By: Lt Col JS Sodhi (Retd), Editor, GSDN

Robert Atkins famous quote “Don’t fix what’s not broken” has a deep meaning when Israel’s military might is compared between the period 1948-2014 when the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) was the finest professional military in the world, to the decade 2015-2025 in which Israel had to end its wars with Hamas and Hezbollah with ceasefires that lead to the resignation of the IDF’s Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi and its Southern Army Commander Major General Yaron Finkleman on January 21, 2025 clearly indicating defeat for the IDF.

Background of the IDF

After David Ben-Gurion proclaimed the Israeli Declaration of Independence on May 14, 1948, the first order he passed was the formation of the IDF. The IDF on formation comprised of personnel who had served in the Haganah and the Palmach.

Haganah which was founded in 1920 was the main Zionist paramilitary organisation that operated for the Yishuv (the Jewish settlements) in the British Mandate for Palestine, protecting the Jewish from the attacks by the Arabs.

Palmach, which was founded in May 1941 was the elite strike force of Haganah, capable of operations on land, sea and air that was the secretive and underground, too worked for Yishuv, comprised 2000 personnel.

Both Haganah and Palmach were disbanded on May 26, 1948 when the IDF was officially raised and all the personnel of Haganah and Palmach were absorbed in the IDF.

In the first war that Israel fought immediately after its independence, it was confronted with a four-front attack waged by Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan backed by Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The invading armies of the Arabs had 270 tanks, 150 field guns and 300 aircraft despite an over-whelming numerical superiority, as compared to just three tanks and no aircrafts that the IDF had then.

By the time the 1949 Armistice Agreements were signed between Israel and the warring Arab nations on different days that year, Israel emerged victorious though losing the Gaza Strip to Egypt and the West Bank to Jordan including East Jerusalem.

On July 20, 1949 after the last of the armistice agreements was signed between Israel and Syria, the IDF despite numerous shortages and handicaps, had won the War of Independence for Israel and thereafter the IDF grew from strength to strength in the next nearly-seven decades, to being reckoned as the finest professional military in the world.

The pole position for the IDF amongst the professional global militaries came after immense trials, tribulations, basing their doctrines on sound military foundations and above all, the immense war experience that the IDF gained through numerous wars, conflicts and skirmishes that the IDF was baptised in, soon after its formation in 1948.

In the subsequent three multi-front wars that Israel fought in 1956, 1967 and 1973, the IDF always emerged victorious and managed to take back the Gaza Strip, West Bank and the Sinai Peninsula.

The numerous special missions carried out by the IDF,  be it the “Operation Wrath of God” in 1972 to revenge the killing of the Israeli athletes participating in 1972 Munich Olympics or the successful Raid on Entebbe codenamed “Operation Thunderbolt” launched on July 03-04, 1976 to rescue 104 hostages hijacked onboard an Air France flight between Tel Aviv and Paris, which was diverted to Entebbe International Airport, Uganda, cemented IDF’s position as the finest professional military in the world.

After Hezbollah was formed in Lebanon in 1985 and the Hamas in 1987, the IDF found itself involved in wars with both these organisations in the last 18 years.

After Hamas started administering the Gaza Strip in 2007 which is located on Israel’s southern border, Israel has attacked the Gaza Strip five times in 2008, 2012, 2014, 2021 and 2023. But each time Israel had to end its war with Hamas with ceasefires, the last of which being in January 2025.

On Israel’s northern border too, the IDF had to end its war on the Hezbollah in Lebanon in 2006 and 2024 with a ceasefire.

Despite the IDF ending its wars with the Hamas in 2008, 2012 and 2014 and with Hezbollah in 2006 with ceasefires, it took a decision in 2015 that would have far reaching consequences on the credibility of the IDF as the world’s finest fighting force.

For, it was in the year 2015 that the Israeli political and military leadership agreed for the implementation of the Gideon Multi-Year Plan (GMYP) for restructuring the IDF in a massive way that would affect the structure, doctrine and war-fighting priorities of the IDF, with the hope of transforming the IDF into a modern, lean and more combat-effective force. Various implications of the GYMP have been discussed by the Author in his recent article.

As Israel’s 2023-2025 war with Hamas and the 2024 war with Hezbollah will prove, the GMYP proved to a blunder and with both the adversaries, Israel had to end the war on a ceasefire, which eventually led to the resignation of IDF’s two senior-most officers.

The Gideon Multi-Year Plan

In October 2015, the Israel Defence Forces Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Gadi Eisenkot while announcing the GMYP in a press conference, stated it as an extensive five-year modernisation effort that would give the IDF a “completely new look in 2020”.

The salient points of the GMYP that would totally transform the IDF for futuristic combat that disregarded a conventional war scenario, encompassed the following –

• Vast reduction in manpower and training doctrines

• Establishing cyber and signal intelligence wings

• Reduce artillery and armoured brigades

• Replacing the Division as the cutting-edge combat fighting force by Integrated Battle Groups

• Achieve cost-cutting in the defence budget

GMYP proved to be a blunder as the above measures failed miserably as has been analysed in detail by the Author in his recent article.

Tnufa

Consequent to the success of implementation of the GMYP in the stipulated five-year period, the IDF Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Aviv Kochavi on February 13, 2020 announced a new multi-year plan called “Tnufa” which is a Hebrew word meaning “Momentum” in English.

Tnufa envisioned harnessing latest technologies to infuse the most effective firepower to the frontline combat units. The emphasis was on short and swift operations to deal with organisations like the Hamas and Hezbollah, as conventional war threats no longer figured in the IDF discussions and deliberations. Tnufa also revolved around abandoning the historical proclivity of the IDF for offensive operations.

In essence, the IDF had decided to have a defensive mindset as they felt that they would be dealing only with the likes of Hamas and Hezbollah who were “mere terrorist organisations” as they were devoid of air power, naval power and artillery firepower that a conventional military possesses.

This was a grave blunder that further dented the combat prowess of the IDF affected by GMYP as the mindset and mentality of a nation’s armed forces must always be offensive and long exposures to counter-insurgency and fighting with terror organisation impedes and impacts the preparedness of a nation’s military for a conventional war.

Effect of GMYP and Tnufa in IDF’s recent wars with Hamas & Hezbollah

As the result of the GMYP and Tnufa defence reforms which were touted to be Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) for the IDF that were launched in the decade 2015 onwards, the IDF felt fully confident of tackling any threat that Israel was to ever face.

So much was the confidence of the IDF in the recent RMAs that intelligence reports emanating since 2022 warning of a large-scale attack by Hamas was rubbished on the belief that it was not executable given the immense military superiority that IDF enjoyed. So much so, the 40-page document accessed by the Israeli intelligence officials code-named “Jericho Wall” outlined point by point, the way the Hamas attack would attack Israel. It happened exactly as was outlined in “Jericho Wall” on October 07, 2023 and the IDF was unprepared to defend Israel.

Reduction in manpower, change in training doctrines, reduced combat formations, superior confidence, cost-cutting measures and negating conventional war threats that emanated from GMYP and Tnufa had disastrous consequences on October 07, 2023 when at 6.30 am over a 1000 Hamas personnel invaded Israel and killed over 1200 Israeli citizens and soldiers and took 251 hostages.

The ultra-tech “Iron Wall” created as a consequence to the GMYP whose construction commenced in 2016 and was completed in 2021 was breached at 40 places by Hamas and for 20 minutes till 6.50 am when the IDF’s electromagnetic spectrum was jammed, Hamas personnel created bloodbath and mayhem inside 15 miles of the Israeli territory as the IDF was helpless as its communications were jammed.

The 30-foot-tall border wall on its northern border with Lebanon constructed in 2018 too proved ineffective for the Hezbollah attacks that started on Israel soon after the Hamas attack of 0ctober 07, 2023.

The defensive mindset that had set in the IDF due to GMYP and Tnufa had telling consequences and the ground offensive launched by the IDF in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon started meeting with stiff resistance. The Royal United Services Institute, a reputed think-tank located in London, on October 25, 2024 reported Israel losing the war with Hamas and Hezbollah.

Despite the IDF causing total destruction of the 365-square kilometres Gaza Strip and killing all the top leadership of Hamas including Ismail Haniyeh and Yahya Sinwar and causing immense destruction of southern Lebanon and killing the top leadership of Hezbollah which included Hasan Nasrallah, there was growing discontent by the Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant and senior IDF officers with the Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu over huge reverses being suffered by the IDF on both its northern and southern borders and the reluctance to sign ceasefire with both Hamas and Hezbollah.

Unable to take the losses that the IDF was suffering, Yoav Gallant became a bitter critic of Benjamin Netanyahu and in the midst of the Israeli wars with Hamas and Hezbollah was dismissed as the Defence Minister on November 05, 2024. This was the first clear indication that indeed Israel was losing the wars.

Eventually, Israel ended its wars with a ceasefire with both the Hamas and Hezbollah on January 19, 2025 and November 27, 2024 respectively, which ended the 15-month war with Hamas and the 60-day war with Hezbollah.

The resignation of the Chief of Staff of the IDF, Lieutenant General Herzi Halevi and its Southern Army Commander Major General Yaron Finkleman on January 21, 2025 cemented Israel’s defeat in its war both with Hamas and Hezbollah.

Never before in military history, has a military chief resigned after his nation has won the war. Military chiefs resign after a war only when their nation gets defeated.

Other Reasons for Israel’s Defeat

There are few other reasons that need deliberation which contributed to Israel’s defeat to Hamas and Hezbollah apart from GMYP and Tnufa that have been discussed in detail above.

Political unrest in Israel:     The political unrest that had started in Israel soon after Benjamin Netanyahu announced judicial reforms in January 2023 that sought to curb the Israeli judiciary’s independence, started escalating as they were perceived to be done with the aim of protecting Benjamin Netanyahu who was facing a slew of corruption charges. As the protests escalated, many reservists refused to join active duty in the IDF. As a result, the IDF faced enormous manpower crunch.

Political leadership needs to understand that a nation’s military is made up from the same civil society and any action that is against the constitution or moral-ethics has a consequence for the nation’s defence forces too, as no nation’s army can be isolated and insulated from its civil society, whatever be the curbs and controls imposed on the uniformed personnel.

Hyped ultra-nationalism for Power:           Benjamin Netanyahu by backing the 2018 Nation-State Law which effectively established the Israeli Arabs as second-class citizens, created deep fissures in the Israeli society. Out of the total Israeli population, 21.1% are Israeli Arabs and 73.2% are Jews. Though this hyped ultra nationalism helped Benjamin Netanyahu to be in power, but it wrecked the Israeli society and Israel started witnessing internal discord. A fractured and divided nation is always an easy prey for its enemies.

Conclusion

If Israel regards Hamas and Hezbollah as terrorist organisations, then it needs to study the report on how terrorist groups end published by the RAND Corporation, a highly-credible US global policy think-tank, on June 30, 2008 which highlighted that only 7% of the terrorists’ groups ended by using military force whereas 43% ended through political dialogues, 40% through effective policing and 10% after the objectives of the terrorist organisations had been achieved.

And, if Israel envisions Hamas and Hezbollah as conventional war threats, then the IDF needs a relook at the defence reforms undertaken as a consequence of the Gideon Multi-Year Plan and Tnufa and the Israeli political leadership needs to think on reuniting the Israeli society, whatever religion an Israeli citizen may belong to.