All is not well along India’s eastern seaboard – The Bay Of Bengal. The political reshuffle in Dhaka during August last year, marked by the sidelining of Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, many opine bore the unmistakable fingerprints of American strategic orchestration. The rapid elevation of Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus as Chief Adviser to Bangladesh’s interim government only reinforced the perception of external influence, particularly given Yunus’ long-standing proximity to U.S. policymakers.
This arrangement, however, strayed from constitutional norms. Bangladesh’s caretaker governance mechanism mandates the appointment of a former Supreme Court judge, not a civilian appointee with no judicial standing. Yet, the Bangladeshi military extended its institutional endorsement, raising further eyebrows. Yunus’ subsequent trip to Washington, accompanied by the student leader who had spearheaded the anti-Hasina agitation, and his reported interactions with figures such as Bill Clinton, and possibly even President Joe Biden, lent credence to the view that the U.S. deep state was closely managing the transition.
From New Delhi’s standpoint, Yunus’ early public remarks and the positions taken by his advisers have exhibited a troubling shift away from the traditionally cooperative posture towards India. Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri’s recent visit to Dhaka, during which he engaged with Yunus, was likely a signal of Indian concerns being conveyed at the highest levels.
The geopolitical recalibration became even more evident when Yunus travelled to Beijing and met with Chinese President Xi Jinping.
At a business forum, he provocatively stated,
“The seven sisters of India are landlocked—they have no way to reach the ocean. We are the only guardian of the ocean for all of this region. From Bangladesh, you can go anywhere you want. The ocean is in our backyard.”
Such a statement either betrays a profound lack of geographical and strategic comprehension or is a deliberate attempt to recast the regional maritime narrative. With over 7,500 km of coastline – 6,100 km on the eastern seaboard alone – and a formidable naval presence including two operational SSBNs (with a third on the horizon), India remains the preeminent maritime power in the Bay of Bengal. To imagine Bangladesh as the “guardian of the ocean” is a gross misreading of regional naval realities.
Moreover, India and Bangladesh share deep military-to-military linkages. The two navies engage in regular joint exercises, and a significant number of Bangladeshi officers continue to receive training in Indian institutions, promoting professional camaraderie and interoperability.
Yunus’ overtures to Chinese investors, therefore, are not only diplomatically provocative but also geopolitically puzzling – particularly for someone viewed as a U.S.-endorsed transitional figure. Notably, his China visit coincided with that of two senior U.S. generals to Bangladesh, while the Bangladeshi Army Chief, General Waker-Uz-Zaman, also made a visit to Beijing soon after Yunus’ return.
In the final months of her tenure, Sheikh Hasina had publicly stated that Washington had expressed interest in accessing St. Martin’s Island, a strategic outpost merely 9 km from the Cox’s Bazar-Teknaf peninsula and 8 km from the Myanmar coastline. Her decision to deny this request possibly contributed to the erosion of U.S. support.
The situation in Myanmar, with its spiraling internal instability and Beijing’s expanding influence, continues to draw intense scrutiny from Washington. In parallel, China’s growing footprint in Bangladesh through political, economic, and now military inroads is creating a complex matrix of alignments that New Delhi must monitor closely.
Strategic Realignments in the Bay of Bengal
India’s eastern flank is entering a period of renewed turbulence and countering the evolving theater will require strategic clarity, enhanced regional diplomacy, and robust maritime preparedness to ensure that the Bay of Bengal does not become an arena for great power contestation at the expense of regional stability.
The Bay of Bengal remains the last major quadrant of the Indian Ocean where the United States does not maintain a direct physical military presence – a strategic void that is becoming increasingly consequential.
Against this backdrop, the Biden administration had earmarked $167 million for Myanmar, including $75 million for cross-border humanitarian assistance. Of this, $25 million was allocated for non-lethal aid to ethnic armed organizations, signaling a renewed American interest in the unfolding dynamics along the Indo-Myanmar frontier.
China, for its part, has entrenched itself deeply in Myanmar’s strategic calculus. Beijing continues to support the ruling junta while simultaneously maintaining covert ties with several ethnic armed groups operating along its border. This dual strategy is driven by the imperative to secure the energy and logistics corridor running from Kyaukphyu port to Kunming. The Kyaukphyu deep-sea port, developed by China under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is a critical node for offloading Saudi and Iranian crude, which is then transported inland via pipelines. This corridor offers China a vital alternative to the congested and potentially vulnerable Malacca Strait, reducing its exposure to U.S. naval interdiction in a crisis scenario.
To balance Chinese influence and maintain equidistance between its two powerful neighbors, the Myanmar government awarded the development and operational contract of the Sittwe Port to India’s Inland Waterways and Port Logistics (IPGL). This port is a cornerstone of the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, aimed at enhancing connectivity between India’s Northeast and the Bay of Bengal, bypassing dependence on transit through Bangladesh. Once fully operational, this corridor could integrate India’s landlocked northeastern states with the economies of Southeast Asia – Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam – ultimately linking into the Pacific via the South China Sea.
Meanwhile, Bangladesh remains another critical node in this Indo-Pacific jigsaw. China has made significant inroads in Dhaka, emerging as the country’s largest import partner and a key defense supplier. Eleven major Chinese infrastructure projects are currently underway, many falling under the ambit of the BRI. These ventures are said to support over 55,000 Bangladeshi jobs, cementing Beijing’s economic leverage. Reports have previously surfaced suggesting Chinese proposals for regular People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) deployments from Bangladeshi ports. However, under Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina, such proposals were firmly declined, likely to avoid transforming the Bay of Bengal into another theater of major power rivalry.
The U.S., too, has been assertive in re-engaging the region, spurred by concerns over China’s deepening presence in both Myanmar and Bangladesh. The situation in Rakhine State has become increasingly complex. The Arakan Army now controls vast swathes of the region, including almost the entire border with Bangladesh—barring the crucial ports of Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. Their ascendancy has triggered serious humanitarian concerns, including reported atrocities against the Rohingya population. These developments have strategic implications for both New Delhi and Washington, given the proximity to the Indian border and the refugee pressure it could intensify.
President Trump’s suspension of USAID funding, which had been supporting basic food and medical relief for Burmese refugees in India, Bangladesh, and Thailand, has created a dangerous vacuum. The withdrawal of this lifeline raises the specter of worsening malnutrition, disease, and potential radicalization.
Compounding these concerns is the emerging role of Muhammad Yunus. Reports suggest that the interim Bangladeshi leadership under Yunus is considering inviting Chinese investment for the development of Mongla Port, a project previously awarded to India during the Hasina administration.
Even more concerning are reports of overtures made to Pakistan to develop an airbase at Lalmonirhat, near India’s vulnerable Siliguri Corridor (Chicken’s Neck). The strategic consequences of such developments could be profound, destabilizing the delicate regional equilibrium and inviting external power projection into a sensitive tri-junction of South Asia.
As geopolitical currents intensify, Myanmar, Bangladesh, and the littoral infrastructure surrounding this basin are becoming central to great-power rivalries playing out far beyond South Asia’s traditional spheres.
The Biden administration’s $167 million assistance package for Myanmar, of which $75 million was allocated for cross-border humanitarian aid and $25 million for non-lethal support to ethnic armed organizations, reflects Washington’s attempt to remain engaged in a region dominated by Chinese infrastructure and influence. Yet, American presence remains symbolic, more diplomatic than decisive, especially in the face of expanding Chinese economic and military footprints.
China’s Strategic Dualism in Myanmar
China’s engagement in Myanmar is layered with tactical ambiguity. On one hand, Beijing continues to support the ruling military junta; on the other, it nurtures ties with several ethnic armed groups. This dual policy is not ideological, it is logistical.
At the heart of this balancing act lies the strategic port of Kyaukphyu, developed by China as part of its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Crude oil from the Gulf, particularly Saudi and Iranian supplies, is offloaded here before being transported through pipelines across Myanmar into China’s Yunnan province, terminating at the Kunming refinery. This overland corridor serves as a vital alternative to the Malacca Strait, which, in times of military tension with the U.S., remains vulnerable to naval blockades or chokepoint disruptions.
To ensure the corridor’s stability, Beijing has also backed rebel groups near its borders, using influence and funding to prevent any disruption to the oil pipeline. This delicate arrangement secures Chinese energy flows and deepens its long-term economic entrenchment in Myanmar.
India’s Counterbalance: Sittwe and Kaladan
In an effort to maintain a balance of power between China and India, Myanmar awarded India’s Inland Waterways and Port Logistics (IPGL) the development and operational contract of Sittwe Port. Strategically located, the port is a crucial node in the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Project, which aims to provide India’s landlocked Northeastern states with a direct corridor to the Bay of Bengal, bypassing Bangladesh entirely.
More importantly, once fully functional, this corridor will enable India to connect its Northeast with Thailand, Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam, offering access to the broader ASEAN region and the Pacific via the South China Sea. It is both a connectivity lifeline and a geopolitical statement.
Bangladesh
Bangladesh, meanwhile, sits at the center of this evolving strategic triangle. China has invested heavily in its infrastructure and defense capabilities, with 11 ongoing projects under the BRI. It has become Dhaka’s largest import partner, and Chinese ventures now support over 55,000 local jobs.
While there were reports that the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) had sought to operate from Bangladeshi ports, the Sheikh Hasina government rejected such proposals. The intent was clear: Dhaka sought to avoid transforming the Bay of Bengal into a battleground of major power rivalries.
The U.S., concerned about China’s increasing maritime influence and entrenched leverage in both Bangladesh and Myanmar, has also tried to remain engaged, though largely through diplomatic and humanitarian channels.
The Arakan Army and the Rakhine Flashpoint
Recent developments in Myanmar’s Rakhine State have further destabilized the region. The Arakan Army, a powerful ethnic armed group, has reportedly taken control of large swathes of territory along the Bangladesh border, excluding only the crucial ports of Sittwe and Kyaukphyu. Their growing influence has intensified fears of human rights abuses, especially against the persecuted Rohingya population, who now face yet another round of displacement and violence.
The Last Bit
With competing corridors, contested ports, and fluid allegiances, the Bay of Bengal is fast emerging as a maritime pressure point.
The intersection of U.S., Chinese, and Indian interests – overlaid with regional instability and shifting leadership in Bangladesh and Myanmar – necessitates vigilant monitoring. For India, securing the eastern seaboard and safeguarding its maritime and continental flanks will be central to sustaining strategic dominance in the Indo-Pacific.
In this unfolding contest, Myanmar and Bangladesh will remain the geopolitical swing states. What they choose – or are forced – to become, may well decide the future balance of power in the Indo-Pacific.
