating onshoring or nearshoring to the United States, diversifying markets to reduce U.S. exposure, or reengineering products and value chains to reduce tariff sensitivity.

The U.S. administration’s stated intent — particularly regarding the 100 per cent tariff on pharmaceuticals — is to incentivize onshore production of strategically important goods. For certain large multinationals, the calculus may favour building or expanding U.S. manufacturing capacity, but this option is capital-intensive and time-consuming. For Indian firms that sell primarily into the U.S. market, onshoring is not an immediate option unless they can partner with U.S. firms or relocate some production, and relocation is often constrained by capital, labour availability, and regulatory timelines. Diversification is a more feasible short-to-medium-term strategy: Indian exporters can attempt to reallocate shipments to alternative markets, such as the EU, the Middle East, Africa, and ASEAN countries. Indian authorities have identified dozens of potential alternative markets and have offered trade facilitation to help exporters find new buyers. However, shifting markets is no trivial task. Non-U.S. markets may have different standards, longer certification processes, entrenched competitors (e.g., Bangladesh and Vietnam in the textiles industry), and logistical challenges. Thus, while market diversification is a necessary tactic, it cannot eliminate the economic pain in the near term for goods where the U.S. is the primary or high-margin market. There is also a technological dimension: exporters can attempt to upgrade product value, shift to differentiated branded goods less sensitive to tariff arbitrage, or invest in certifications and manufacturing quality that open access to higher-value segments where price competition is less intense. Indian industrial policy and corporate strategy may therefore accelerate structural upgrading in affected sectors, raising long-term competitiveness but requiring capital, skills and time.

Defence, Strategic & Geopolitical Consequences

The tariff war extends beyond economics into strategy and geopolitics, as U.S.–India ties encompass defence cooperation, intelligence sharing, and a convergence of interests in the Indo-Pacific. The political economy of tariffs can bleed into perceptions of reliability and trust in strategic partnerships. Some strategic analysts argue that using tariffs as coercive leverage against a close security partner undermines long-term geopolitical goals: if economic coercion erodes trust, it may limit the scope for deeper cooperation on defence tech transfers, logistics sharing, or joint operations. Commentators in policy outlets have warned that alienating a rising power through heavy-handed economic measures risks spurring hedging behaviour and alignment with alternative power centres, which could be counterproductive to U.S. security objectives in Asia. These arguments assert that strategic interests are best preserved through stable and predictable economic relations, and that punitive tariffs can undermine this predictability. India faces a strategic squeeze in which Washington’s tariff pressure is partially linked to India’s energy choices, notably purchases of Russian oil. New Delhi’s sourcing decisions are shaped by energy security, price, and geopolitical calculations. While aligning with U.S. preferences might reduce trade friction, it may simultaneously reduce India’s bargaining room on energy and other strategic fronts. Suppose New Delhi perceives U.S. demands as an attempt to dictate its strategic choices. In that case, it may resist, doubling down on diversification that strengthens alternative ties, including with Russia and Middle Eastern suppliers. This dynamic illustrates how trade instruments can be used as geopolitical levers and how such leverage can produce unanticipated strategic realignments.

The tariff conflict could also accelerate India’s outreach to other partners. Indian diplomacy has actively sought alternative markets and investment partners, intensifying engagement with regions such as Africa, Latin America, Southeast Asia and the Gulf. Over the longer term, a sustained tariff dispute might strengthen India’s economic ties with other powers and multilateral groupings that provide alternative routes for trade and investment. While diversification reduces dependence on any single partner, it also reshapes geopolitical configurations in ways that may not be in the short-term interest of the imposing power. Defence and high-technology cooperation between the United States and India had been growing for years prior to the tariff dispute, encompassing arms sales, joint exercises, and technology transfer agreements. The tariff friction introduces a risk that political trust could erode, slowing or complicating future transfers of sensitive defence technologies and dual-use items. India, aware of such vulnerability, may pursue a twin-track approach of diversifying defence procurement and deepening indigenous capabilities. Accelerating indigenous defence production is consistent with India’s “self-reliance” policy but requires time and investment. In the near term, procurement pauses or hesitations by India in U.S. contracts could reduce the volume and tempo of bilateral defence business — a costly political signal on both sides.

On technology, tariffs are only one instrument; export controls, investment screening and non-tariff barriers constitute other levers that can be used to influence high-value, dual-use trade. If strategic mistrust hardens, both sides may deploy non-tariff restrictions more aggressively, creating fragmentation in standards, supply chains, and market access in cutting-edge sectors such as semiconductors, advanced materials, and critical life-science inputs. India’s reaction could be to deepen efforts at domestic capability building and to seek alternative suppliers from friendly partners, thereby increasing global supply-chain fragmentation. Over the long term, this can lead to parallel ecosystems that hinder integration and increase costs.

India’s immediate policy toolkit includes emergency relief for exporters, credit and liquidity support, targeted subsidies, tariff mitigation measures such as drawback schemes, and intensified trade diplomacy to open alternative export markets. These steps have been initiated to varying degrees; Indian officials have announced planned relief packages and diversification efforts in the market. Such measures help buy time and prevent systemic collapse in vulnerable industries. However, they also carry fiscal costs and may simply postpone necessary structural adjustments if not paired with reforms that raise productivity and product complexity in Indian manufacturing. A medium-term strategy should emphasize competitiveness upgrading, including investments in logistics, port efficiency, certifications, worker skills, technology adoption, and product differentiation. Policy measures that incentivize quality, branding, and R&D can help Indian firms move up the value chain and reduce their vulnerability to tariff arbitrage in basic commodities. Internationally, India can expand preferential trade agreements and market access initiatives, negotiate regulatory mutual recognition with blocs, and deepen trade facilitation efforts to accelerate market entry into alternative destinations. In terms of scenarios, a benign path would involve the U.S. tariffs being treated as temporary leverage, leading to a negotiated settlement in exchange for targeted policy moves or trade-opening measures by India, with limited long-term damage. A middle path would involve protracted tariffs, which India largely mitigates through diversification and upgrading, but with measurable near-term growth costs and political strain. A worst-case scenario would be persistent, growing tariffs and scope creep (e.g., the expansion of pharma tariffs to generics or biosimilars), causing structural export contraction, prolonged rupee weakness, and strategic drift between the countries, with knock-on implications for regional geopolitics.

Risk & Uncertainties

The imposition of sweeping tariffs by the United States under the Trump administration injects a profound layer of uncertainty into India’s economic and strategic calculus. At the heart of the issue is not only the immediate economic damage but also the unpredictability of policy trajectories. The Trump presidency has already demonstrated a willingness to use tariffs not merely as tools of economic protection but as instruments of leverage in a broader political and strategic sense. This creates a systemic risk environment where India cannot assume that tariff measures are temporary or limited to specific sectors. Instead, Indian policymakers must now prepare for a shifting baseline in which protectionism is embedded in the United States’ trade posture, with consequences that extend across industries and into the diplomatic sphere. One of the foremost risks stems from the volatility of U.S. policy itself. Unlike structural reforms or treaty commitments, tariffs imposed by executive decision can change with relative ease, subject to domestic political cycles, electoral considerations, and shifting alliances within the U.S. Congress. This means that for Indian businesses, the planning horizon is compromised. Pharmaceutical exporters—India’s flagship industry with nearly $25 billion worth of exports to the U.S. in 2024—must weigh the costs of building alternative market strategies against the possibility that tariffs could be rolled back within a few years. This creates a “policy whiplash” environment, where firms are forced into hedging strategies, reduced capital investments, or price increases that erode competitiveness. The risk profile also encompasses broader financial and macroeconomic vulnerabilities. Indian equity markets, which are heavily exposed to IT and pharmaceutical companies, have already displayed sharp volatility following tariff announcements. The depreciation of the Indian rupee in response to potential capital outflows further compounds uncertainties, as it raises import costs for energy and critical inputs. This introduces inflationary pressures into the domestic economy, forcing the Reserve Bank of India to strike a delicate balance between maintaining growth and containing inflation. Moreover, India’s sovereign credit ratings may come under pressure if global investors perceive a structural erosion in export revenues, particularly when paired with rising fiscal deficits linked to subsidies or support measures for affected industries.

Beyond the purely economic sphere, there is a risk of strategic misalignment. India’s deepening partnership with the U.S., particularly in defence procurement and Indo-Pacific security frameworks, is premised on mutual trust and shared objectives in countering Chinese assertiveness. Tariffs, however, risk injecting friction into this relationship by creating a perception of unilateralism and transnationalism in U.S. policy. India may become increasingly cautious about overcommitting to U.S.-led initiatives, instead seeking to preserve strategic autonomy by balancing its relations with Europe, Russia, and even China, where necessary. The tariff dispute thus has the potential to destabilize the political foundation of the India–U.S. partnership, raising long-term uncertainties about the reliability of the alliance. At the same time, the global dimension magnifies risks. Suppose other countries, especially within the European Union or East Asia, respond to U.S. protectionism by erecting their own trade barriers. In that case, India may find itself squeezed out of multiple markets simultaneously. Alternatively, these economies may seize the opportunity to strengthen their economic ties with the U.S. at India’s expense, further isolating Indian exporters. The cascading effect of protectionism can lead to a “race to the bottom,” where multilateral norms are weakened and global trade fragmentation accelerates.

This is where international institutions, such as the World Trade Organisation (WTO) and the G20, as well as emerging regional frameworks, become critical. In theory, India has recourse to the WTO’s dispute settlement system. Tariffs that violate Most Favoured Nation (MFN) principles or lack proper justification under national security exemptions can be challenged. However, the WTO’s dispute resolution mechanism has been significantly weakened in recent years, particularly due to the U.S. blocking appointments to the Appellate Body, effectively paralyzing the system. Even when disputes proceed, they are notoriously slow; on average, cases can take two to four years to reach a binding ruling. For a dynamic industry like pharmaceuticals, where pricing and patent cycles evolve rapidly, such delays render legal remedies less effective in mitigating immediate harm. Other international forums offer opportunities, but also pose limitations.

The G20, where India holds increasing influence, can serve as a platform to build consensus against protectionism. India’s presidency of the G20 in 2023 highlighted its capacity to shape discussions on resilient supply chains and equitable trade. However, such forums are primarily consultative and lack enforcement mechanisms. Similarly, the BRICS grouping, with its renewed expansion to include countries such as Saudi Arabia and Iran, presents India with an opportunity to forge coalitions advocating for multipolar economic governance. However, BRICS remains fragmented by divergent interests and does not currently possess binding economic mechanisms capable of countering U.S. tariffs. Another dimension of uncertainty is the response of multinational corporations and global investors. Large pharmaceutical and IT firms operating in India may accelerate their diversification strategies by relocating parts of their production or R&D to Southeast Asia, Eastern Europe, or Latin America, thereby hedging against tariff risks. While India remains attractive due to its skilled workforce and cost advantages, the perception of U.S. hostility toward Indian exports could weaken India’s ability to attract new investments. This poses a threat to long-term industrial upgrading, which is crucial for India’s ambition to transition from a service-dominated economy to a manufacturing powerhouse, as outlined in initiatives such as “Make in India” and “Atmanirbhar Bharat.” For India, navigating these risks requires a multi-layered approach. Diplomatic engagement with the U.S. remains paramount, particularly through mechanisms like the India–U.S. Trade Policy Forum, which can serve as a channel for negotiations and temporary relief measures. At the same time, India must strengthen its legal and institutional capacities to pursue WTO challenges more effectively, even if outcomes are uncertain. Diversification of trade partnerships—accelerating free trade agreements with the European Union, the United Kingdom, and the Gulf Cooperation Council—can also provide alternative markets and reduce overdependence on the U.S. Yet, uncertainty remains the defining feature. Tariffs are not isolated economic measures; they are embedded in the larger contestation over global economic governance. International institutions, although imperfect, remain important venues for norm-setting, coalition-building, and signalling. Their ability—or inability—to manage disputes, such as the current tariff war between the U.S. and India, will shape not only the bilateral relationship but also the future of the multilateral trading system. For India, the stakes are unusually high: failure to navigate this turbulent environment could jeopardize its growth trajectory, undermine strategic partnerships, and weaken its aspiration to become a central pillar of the global economy in the twenty-first century.

Conclusion

Trump’s tariff campaign against India in 2025 marks a sharp and consequential juncture in the bilateral relationship. Economically, it imposes immediate stress on exporters, financial markets, and potentially GDP growth, with particular vulnerability in labour-intensive and pharmaceutical sectors. Politically, it forces Indian policymakers to make difficult choices between short-term relief and long-term competitiveness, and the episode risks fueling protectionist sentiment domestically. Strategically, the tariffs constitute a test of the U.S.–India partnership: while defence and security cooperation may persist through shared regional interests, trust and long-term alignment could be weakened, prompting India to diversify partners and accelerate self-reliance in critical sectors. The domestic political implications of the tariff war are manifold. The sectors at risk employ millions of workers in politically pivotal states. Tariff-induced job losses or factory shutdowns could convert economic pain into electoral politics, increasing pressure on the federal government for rapid relief and on state governments for policy interventions. Indian political leaders and commentators have used nationalistic rhetoric to frame the event as an affront to Indian sovereignty and economic dignity, with the prime minister urging citizens to support domestic industry and reduce dependence on foreign products. This rhetorical framing helps build domestic consensus for countermeasures.

However, it also risks entrenching protectionism that could undermine India’s longer-term growth agenda if it translates into durable inward-looking policies. From a governance perspective, the tariff war stresses public finances and priorities. Relief packages and export incentives require fiscal room; if these measures are funded through higher borrowing or diverted from capital spending, the longer-term productivity growth story may be weakened. Conversely, if relief is tightly targeted and coupled to longer-term upgrading (for example, assistance conditional on digitalization or product upgrading), the policy response could mitigate near-term pain and strengthen future competitiveness. The judgment and administrative capacity to design such conditional, efficient programs will be a decisive factor in how much structural damage is avoided. Additionally, the tariff episode catalyzes debates within India about the balance between strategic autonomy and economic interdependence. Many analysts and policy elites fear that conceding strategically (for example, shifting away from certain energy suppliers) purely for tariff relief would set a precedent that undermines India’s policy independence. Thus, political calculus tilts toward resisting coercive external demands, even as policymakers seek pragmatic ways to protect exporters and maintain macroeconomic stability. The outcome will depend on whether the tariff measures are a temporary bargaining tactic or the start of a sustained policy posture; on the clarity and scope of the pharmaceutical tariff; on India’s skill at rapidly redirecting exports and upgrading competitiveness; and on how both governments trade off short-term political incentives against long-term strategic goals.

About the Author

John Peterson

Gayathri Pramod, a research scholar, works on the genealogy of governance over life and death in times of war, with a particular focus on the West Asian front. Her research interests centre on the thematic study of war crimes and other geopolitical flashpoints.

• Twitter
• LinkedIn
• Instagram
• WordPress

By: Hridbina Chatterjee

India’s foreign policy has gone through a significant change—transitioning more away from “Strategic Equidistance” to “Multi-Vector Engagement.” For decades, New Delhi – in line with the Non-Aligned Movement – adhered to a sort of “passive balancing,” maintaining an objective and cautious distance from all major global power competitions in practice and theory, so as not to disrupt development. However, with a series of recent crises, including the weaponizing of trade through tariffs, energy shocks, ruptures to the global order, and great power competition, it is clear that India’s traditional neutral position is no longer defensible nor a strategic advantage. This transition is an active – and acknowledged – strategy. India no longer aims to evade confrontation; it actively seeks to engage with everyone – the US, Russia, China, and the EU – but under terms that India sets. The “active pivoting” is a pragmatic necessity, where India leverages its growing economic and demographic stature to establish roles in global governance, procure important resources, diversify supply chains and ultimately ensure that any new order advances India’s relevant national interests, positioning it as a central player in the world rather than a marginal balancer.

From Strategic Non-Alignment to Multi-Vector Engagement

Historically, India’s foreign policy was based on Strategic Non-Alignment that originated in a post-Cold War continuation of its original Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) philosophy. This strategy—which can be referred to as “Passive Balancing” or “Strategic Equidistance”—sought to maintain diplomatic neutrality (while avoiding overt alignment with large power blocs) and focus almost entirely on shoring up its developmental space. In a relatively stable, unipolar, or initially multipolar world, this provided India with important strategic autonomy. Today, however, a new era of dramatic instability (the weaponization of trade, energy, and finance) renders an approach based on “passive” equidistance inadequate for the new context. Geopolitical friction points such as the Russia-Ukraine war or increasing US-China tensions are decidedly incompatible with a passive watching-and-waiting approach that has characterized India’s previous foreign policy; these are choices.

The new context requires Multi-Vector Engagement, or “Active Pivoting.” This is an approach that is real-time, based on pragmatic considerations, and involves India engaging with all major and minor power centers—the West, Russia, the Gulf countries, Global South, regional groupings, and so on—all simultaneously but through a hard-headed lens of national interests. The goal is to maximize gains from each of these relationships as well as minimize vulnerabilities. It is not about taking sides, but about having a seat at every table and ensuring India’s voice is integral to any discussion on global governance, trade, or security.

Navigating the Tariff and Trade Turbulence

The global trade landscape has become increasingly protectionist, with tariffs being deployed as a geopolitical tool. India finds itself trying to manage rising pressures from trade partners, while navigating opportunities for economic advantage. Tariff shocks, where select major economies place heightened duties on certain Indian exports, often unrelated to the actual goods but to political decisions around energy sources, is a direct threat to India’s ambitions of growing manufacturing and its associated exports.

India is responding in clear sight of its Multi-Vector Engagement. Rather than giving in to pressures of trade partners, it is expanding its supply chain partners and building supply chain relationships in markets outside of trade partners. The drive for Atmanirbhar Bharat (self-reliant India) is not an isolationist strategy, rather it is a strategic hedge against supply chain weaponization, with the desire to build resilience domestically and to be a reliable alternative to other manufacturing markets. India is also pursuing new free trade agreements (FTAs) with partners, working with new multilateral trade forums, and seeking to reform international trade rules in favour of emerging economies’ effective engagement.

Strategic Autonomy Amidst Energy Shocks

The volatility in global energy markets, particularly in the wake of geopolitical conflicts, poses threat to India, which is a significant energy importer, disrupting its rapid growth trajectory and spurring debilitating inflation. The energetic pivot that India is taking in the energy domain is a great example of pragmatic foreign policy that puts energy security and affordability ahead of ideological fit.

India has leverage, and it’s utilizing it. New Delhi made significant savings that shielded its domestic economy from international price hikes by greatly increasing its import of discounted oil from countries such as Russia after Western powers induced sanctions upon said country. While this was criticized, India stood by its decision to say its duty is to protect its 1.4 billion citizens. At the same time, India is strengthening strategic energy relations with Gulf nations, investing in renewable energy, and encouraging green hydrogen to lower its long-term reliance on fossil fuels. This balanced strategy results in securing immediate energy needs while preparing for a sustainable future, thereby strengthening its strategic autonomy.

Responding to Shifting Alliances and Geopolitical Crises

The contemporary world is characterized by an accelerating shift in global power and the formation of new, fluid alliances. Evidence of India’s active pivoting is most notable in its positioning on emerging alliances and global crises. The approach of the country is to join or participate in a number of sometimes conflicting groupings without committing entirely to one or another one’s side.

On one hand, India is an integral part of the Quad (with the US, Japan, and Australia), which orients itself towards a free and open Indo-Pacific and is an important balancing mechanism against assertiveness in the region and strengthened its bilateral defence and technology relationships with Western countries. At the same time, India is also at the forefront of initiatives such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which include the participation of China and Russia, among others. This dual engagement, often referenced as “Multi-Alignment,” enables India to influence dialogues both within the Western-led order and the emerging non-Western axis. In convening and taking leadership roles in major forums, such as the G20, India has successfully conceived its position as the “Voice of the Global South,” advocating for debt relief, climate finance, and proportionate representation in global governance institutions, and this active engagement in global normative processes is indeed the ultimate evidence of its efforts growing from passive balancing status to actively altering situations and outcomes.

The Decisive Shift from Balancing to Shaping

India’s choice to abandon Strategic Equidistance for Multi-Vector Engagement is an imperative born of necessity, marking its ultimate transition from a rule-taker to a rule-shaper. There is no longer a viable “wait and watch” regime; the time for passive neutrality is over. The intermix of economic pressures (tariffs, supply chain disruptions), security dilemmas (border issues, regional instability), and existential concerns (climate change, energy security) calls for a forward-looking, nimble, and interest-based foreign policy.

Multi-Vector Engagement requires relentless diplomacy in an adverse climate, compartmentalization of competing bilateral relationships (e.g., strong ties to the US, while also continuing the modality of defense and energy trades with Russia), and explicitness in advocating its national interests on the global stage. India desires to use its demographic dividend, economic growth, civilizational/soft power appeal, and developing defense capabilities to not only secure its future but to promote a genuinely multipolar, rules-based, and equitable order in the world to best position itself as a global pivot to a proliferated bipolar state, rather than a side-player in a new global order.

By: Prachi Kushwah, Research Analyst, GSDN

The European Union (EU) is today in a very critical crossroad with the People’s Republic of China. In the past forty years, China has been seen to evolve as isolated developing economy to a global superpower that has tremendous political, economic and technological influence across the world. The EU that has been keen on portraying itself as a champion of democratic ideals, multilateralism, and free trade has on the other hand increased its involvement to China and has become increasingly cautious about the possible dangers of depending heavily on Beijing. This has become a complicated political game that raises the questions of whether the EU is becoming a victim of a so-called Chinese grip. This paper tries to delve into this question by looking at how the EU-China relations have changed with time, the economic and trade relationship, the Chinese contribution to technology and infrastructure in Europe, the political and diplomatic impact, the security risk, and the last thought on how the EU can gain the independence further. Through these dimensions we will be able to see that the answer is not binary but rather it emphasizes the fine balancing act that Europe needs to ensure to strike between opportunity and vulnerability.

Historical Background of EU-China Relations

On May 6, 1975, the formal diplomatic relations between the European Economic Community, the forerunner of the modern-day European Union and the Peoples Republic of China were officially established. Back in 1990, China was still just coming out of the chaos of the Cultural Revolution and the EU was still in the midst of its institution-building and common market. Initial interaction was meagre with the early interaction largely being trade and cultural interactions. The changes that were implemented by Deng Xiaoping in December 1978 however exposed the Chinese economy to the world resulting in increased interconnection with Europe. The EU had developed into a major partner to China by 1990s when they realized the increasing influence that Beijing had on the world markets. In 2003, the EU and China also took their relationship to a new level of Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which was meant to extend beyond trade to other fields of cooperation like science, education and the environment.

But together with cooperation tensions started to appear. The European parliament also questioned the human right practices, freedom of expression and the lack of democracy in China. These problems usually conflicted with the normative identity of EU. Economic interdependence increased at a high rate in spite of these political differences. EU-China trade in goods had up to 2020 reached US$ 709 billion with China emerging as the second largest trading partner of the EU after the United States. This two-sidedness: between values in conflict and between economies in interdependency has represented the movement of EU-China relations.

Economic Interdependence Trade

Trade and investment are the foundation of EU-China relations. The fact that the volume of trade between the two parties is so enormous shows how they are mutually dependent. This saw trade between the EU and China in goods and services to reach more than US$ 2 billion a day by 2024. EU imports huge volumes of consumer goods, electronics, textiles, and intermediate products with China and exports machinery, vehicles, pharmaceuticals, and luxury goods. Another significant market that has been gained by Europeans is their wine, dairy, and pork in China.

However, China has always had the balance of trade. The asymmetry of the relationship is witnessed in 2023 where the EU trade deficit with China is in excess of US$ 400 billion. European businesses tend to complain of unreasonable competition by the Chinese companies which enjoy state subsidies, inexpensive labour and less rigorous environmental regulations. The steel, solar and textile markets in Europe have all had a hard time competing with the Chinese imports.

The 2020-2021 COVID-19 pandemic demonstrated the dangers of overdependence on China-based supply chains even further. The inadequacy of medical machinery, drug raw materials and electronic parts made EU policymakers face the weaknesses of globalization. Although the European leaders accept that doing business with China leads to economic development, it is increasingly being realized that it is time to diversify and limit strategic reliance.

Digital Influence and Technology

Technology is one of the most disputable fields of EU-China relations. China has grown swiftly to become a leader in artificial intelligence (AI), semiconductors and telecommunications. The arrival of the Chinese companies like Huawei and ZTE into the European market created hope of quicker, inexpensive technological infrastructural support, in particular in executing the fifth-generation (5G) networks. This was however soon followed by security authorities in the various countries such as Germany, France and Netherlands to raise alarm about the possibility of espionage, threat to data security and overreliance on Chinese companies in building of essential infrastructure.

The discussion escalated in December 2020 when the European Commission released a toolbox of actions towards safe 5G implementation, stating that it is necessary to not be dependent on a single supplier. Other member states of the EU, such as Sweden and Denmark, have subsequently limited or prohibited Huawei equipment on their networks. In the meantime, European companies like Nokia and Ericsson are trying to offer alternatives, but they are hard pressed by the competition that is well subsidised by the Chinese competitors.

The technological industry is also an indication of a wider geopolitical conflict between China and the United States. EU has always been lying in the middle trying to safeguard their economic interests and at the same time maintain their strategic autonomy.

Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) in Europe

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) a giant infrastructure investment endeavour by the Asian continent, Africa and Europe was launched in September 2013. One of the areas where BRI projects have been very active is Europe. In March 2019, Italy was the first G7 to sign a memorandum of understanding with China on the BRI. China has invested in railways, ports and energy in other European states e.g. Greece, Hungary and Serbia.

A good example is the Port of Piraeus, Greece. China Ocean Shipping Company (COSCO) later on in August 2016 took the majority stake in the port turning it into a key Chinese export hub to Europe. Although this investment improved the infrastructure of these regions and generated employment opportunities, critics believe that it made China strategic in terms of European trade routes.

The advocates of BRI initiatives stress that the Chinese capital will bridge infrastructural gaps caused by insufficient EU funds. Critics, though, are concerned with so-called debt traps and political considerations. The case of Hungary is one example when it is alleged that Brussels lacked transparency in pursuing Chinese-funded projects in the country. The BRI is therefore an opportunity of development as well as the potential geopolitical leverage weapon.

Diplomatic and Political Influence

In addition to economics China has also increased its political presence in Europe. In April 2012, a so-called 17+1 framework was introduced that united China with 17 Central and Eastern European countries, most of which are member states of the EU. This format also caused concern in Brussels, because this format appeared to circumvent EU institutions and separate member states. Other nations, including Lithuania, later pulled out claiming transparency and excessive reliance on Beijing.

Another form of influence by China is by exerting diplomatic pressure. As an illustration, the EU attempted to make some bold words criticizing human rights violations in Xinjiang or political oppression in Hong Kong, but some of the EU members watered down their words because of economic relationships with China. This has weakened the capacity of EU to provide a common voice in international issues touching on human rights.

Meanwhile, Chinese embassies in Europe are now more aggressive, resorting to social media and social diplomacy to push Beijing messages. This approach, often so-called wolf warrior diplomacy has occasionally caused estrangement among European citizens and decision makers.

Risks and Security Concerns

The increasing Chinese influence in Europe is not only a threat to the economy. The European intelligence services have also sounded alerts several times with regard to cyber-espionages, which have been associated with Chinese players. Claims of intellectual property theft and intimidation of transfer of technology also contribute to mistrust.

The context has also been changed by geopolitical developments. When Russia invaded Ukraine on February 24, 2022, it revealed the risks of using authoritarian regimes as sources of important resources. The uncertain attitude of China to the war, its cooperation with Russia, and a lack of readiness to denounce the aggression have increased the anxiety of the European secret positioning.

Another issue is energy dependency. With the introduction of renewable energy in Europe, the Chinese leadership in the production of solar panels and rare earths is a threat of future helplessness. The dilemma of the EU is that it should not repeat what it did with Russia in the energy sector, and this time with China in technology and green industries.

European Reactions and Strategic Independence

With all these challenges, the EU has started to re-adjust its position with regard to China. The European Commission in March 2019 termed China as a partner, competitor, and systemic rival. This triple framing is what is signifying that the EU is conscious of the intricacy of the relationship. Ever since, Brussels has endeavoured to reinforce trade defence tools, and review foreign investments, as well as protect critical technologies.

There is also the Global Gateway initiative by the EU which was launched in December 2021 with a view of mobilizing US$ 340 billion in infrastructure projects around the world as an opposition to the Belt and Road Initiative by China. The partnerships with the United States, Japan, and India are also being extended to encourage diversification of the supply chains.

The concept of strategic autonomy has taken over the leadership of the EU policy. Although this does not imply breaking ties with China, it ensures that there should be a balance. European leaders are more insistent on the fact that cooperation should not be at the expense of security, democracy, and sovereignty.

Conclusion

Is the European Union in Chinese grip or not is the question that does not lend itself to either yes or no answer. The EU is highly tied to China both on the economic front and this can never be cut off without colossal expenses. However, the EU does not ignore the dangers of relying on China too much in terms of trade, technology, and infrastructure. The argument brings out the peculiarity of opportunity versus resilience in Europe.

The EU still needs to invest in its own technological and industrial resources, establish better contacts with other similar democracies and solidify its internal cohesion in the next few years. Such steps are the only ones that can help the EU not to be too reliant on Beijing and enjoy the benefits of engagement, at the same time. Thus, the so-called Chinese grip is not unavoidable- it is a matter of European strategic decisions in terms of protecting its sovereignty and principles.

By: Simran Sodhi, Guest Author, GSDN

Even as Nepal seems to calm down and stabilize, the recent upheaval in the Himalayan Kingdom has left India worried. The Gen Z protests in Nepal were reminiscent of the youth protests in Dhaka last year, and what followed in Dhaka left India anxious about its Eastern Front. It would then be a fair assessment to make at this time that India is today surrounded by a neighbourhood that doesn’t appear very friendly towards it. Instability in Nepal, a rather unfriendly govt in Dhaka, antagonistic ties with Pakistan, and other countries like Sri Lanka and the Maldives which vacillate between being friends and not-friends, India needs an urgent and serious re-think about its much touted ‘Neighbourhood First Policy’(NFP).

The NFP was first formulated in 2008 but it received a great push after 2014 under the leadership of Prime Minister Narendra Modi. His govt emphasized giving priority to India’s neighbours and building ties with them based on regional connectivity, trade and culture. India also stepped up its defence and security co-operation in the South Asian region but the political instability in many of the South Asian nations poses a perennial challenge. Also, the growing presence of China in the region and its tendency to offer loans to many of the South Asian nations for infrastructure building, etc is another challenge for India. There is also a perception in many of India’s smaller neighbours that India harbours a ‘Big Brother’ attitude towards them and that has also strained India’s ties with many in its immediate neighbourhood.

A quick look at the developments post 2020 makes it abundantly clear that the region is in a state of political instability. In 2023, the Maldives elected a new government which had campaigned on an anti-India platform. Though of late there seems to have been a change of heart in the Maldives and relations seem to be getting better. But there can be no denying the fact that the Maldives does seem to harbour an anti-India sentiment that was on full display in their elections in 2023. 

For India, the hardest blow came in 2024 with the ouster of Bangladesh’s Sheikh Hasina, and with Muhammad Younus becoming Bangladesh’s Chief Advisor. Delhi-Dhaka ties saw a golden period under Hasina who sided with India on many major issues and for India, the Eastern Front was a place of calm and friendship. Younus, on the other hand, has been quite vocal in his critique of India, and in late Sept this year while in New York to attend the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), he publicly hit out at India. He stated that India did not like the student protests that took place in his country last year, and that by providing Hasina a safe haven in India, India is further spoiling its ties with Bangladesh. He even went on to blame India for SAARC becoming non-functional.

Nepal has a similar story for India, in many respects. The Gen Z protests have seen the established politicians get a boot and the country is now gearing up for elections in 2026. India has wisely been careful to not get too involved in the internal politics of Nepal because the pushback from the Himalayan Kingdom carries the same rhetoric, that of India playing ‘Big Brother”.

With neighbours like Pakistan, India’s ties today are almost a cipher. With the Taliban in Afghanistan, India has started an outreach but there is nothing very substantial there as of today. Bhutan and Mauritius (extended neighbourhood) are today the two spots in India’s neighbourhood where India is maintaining excellent ties. But even in Bhutan, the Chinese are working overtime to increase their foot print.

In short, India today needs to go back to the boardroom and do a serious re-think of its ties with its neighbours. The present scenario is grim and also poses a serious challenge to India’s security as is evident with the coming together of Pakistan-China and Bangladesh. India also needs to either breath new life into SAARC or look at other regional groupings which can help South Asia integrate into a closer unit. SAARC held its last meeting in 2014. India has maintained that since Pakistan continues to sponsor cross-border terrorism into India, it cannot be in attendance in SAARC. That has helped finish off SAARC as a regional grouping, more or less. India then turned its attention to BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) grouping that excludes Pakistan for regional cooperation. But BIMSTEC really hasn’t shown the kind of positive trajectory one expected from it.

With time not on its side, as the recent events in Dhaka and Nepal show, India needs to swiftly re-think its Neighbourhood First Policy. India also needs to invest more in bilateral relationships with its smaller South Asian neighbours; and either revive SAARC or put in place a new regional grouping for South Asia that will bind all together. If India doesn’t act fast, it might prove to be too late with China breathing down the region’s neck.

About the Author

Simran Sodhi is a Delhi-based journalist and foreign affairs analyst. She holds a Masters in International Relations from the American University in Washington DC. In 2009, her book ‘Piercing the Heart- Untold Stories of 26/11’ was published. She has written for a number of leading national and international publications. She tweets at @Simransodhi9

• Twitter
• LinkedIn
• Instagram
• WordPress

By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

South Asia with 25% of the world’s population with 2.04 billion and comprising India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan with per capita GDP of just US$ 2691.6 in 2024, is amongst the poorer regions of the world, though faring better than the African sub-regions. Western & Central Africa had per capita GDP of US$ 1284.20 last year. Per capita GDP of the ASEAN nations were US$ 5814 in 2024 and Central Asian nations had per capita GDP of US$ 5900 the same year.

Viswathika Gayathri’s famous quote “Poverty is the root cause of all evil” pretty much holds true as it explains why Western & Central Africa and South Asia periodically see unrest and uncertainty. These regions are perpetually mired in turbulence and turmoil with poverty being the root cause. For poverty gives rise to communalism, unrest and uncertainty.

In 2024, 75.6% of the population residing in South Asia lived below the poverty line on less than US$ 6.85 a day whilst 10.5% of the South Asian populations was mired in extreme poverty who lived on less than US$ 3 per day. Last year, the Western & Central African regions saw 35.7% of the population in extreme poverty. In 2024, Though the ASEAN nations had 10.8% of the population below the poverty line but no one lived below the extreme poverty line.

But amongst these regions in general and South Asia in specific, stands out India which despite not being a rich or developed nation has seen resilience and resoluteness in her pursuit for progress and prosperity. From mortgaging gold in 1991, today India is the world’s fourth largest economy.

India, a land of Unity in Diversity with a bouquet of 89 major and minor religions and 122 major languages and 1599 other languages that are spoken across the length and breadth of the country, has always seen peaceful transition of power and no national uprisings that have turned violent.

Be it the Taliban 2.0 seizing power by force in August 2021 or the dramatic Sri Lankan government change in July 2022 or the violent protests that shook Pakistan in May 2023 or the mayhem that seized Bangladesh in August 2024 or the massive student protests in Nepal in September 2025, India has never seen such chaos and mayhem and will never see in future too.

Three issues that have played a pivotal role in India standing strong as South Asia remains engulfed in chaos and confusion, are India’s well-written constitution, India’s independent judiciary and India’s apolitical and secular armed forces.

A good constitution is quintessential for a just and democratic society which sets the fundamental rules for governance, protects citizens’ rights, establishes a system of checks and balances to prevent abuse of power and fosters social cohesion.

The Indian Constitution adopted on November 26, 1949 and enacted on January 26, 1950 established India as a sovereign, socialist, secular, democratic republic with a federal parliamentary structure and parliamentary system of government. It outlines the framework for the government’s powers, duties, procedures as well as the fundamental rights and duties of citizens.

Certain features of the Indian Constitution are so integral to its functioning and existence that they can never be changed. This is also known as the Basic Structure Doctrine. This has ensured that the basic framework and foundation of the Indian Constitution can never be changed.

Pakistan since its creation in 1947 has seen three constitutions in 1956, 1962 and 1973. Nepal has seen seven constitutions in the last 77 years – 1948, 1951, 1959, 1962, 1990, 2007 and 2015.

Since gaining independence in 1948, Sri Lanka has seen three constitutions in 1948, 1972 and 1978. Afghanistan has seen eight constitutions in the last 102 years – 1923, 1931, 1964, 1987, 1990, 2004 and no formal constitution since 2021 as the Taliban government follows the Sharia law.

Clearly, the Indian Constitution has been so well-written that it has withstood the test of time. Whenever, any situation has risen which could shake the foundations of India, the Constitution has in-built features that have kept India united and strong.

The next issue that has kept India strong and united is India’s independent judiciary. The judiciary in India is composed of the Supreme Court at the top of the pyramidical justice system, followed by the state High Courts and then various subordinate courts, forming a hierarchal structure to administer justice and interpret law. The Indian judiciary functions as an independent guardian of the Indian Constitution and people’s fundamental rights.

The Indian judiciary has ensured that justice is dispensed within the framework of the Indian Constitution and various laws in force. However, a point of concern that needs mentioning is how some individuals tarnish and taint the Indian judiciary when judgements aren’t given as per their expectations. But when judgements are given as per their expectations then these very individuals praise the Indian judiciary. A classic case of never being graceful and gracious when things don’t turn out as per one’s desires.

These very people who criticize and condemn the Indian judiciary by often stating that there are over 51 million cases pending in the Indian courts, will never highlight that the number of Judges in India is only 21 per million as compared to 150 per million in the USA and 100 per million in the United Kingdom. They also never bring out that India has only 158 police personnel per million population as compared to 271 police personnel in the USA and 2400 police personnel in the United Kingdom per million population. The United Nation’s recommended strength of police personnel for every million population is 222.

In the Indian High Court, the average pendency for a court case is 3-5 years, whereas for the United Kingdom High Court it is 3-4 months and for the US High Court is just 2-4 months.

Needless to say, that swift justice in a very less time frame is directly proportional to the number of judges and police personnel.

The Indian judiciary has always upheld the Indian Constitution and the various laws and has never succumbed to fear or favour. The miniscule aberrations have been dealt very severely by the Collegium system that is existing in the Indian Supreme Court and the Indian High Courts.

The third pivot that has been instrumental in India’s rise compared to the other South Asian nations, is the Indian Armed Forces comprising the Indian Army, Indian Navy and Indian Air Force which are apolitical and secular.

The Indian Armed Forces unlike most militaries in the South Asian nations, have kept itself apolitical and secular. Be it a man-made tragedy or a natural disaster, the Indians have supreme confidence in the Indian Armed Forces and in every task assigned to the Indian Armed Forces by the political leadership of the time, the Indian Armed Forces has come out with flying colours.

The Indian Armed Forces have never seized power as most South Asian nations have this troubled history. This has ensured that India has always had political leadership at the helm of affairs and the path for peace and prosperity has been followed. For, the political leadership is best suited to govern the nation than its military.

Pakistan has been under military rule thrice from 1958-1971, 1977-1988 and 1999-2008. It is well known that the Pakistan Army even when not in political power, governs the nation from the shadows.

Bangladesh since its independence has seen 29 military coups and has seen military rule during the periods 1975-1981 and 1982-1990.

India has neither seen any period of military rule nor any attempted military coup. The Indian Armed Forces have only focussed on the defence of India from external aggressions and internal disorders.

Those who call for Indian Armed Forces to get political or mock its secular credentials, should look at the state Pakistan and Bangladesh are in today because of their militaries being political and communal.

As South Asia is deeply mired in uncertainties and is slipping, India stands strong with her well-written constitution, independent judiciary and apolitical & secular armed forces being the three major pivots.

There is no nation in South Asia, except India, which in the last eight decades has seen a democracy with the same constitution down the years, independent judiciary that has performed without and fear or favour and no military coups or military rule.

The well-written constitution, independent judiciary and apolitical & secular armed forces are India’s main pivots. Any attempt to tinker with these three pivots or even one of them, will prove detrimental for India.

About the Author

Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd) is the Founder-Editor, Global Strategic & Defence News and has authored the book “China’s War Clouds: The Great Chinese Checkmate”. He tweets at @JassiSodhi24.

• Twitter
• LinkedIn
• Instagram
• WordPress