By: Anuraag Khaund
Last month witnessed a flurry of activities and analyses as PM Narendra Modi went for his first summit on 13 February with US President Donald Trump post the latter’s re-election last November. The summit focused on key areas such as trade, economic partnership, defence and technological partnership and cooperation in multilateral fora which were encapsulated in the India- US Joint Statement released in the aftermath of the Summit. Some of the actions outlined in the Statement such as the signing of a new ten-year Framework for US- India Major Defense Partnership in the 21st century and the announcement of initiatives such as the US- India COMPACT (Catalyzing Opportunities for Military Partnership, Accelerated Commerce & Technology), Autonomous Systems Industry Alliance (ASIA) and the US- India TRUST (Transforming the Relationship Utilizing Strategic Technology) among others underscored and reiterated the importance of the partnership with Washington for India’s own strategic ambitions.
Meanwhile, just days before the meeting, the Trump administration targeted the port of Chabahar as part of its ‘maximum pressure’ against Iran. The National Security Presidential Memorandum (NSPM)-2 signed by Trump on 4 February 2025 regarding this matter stipulated the Secretary of State to ‘modify or rescind sanctions waivers, particularly those that provide Iran any degree of economic or financial relief, including those related to Iran’s Chabahar port project’ in a bid to exacerbate the financial and economic pressure on Tehran. The NSPM 2 comes at a time of heightened Indian involvement in the Shahid Behesti terminal of Chabahar with the port playing an important role in furthering Indian interests in Afghanistan and Central Asia. While India has not officially commented on the decision by the Trump administration, yet questions were raised whether PM Modi’s visit to the US and his bonhomie with Trump would work the charm offensive in getting Washington to re-think its perspective on the strategically important port (for India) and provide the same leeway to India on Chabahar as was done during the first Trump administration in 2018.
However, both the above events clubbed together has raised important questions on India’s much touted Strategic Autonomy which has defined New Delhi’s interactions with key geopolitical actors such as US, Russia, China, Europe, Iran, Gulf, and the Israel especially in theatres such as Ukraine and the Middle East.
Strategic Autonomy broadly refers to the ability of a country to take decisions that best serve its interests irrespective of the exertion of pressure from the outside. It is marked by the refusal to take sides with any particular country or bloc and instead seek partnerships and alignment with multiple actors or multiple alignment. Most importantly, in terms of the current geopolitical scenarios, it refers to the exercise of autonomy in seeking benefits from both sides of any conflict without being forced to ally with one against the other. These aspects of strategic autonomy were seen in India’s outreach and maintenance of ties with both the US led West, including Ukraine and Russia at the height of the conflict since 2022 as well as the maintenance of ties with Israel and Iran in the backdrop of the conflict in Gaza since 2023. However, the current ascension of the Trump administration marked by its volatile and often maximalist goals as witnessed in the rescinding of Chabahar and the exhibition of transactionalism in dealing with both friends, allies and foes have raised questions over New Delhi’s ability to maintain its Strategic Autonomy as during the Biden era. Most importantly, in addition to Chabahar other factors too have added to the doubts about the same some of which were seen in the Modi- Trump summit.
Foremost amongst these issues were tariffs, oil and gas purchases and the weapons deal. The announcement of reciprocal tariffs on India while sharing the dais with PM during the press conference as well as the insistence on increasing two-way trade to 500 billion by 2030 through the means of a ‘mutually beneficial, multi-sectoral Bilateral Trade Agreement (BTA)’ which entails India reducing its tariffs and other barriers to increase American access to its markets has raised doubts whether the above might end up serving US interests at the expense of the survival of Indian enterprises. So too has been the Indian decision to import more oil and gas from the US which in the backdrop of continuous American sanctions on New Delhi’s purchase of cheaper Russian and Iranian energy supplies over the years have led to the speculation of the above being an instance of ‘arm-twisting’ by Washington in exchange for defence deals. With regard to the purchase of weaponry and defence acquisitions, the potential sale of F-35 Stealth Fighter Jets to India has raised a flurry of comments ranging from those seeing the offer as elevation of India’s value as a strategic partner in the eyes of US to viewing it as a costly deal with minimal benefits to India. The latter perception got more traction due to the comments from Trump’s close aid Elon Musk labelling the F-35 as the ‘worst military value for money in history’ and its ‘obsoleteness’ in front of new technologies like drone and UAV warfare which has led to questions of whether the deal was aimed more at filling US coffers than in genuinely aiding Indian defence modernisation.
Adding to the above was the issue of the manner of deportation of undocumented Indian immigrants in US military planes and India’s apparent acquiescence and non-objection to the same despite speculations that the issue might have been raised in private conversations with Trump has also raised doubts in some quarters regarding India’s ability to stand up for itself at a time when smaller nations like Columbia and Mexico turned away US military flights carrying deportees hailing from both the countries while stressing for the humane treatment of the same in the face of Trump’s backlash. So too was the Indian decision to pre-emptively reduce tariffs on 30 items originating from the US in a bid to ameliorate Washington compared to Mexico’s announcement of retaliatory tariffs to similar threats emanating from its northern neighbour.
All in all, the commentariat remain divided on the nature of the Modi- Trump Summit and the events preceding the latter with some seeing it as a reflection of India’s strategic flexibility and ‘mission accomplished’ while others questioning it as an instance of New Delhi ‘bending the knee’ to Trumpian pressure. For the purpose of the article, it can be said that there lies uncertainty regarding the extent to which India can exercise its strategic autonomy in the current era with a Trump led USA at the helm of global affairs.
This is none the more evident than in the case of Chabahar as outlined in the beginning of the article. The port’s importance for Indian strategic interests in Central Asia and Afghanistan needs no mention given that it featured prominently in the discussion between Indian Foreign Secretary Vikrant Misri and Acting Taliban Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi in Dubai during January this year. Moreover, the port remains a vital conduit for strengthening Indo- Iranian ties in the backdrop of Tehran’s displeasure at Indian hesitancy to purchase oil in compliance with US sanctions in 2019. Most importantly, Chabahar remains crucial to New Delhi’s plans in countering Chinese influence not only in Iran but also the wider Central and South Asian region especially with regard to the port of Gwadar. In addition, Chabahar also lies at the centre of connectivity projects such as the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) involving India, Iran and Russia which is being touted as a possible alternative to the China led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). All of these explain the massive investment worth 120 million USD and extension of line of credit worth 250 million USD to Iran as well as the handling of the Shahid Behesti terminal by Indian Ports Global Limited (IPGL) in Chabahar which might come to naught in the face of rescinding of waivers.
Any form of retrenchment or reduction of Indian participation in Chabahar would be inimical only for New Delhi but US as well. India’s withdrawal from Chabahar under Trump’s duress would only end up strengthening China’s influence in Iran and push Tehran further into Beijing’s embrace thereby reducing any chance of thaw in the strained US- Iran relations necessary not only for the stalled nuclear talks but also for a stable West Asia. The loss of Chabahar would also affect India’s bargaining position with the Taliban vis-a vis China as in the absence of any alternative, the regime in Kabul would be compelled to fully embrace the BRI, thereby strengthening Beijing’s hand. Not to mention the fillip it would provide to Gwadar and plans to expand the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan and Central Asia thereby deepening Beijing’s influence in the region while undercutting Indian as well as US presence. Such strengthening of Chinese foothold is not conducive to American interests in the above strategic region as Washington seeks to establish a sort of ‘intelligence presence’ in Taliban ruled Afghanistan. However, access to India involved Chabahar could be used by the Trump administration as a leverage with the regime in Kabul.
The repercussions of any possible Indian exit from Chabahar will also be witnessed in ties with Russia. The most immediate impact will be on the INSTC which has witnessed a steady increase in the transit of goods between India and Russia. The removal or non-inclusion of Chabahar would raise questions over the feasibility of the above route which would force member states of the connectivity project especially the Central Asian and Caucasus states to consider joining alternatives such as the Trans Caspian International Trade Route (TITR) also known as the Middle Corridor with China being one of its terminals as well as a major stakeholder, thereby posing a challenge to Russian influence in the above areas. In addition, Indian acquiescence to the threat of sanctions in Chabahar might also compel Moscow to question New Delhi’s ability to maintain its commitments to other connectivity projects such as the Northern Sea Route (NSR) and the Chennai Vladivostok Maritime Corridor in the face of similar US pressure in future. Moreover, any interpretation of India becoming ‘subservient’ to Trump-led USA by Russia would also lead Moscow to re-value its ties with Pakistan as seen in the Russian expression of support for Islamabad’s BRICS membership bid and the launch of international freight train service connecting the port of Karachi with Russia passing through Iran, Turkmenistan, and Kazakhstan thereby posing a direct challenge to Indian ambitions regarding INSTC.
From Washington’s perspective, continued Indian engagement with Russia will prevent the latter from slipping completely into Chinese embrace as speculations abound about Trump’s outreach to Putin as an attempt by the former to drive a wedge in the Moscow- Beijing ‘no limits partnership’. As Trump seeks a quick end to the stalemate in Ukraine, it can ill afford to displease Moscow by having adverse implications on the latter’s interests with other countries such as India. Nor would Trump prefer any jeopardization of Indo- Russian given New Delhi’s potential to act as a mediator between Washington and Moscow, despite the US President’s explicit endorsement of China as ‘a very important player’ who could aid in ‘getting this (Russia-Ukraine) war over’.
Despite the increasing Indo- US alignment, what cannot be overlooked is Trump’s contradictory attitudes towards China. While Beijing continues to be seen as the principal challenger to the US as viewed in the latter’s designation as the ‘biggest threat’ to US by newly elected Secretary of State Marco Rubio, yet Trump’s emphasis on his closeness with and fondness for Chinese President Xi Jinping raises doubts over the preceding sentiment. While it can be brushed off as one among the compliments showered to numerous world leaders by Trump, yet the importance of personality and interpersonal relations in shaping the latter’s attitude and manner of outreach to countries, friend and foe alike, cannot be discounted. Who knows whether his bonhomie with Xi might affect the current US administration’s outlook towards China and even towards ‘major partners’ like India? Such suspicions are not unfounded given the offer for mediation in ending the India- China dispute made by Trump during the joint press conference with Modi while also showering praises on Xi at the same time. Also interesting were the remarks by the Pakistani politician Bilawal Bhutto Zardari on Islamabad’s role to act as a bridge between US (Trump) and China almost a week after the above press conference. This was followed by the release of 397 million USD for the maintenance of F-16 fleet in Pakistan by the same Trump administration which was heavily cutting down on all foreign funding under USAID. Coincidence or something big in the offing involving US, China, and Pakistan?
Most importantly, what should not be overlooked is Trump’s tendency for transactionalism in addressing global conflicts and his tendency to seek a quick end to conflicts without resolving deeper underlying issues. This was made evident in the demand for access to Ukrainian rare minerals as re-payment for the 60 billion USD military ais offered by the US since 2022 and the comments by Pete Hegseth on the ‘unlikelihood’ of the restoration of Ukrainian territories captured by Russia as well as the acknowledgement by Trump regarding the same as Moscow’s leverage over Kyiv. Adding to this is the statement of ‘Ukraine someday becoming a part of Russia’ marking the disregard, even if informally, of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of a country− characteristic of the unpredictability of Trumpism. It won’t be far-fetched to assume that such a scenario would not play out in the event of a Trump led mediation between India and China whereby New Delhi, like Ukraine, would be asked to accept the changed status quo along the LAC forcibly wrought by Beijing since 2020 for the sake of an ‘early end’ to the confrontation. Not to mention the outright threat of tariffs as well as the possibility of ‘arm-twisting’ to increase Indian purchases of US hydrocarbons and weapon systems or demands for allowing unfettered access to the Indian market by American corporate interests at the expense of our domestic civilian as well as defence industries in return for Trump’s continued support which can be snapped off any moment just as in the case of Ukraine or the NATO.
Further bolstering the above scepticism is the importance attached to China and Xi in Trump’s plan for outreach to Russia as well as President Putin which he has reiterated in several forums. Besides Moscow, Beijing’s partnership with Iran and North Korea would also make it a crucial partner in the eyes of Trump as it seeks to find solutions to issues such as the crisis in Middle East, Tehran’s nuclear program and the de-nuclearization of the Korean Peninsula. All these factors combined might make Trump question the ‘indispensability’ of India as a partner over the prospect of ‘quick solutions’ to the aforementioned crises offered by partnership with China. Not to mention the business interests of Musk in China which could further blunt Trump’s policy against Beijing. Taken together, it might not be an overstatement to state the possibility of Washington making peace with Xi regime and leaving the Indo- Pacific and Asia as belonging to the Chinese sphere of influence . All the while, New Delhi would be abandoned to fend for itself in an unstable and constrained near and extended neighbourhood.
As the world braces for a return to the era of ‘stark and naked’ realpolitik, it becomes necessary for India to not only defend but also uphold and enhance its strategic autonomy while strengthening its alignment and partnerships with key players across geographies and spectrums− be it Russia, Iran, Israel, the EU, ASEAN, Gulf, BRICS, NATO− while also maintaining its partnership with the US and communication with China.
As stated by Indian External Affairs Minister Dr S Jaishankar “No country can have a veto on India’s ties” –the maxim applies equally to Washington and other partners of New Delhi.
Because the words of Lord Palmerston ‘We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. Our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow’ still rings true in today’s geopolitical arena as it did back in the 18th century.
About the Author
Anuraag Khaund is pursuing PhD in International Politics from the School of International Studies, Central University of Gujarat. He has published opinion pieces in The Diplomat, Deccan Herald, Kashmir Observer and Modern Diplomacy. His interests include International Relations and Geopolitics with a focus on Eurasia, East, West, South and Southeast Asia. In addition to geopolitics, he also looks at the intersection between civilizational histories and current global politics. The author can be contacted at khaundanuraag@gmail.com
