By: Prof. ML Meena & Ravi D. Bishnoi
There is a quiet mistake that often shapes how wars are understood. We tend to focus on visible actions like airstrikes, missile launches, naval deployments and we assume that these define the real sense of conflicts. Yet the current Iran-US-Israel confrontation suggests something more complex. What matters is not only what is happening, but where and why real control lies, is more important and grounded. Now, Increasingly, that control is shifting away from the battlefield and into systems that determine how the global economy and security architecture function.
To understand this, one must begin with a grounded geographical observation. This conflict is not being fought to secure a decisive military victory. It is being fought to shape economic, strategic, and psychological conditions in ways that make victory itself uncertain and costly. As Iran’s Supreme Leader himself indicated, “this is the end of the war,” reflecting a strategic approach where conflict is seen as an ongoing process shaped through pressure, endurance and leverage.
This becomes evident when examining the Strait of Hormuz strategic dilemma. Approximately 17-20 million barrels of oil per day pass through this narrow waterway, accounting for nearly one-fifth of global petroleum consumption, according to data from the U.S. Energy Information Administration (EIA). In addition, around 25-30 percent of global liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade, particularly from Qatar, transits through this corridor. Iran has not attempted a full closure of the Strait in the early stage of the war. Instead, it has engaged in intermittent disruption strategies like small naval and fast-attack craft deployments, drone surveillance or selective harassment of commercial vessels. This approach mirrors earlier incidents, such as the 2019 tanker attacks near Fujairah, which triggered immediate spikes in oil prices and insurance costs.
The impact of such disruptions is qualitative and measurable. During previous Gulf tensions, war-risk insurance premiums for tankers rose by 200-300 percent, while Brent crude prices experienced short-term increases of 8-12 percent within days. Even minor incidents have forced shipping companies to reroute or delay cargo, affecting supply chains across Asia and Europe. In this strategic wall, we see clearly that a localized disruption thus generates systemic consequences.
This reveals a fundamental shift. World understood the basic theory means power is no longer defined solely by military superiority in contemporary affray. It is increasingly defined by the ability to manipulate interconnected systems. Iran’s conventional military capabilities remain limited compared to the United States and Israel. However, by leveraging geography and economic interdependence, it has demonstrated an ability to exert influence disproportionate to its military strength. From Iranian military response during the blockade, says that ‘If the security of Iran’s ports… is threatened, no port… will be safe’, is directly shows system-level retaliation logic.
The American response highlights another dimension of this transformation. The United States maintains a so-called significant naval presence in the region, including the U.S. Fifth Fleet based in Bahrain, supported by carrier strike groups and advanced surveillance systems. Despite this, the ability to guarantee uninterrupted maritime flow remains constrained. This limitation is structural, because United States is deeply integrated into the global energy economy. Although it is one of the world’s largest oil producers, global oil prices remain interconnected. A sustained increase of $10-15 per barrel has historically contributed to measurable rises in inflation. For instance, energy price shocks in previous crises have added 0.3-0.5 percentage points to U.S. inflation rates, while also increasing transportation and manufacturing costs.
This creates a geo-strategic paradox. The stronger power must operate with caution to avoid economic blowback, while the weaker power employs disruption to amplify costs. Iran clearly shows that, it does not need to achieve battlefield dominance. Actually, its core objective is to ensure that prolonged engagement becomes economically and politically burdensome for its adversaries.
In this scenario, Israel’s actions introduce a distinct strategic timeline. Its actions are shaped by concerns over Iran’s nuclear capabilities. According to reports from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), Iran has accumulated many kilograms of enriched uranium, including material enriched up to 60 percent purity. While weapons-grade uranium is typically enriched to around 90 percent, the current level significantly reduces the time required to reach that threshold.
This creates what analysts describe as a “breakout window,” potentially measured in weeks rather than months. Israel’s strategy is therefore preventive, aimed at disrupting this trajectory before it reaches an irreversible stage. This explains the frequency and precision of its strikes on nuclear-linked infrastructure and military assets.
However, this forward-leaning approach generates divergence within the broader strategic framework. Now, new idea emerge that the United States seeks to extend indirectly timelines through negotiation and controlled pressure. Second hand, Israel seeks to compress timelines through pre-emptive action. Iran operates between these positions, balancing resistance with calculated escalation.
Here, it is particularly important to understand the nuclear dimension; thus far, the United States and Israel have presented it from a unilateral perspective. The concept of “threshold capability” refers to a state’s ability to assemble a nuclear weapon rapidly without having formally done so. This ambiguity alters deterrence dynamics. It creates a situation where adversaries must respond to potential capability rather than confirmed possession. It is essential to understand the nuclear issue not merely in terms of capability, but also as the discrepancy between the actual situation and the assessment thereof. The concept of threshold capability highlights this very distinction: while the technical capacity exists, the decision and process to convert it into a weapon have not yet been finalized.
In the context of Iran, this distinction has been the subject of the most intense controversy. Various reports have clarified that Iran has enriched uranium to a high level; however, these same reports have also noted that ‘no credible evidence has been found to suggest that Iran is actively pursuing a nuclear weapons program.’ Thus, a clear distinction persists between capability and the actual construction of weapons.
In this same context, U.S. intelligence assessments also warrant attention. Some of reports have repeatedly stated that, since 2003, Iran has not made the decision to restart an organized nuclear weapons program, even as it has continued to develop its technical capabilities. This implies that while the threat is potential, portraying it as an immediate reality is not entirely accurate.
History, too, aids in understanding this distinction. The claims made by the United States prior to the 2003 Iraq War, specifically regarding “Weapons of Mass Destruction’ were subsequently proven to be false. Consequently, the international community today exercises greater caution in accepting any intelligence claims without independent verification. This same prudence is evident in the case of Iran, where technical capability is acknowledged, yet there is no broad consensus regarding the assumption that this capability will be directly converted into a weapon.
Thus, the distinction between ‘capability’ and ‘reality’ is not merely technical, it’s also deep political and layer based strategic. Iran leverages this distinction as a form of strategic equilibrium: it formally maintains a stance of not possessing nuclear weapons, while simultaneously sustaining a deterrent posture through its technical capabilities. This is why, today, the nuclear issue is not focused merely on whether or not a country possesses weapons, but rather on how quickly it can reach that stage, and whether, in fact, it has taken the final step in that direction.
Meanwhile, ceasefires observed in this time, including the Israel–Lebanon front, provide temporary stabilization. However, such pauses often function as operational resets rather than conflict resolution. Historical patterns, including previous Israel-Hezbollah confrontations, indicate that ceasefires frequently precede phases of rearmament and strategic repositioning. This highlights another Geopolitical transformation. In this we see that, Modern conflicts increasingly operate as continuous processes rather than discrete events. Periods of reduced violence often conceal ongoing strategic adjustments. The absence of active combat does not equate to the absence of conflict. Non-state actors further complicate this environment. Hezbollah, for instance, possesses an estimated arsenal of over thousands of rockets and missiles, according to various security assessments. Its operational autonomy introduces unpredictability into the conflict.
Looking ahead, we can discern three potential paths within this broader discourse. The first is negotiation-based stabilisation, which may entail certain interim agreements; however, rather than resolving core disputes, these serve merely to alleviate immediate tensions. Recent behind-the-scenes negotiations, particularly proposals involving partial sanctions relief in exchange for control over uranium stockpiles, point toward this very possibility. Nevertheless, past experiences, specifically the gradual erosion of previous nuclear accords, make it evident that such agreements often serve not as definitive solutions, but rather as a means to buy time.
The second path is controlled confrontation, characterized by periodic escalations in tension followed by strategic pauses. This pattern is clearly discernible in the events of the current month. The temporary ceasefires between the U.S. and Iran, as well as the lull on the Israel-Lebanon front, were not indicative of any permanent resolution; rather, they can be viewed as opportunities for strategic rebalancing. Concurrently, incidents involving the intermittent disruption, and subsequent partial restoration, of oil supplies in the Strait of Hormuz demonstrate that pressure is not being applied continuously, but rather manifests within a specific cycle or pattern. In the coming days, we may observe this conflict unfolding in a rhythmic cadence, marked by a recurring sequence of tension, pauses, signaling and repetition.
The third path is unplanned escalation, which may arise from miscalculation or misinterpretation. In the current climate, this risk is significantly heightened, given that multiple actors are simultaneously active. Drone operations, missile interceptions, and naval maneuvers create a volatile environment where a localized incident could easily be misconstrued as a broader strategic signal. The presence of non-state actors further compounds this complexity, as their actions do not always align with official state policy. In such an atmosphere, the margin for error narrows to a vanishing point.
At present, the second path appears to be the most probable outcome. It affords all parties the opportunity to maintain their strategic positioning without precipitating a decisive confrontation. Upon close examination, the United States appears to be steering clear of total war while simultaneously balancing economic and political pressures. Meanwhile, Israel seeks to maintain limited operations, keeping long-term threats firmly in view. Iran, for its part, will continue to exert pressure by leveraging its geographic and economic position, all while maintaining its stance of strategic ambiguity. Nevertheless, this equilibrium remains exceedingly fragile, contingent upon constant adjustment and restraint.
This situation also gives rise to a profound geopolitical discourse, wherein the essence of power is shifting from direct control to influence, and where the capacity for endurance is becoming more critical than the pursuit of swift victory. A glance back at history reveals that the greatest threats often do not stem from the decisions that are made, but rather emerge from the voids, the spaces where uncertainty, misperception, and structural pressures converge.
We must now consider, if modern conflicts are no longer confined solely to the battlefield, that is, if they are being waged within interconnected systems that impact the entire globe, then who, truly, are the participants in this war? Is this merely a conflict between states, or have global economies and civil societies also unwittingly become stakeholders? And if disruption itself becomes the very instrument of power, then the real question ceases to be, who wins the war? and instead becomes, how much instability can the international order withstand before it begins to transform itself?
