By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN
Introduction
The dramatic deterioration in relations between Pakistan and the Afghan Taliban marks one of the most consequential geopolitical reversals in South Asia in recent decades. Once perceived as strategic allies bound by ideological affinity and convergent interests against external actors, Islamabad and Kabul now find themselves locked in escalating hostility that borders on open conflict. The transformation is striking: Pakistan, long accused of nurturing and sheltering the Taliban during the U.S.-led intervention in Afghanistan, is today conducting cross-border strikes against targets inside Afghan territory. Meanwhile, the Taliban regime in Kabul resists Pakistani pressure, asserts sovereignty over contested border regions, and deepens diplomatic outreach beyond Islamabad’s traditional sphere of influence.
This rupture is not a sudden rupture but the culmination of structural contradictions embedded in Pakistan’s long-standing “strategic depth” doctrine. For decades, Pakistan’s military establishment viewed a friendly regime in Kabul as essential to offset India’s influence and secure its western flank. The Taliban’s return to power in August 2021 was therefore initially welcomed in Islamabad as a geopolitical dividend. Yet the outcome has proved far more complex. Instead of subservience, the Taliban have pursued autonomy; instead of stability, Pakistan faces intensified attacks from the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). What was once considered a strategic asset has evolved into a multidimensional liability.
Understanding this shift requires unpacking three interconnected dynamics: the Durand Line dispute, the resurgence of the TTP, and the Taliban’s recalibrated foreign policy, particularly its cautious outreach to India and regional powers. Together, these factors illuminate why former allies are drifting toward confrontation and what this means for the broader regional order.
Historical Foundations: Strategic Depth and Its Miscalculations
Pakistan’s Afghanistan policy since the late 1970s has been deeply shaped by two enduring strategic anxieties: its rivalry with India and its fear of encirclement. Within the Pakistani military establishment, particularly the General Headquarters (GHQ) in Rawalpindi, Afghanistan was never viewed merely as a neighbouring state; it was seen as a critical buffer space. The concept of “strategic depth” emerged from this worldview — the belief that a friendly or compliant government in Kabul would provide Pakistan with rear security in the event of a conventional war with India and prevent New Delhi from gaining a foothold on Pakistan’s western flank. This thinking crystallized during the anti-Soviet jihad (1979–1989). When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan became the frontline state for the U.S.-led effort to arm and fund Afghan mujahideen factions. With financial and military support from the United States and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) played a central role in selecting, training, and equipping Islamist groups fighting Soviet forces. This period institutionalized Pakistan’s influence networks within Afghanistan and reinforced the belief that militant proxies could serve long-term strategic objectives.
After the Soviet withdrawal and the collapse of Afghanistan into civil war, Pakistan backed factions it believed would secure its interests. When the Taliban emerged in the mid-1990s under Mullah Mohammad Omar, promising order amid chaos, Islamabad quickly recognized their potential utility. In 1997, Pakistan formally recognized the Taliban regime, becoming one of only three countries to do so, alongside Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The Taliban’s ideological conservatism was less important to Islamabad than their geopolitical orientation: they were perceived as anti-India, anti-Iran (at the time), and dependent on Pakistani logistical and diplomatic support.
During the Taliban’s first rule (1996–2001), Islamabad believed its strategic objectives were largely being met. India’s diplomatic presence in Afghanistan was eliminated, and Pakistan enjoyed considerable influence in Kabul’s political and security circles. The expectation was that this alignment would translate into long-term stability along the western border and suppress Pashtun nationalist claims that historically challenged Pakistan’s control over its frontier regions. The events of 9/11 fundamentally disrupted this equation. After the United States launched its military intervention in Afghanistan in October 2001, Pakistan officially aligned itself with Washington as a key non-NATO ally in the “War on Terror.” However, this alignment was layered with strategic ambiguity. While Pakistan cooperated with U.S. counterterrorism efforts and received billions in military and economic aid, it was widely accused of maintaining selective tolerance for Afghan Taliban elements operating from its territory. This dual-track policy was rooted in long-term calculations: Pakistan feared that the eventual U.S. withdrawal would leave behind a power vacuum, and it sought to retain leverage over any future political settlement in Kabul.
Over two decades of conflict, the Afghan Taliban reorganized and regrouped, benefiting from sanctuary networks and cross-border tribal linkages. Meanwhile, Pakistan’s own security landscape became increasingly volatile with the rise of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a militant umbrella organization formed in 2007. Unlike the Afghan Taliban, the TTP directed its violence against the Pakistani state itself. Nevertheless, Islamabad continued to differentiate between “good” and “bad” Taliban, maintaining that the Afghan Taliban were strategically useful while the TTP posed an existential threat.
When the Taliban regained control of Kabul in August 2021 following the U.S. withdrawal under the Doha Agreement, Pakistan’s leadership initially viewed the development as a strategic vindication. Statements from senior Pakistani officials suggested a sense of triumph, interpreting the Taliban’s return as the collapse of Indian influence and Western presence in Afghanistan. There was a widespread expectation within Pakistan’s security establishment that the new Taliban regime would prioritize Islamabad’s concerns, particularly by curbing TTP activities and recognizing the Durand Line as the official border.
However, these assumptions underestimated two structural realities. First, the Taliban, despite years of external support, are fundamentally rooted in Afghan nationalism. Their leadership has consistently resisted the perception of being Pakistan’s proxy. Domestic legitimacy within Afghanistan requires demonstrating independence from foreign influence — especially from Pakistan, which many Afghans historically view with suspicion. As a result, the Taliban have been reluctant to concede on politically sensitive issues such as border recognition or decisive military action against the TTP. Second, the Taliban’s victory in 2021 had a powerful symbolic impact across militant networks in the region. The success of an insurgent movement in expelling a superpower emboldened ideologically aligned groups, including the TTP. Instead of weakening anti-Pakistan militancy, the Taliban takeover indirectly strengthened it. The TTP found renewed sanctuary and operational space across the porous border, increasing attacks within Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan provinces.
Thus, the strategic depth doctrine began to unravel under the weight of its own contradictions. A policy designed to secure Pakistan’s western frontier instead contributed to internal instability. A regime expected to function as a compliant partner asserted sovereign autonomy. What Islamabad perceived as a geopolitical asset evolved into a complex liability, exposing the limits of proxy-based regional strategy in a transformed post-American Afghanistan.
Border Faultlines: The Durand Line and Escalating Military Tensions
At the heart of current tensions lies the unresolved status of the Durand Line, the 2,640-kilometre boundary demarcated in 1893 between British India and Afghanistan. Pakistan regards the Durand Line as the legitimate international border, inherited under international law after 1947. Afghanistan, however, has historically disputed its legitimacy, arguing that it divided Pashtun tribal lands without proper consent. No Afghan government—monarchist, republican, or Taliban—has formally recognized the border. Pakistan’s attempt to fence the entire border accelerated after 2017 to curb cross-border militancy. The project, involving hundreds of checkpoints and surveillance installations, was framed as a security necessity. Yet Taliban fighters have repeatedly dismantled fencing segments, declaring them illegal encroachments.
Since 2022, border clashes have intensified in regions such as Torkham, Chaman, Spin Boldak, and Kunar. Artillery exchanges, closure of trade crossings, and civilian displacement have become recurring features. These incidents signify more than tactical disagreements; they reflect a clash between Pakistan’s security-driven border consolidation and the Taliban’s refusal to legitimize colonial-era demarcations. The border question also carries symbolic weight. For the Taliban, acquiescing to Pakistani demands risks undermining domestic legitimacy among Pashtun constituencies. For Pakistan’s military establishment, failing to assert control undermines state authority and emboldens insurgents. Thus, the Durand Line dispute has transformed into a litmus test of sovereignty and power projection.
The TTP Challenge: Blowback and the Security Dilemma
The most immediate catalyst for hostility is the resurgence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Formed in 2007, the TTP seeks to overthrow the Pakistani state and impose its version of Sharia law. It was responsible for some of the deadliest attacks in Pakistan’s history, including the 2014 Army Public School massacre in Peshawar.
Following Pakistan’s military operations—Zarb-e-Azb (2014) and Radd-ul-Fasaad (2017)—many TTP militants fled into Afghanistan. Islamabad expected that the Taliban’s return to power would result in decisive action against these elements. Instead, the Taliban have adopted a cautious approach. While occasionally facilitating talks between Islamabad and the TTP, they have resisted direct confrontation, viewing the group as ideological brethren and fellow jihad veterans. A temporary ceasefire brokered in 2021 collapsed in late 2022. Since then, TTP attacks have surged, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Balochistan. Pakistani officials accuse the Afghan Taliban of providing sanctuary and logistical support. Kabul denies these claims, insisting that Pakistan’s security issues are internal matters. In response, Pakistan has conducted airstrikes targeting suspected TTP hideouts inside Afghan territory, including in provinces such as Khost and Paktika. These strikes have killed militants but also civilians, provoking sharp condemnation from Kabul. The Taliban government has warned of retaliation and characterized the strikes as violations of sovereignty.
This dynamic exemplifies classic blowback: policies designed to cultivate militant proxies for external leverage have generated internal insecurity. Pakistan now confronts a security dilemma where coercion risks escalation, but restraint enables militant consolidation.
The India Factor and Regional Realignments
One of the most significant shifts complicating Pakistan–Taliban relations is the Taliban’s evolving approach toward India. Historically, India opposed the Taliban during their first regime (1996–2001) and supported the Northern Alliance. During the U.S.-backed Afghan Republic (2001–2021), New Delhi invested over $3 billion in infrastructure, development projects, the Afghan Parliament building, the Salma Dam (Afghan-India Friendship Dam), and capacity-building initiatives. For Pakistan, India’s growing footprint in Afghanistan was viewed through a zero-sum lens — as strategic encirclement. Islamabad’s support for the Taliban was partly driven by the objective of eliminating Indian influence from Afghan soil. However, after the Taliban’s return to power in 2021, India adopted a pragmatic recalibration rather than confrontation. It reopened channels of communication, resumed humanitarian assistance (including wheat shipments and medical aid), allowed limited diplomatic presence in Kabul, and engaged Taliban representatives in Doha and Afghanistan. The Taliban, seeking international legitimacy, economic relief, and political recognition, responded cautiously but positively. High-level engagements and the gradual normalization of contact indicate that both sides are willing to compartmentalize past hostilities in pursuit of present interests. For Pakistan, this development is strategically unsettling because it weakens the very premise of “strategic depth” — the assumption that a Taliban-led Afghanistan would automatically align against India.
Beyond India, the Taliban have pursued a broader strategy of regional diversification. They have engaged China on economic cooperation and the possible extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan, participated in Moscow-led regional dialogues, maintained working relations with Iran despite border and water disputes, and strengthened ties with Qatar and Central Asian republics. China’s approach remains cautious and transactional, focused on security assurances against militant spillover and potential mineral investments. Iran, meanwhile, has confronted the Taliban over water-sharing issues related to the Helmand River and refugee flows, demonstrating that Kabul’s assertiveness extends beyond Pakistan. Russia and Central Asian states maintain limited but pragmatic engagement aimed at containing instability. This multipolar outreach reflects the Taliban’s strategic intent to avoid overdependence on any single actor, particularly Pakistan. By expanding diplomatic options, the Taliban enhance their bargaining leverage, assert sovereign independence, and reduce vulnerability to external pressure. For Islamabad, this emerging autonomy challenges long-held assumptions about influence and control, underscoring the limits of proxy-based regional strategy in a rapidly shifting geopolitical environment.
Conclusion
The breakdown in Pakistan–Taliban relations marks a decisive strategic inflection point in South Asia. What Islamabad once considered a geopolitical triumph—the return of the Taliban to Kabul—has evolved into a complex security and diplomatic liability. The foundational logic of “strategic depth” has collided with Afghan nationalist assertion, the Durand Line dispute, and the resurgence of the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Instead of ensuring a compliant western flank, Pakistan now faces cross-border militancy, escalating military tensions, and a Taliban leadership unwilling to be perceived as subordinate. Simultaneously, Kabul’s calibrated outreach to India, China, Russia, Iran, and Central Asian states reflects a deliberate attempt to diversify partnerships and enhance strategic autonomy.
This evolving confrontation underscores a broader lesson about proxy politics and regional power management. Influence built on tactical convergence rather than institutional trust is inherently fragile. For Pakistan, sustainable stability will require policy recalibration—strengthening internal security frameworks while institutionalizing diplomatic engagement with Kabul. For the Taliban, long-term legitimacy depends on balancing sovereignty with responsible regional conduct. The trajectory of this strained relationship will not only define bilateral ties but also shape the wider strategic architecture of South Asia in the years ahead.
About the Author
Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.
