By: Anuraag Khaund
On October 21 of this year, news came about India and China having reached a possible agreement on patrolling arrangements along the volatile Line of Actual Control (LAC) which has witnessed the armed forces of both the countries engaged in a stalemate since 2020. This announcement by Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri was bolstered by External Affairs Minister (EAM) Dr S Jaishankar’s claim of the situation ‘going back to where it was in 2020…we can say that the disengagement process with China has been completed’. The agreement being alluded to was centered on the friction regarding Demchok and Depsang Plains while the understanding of disengagement in the other two points− Galwan Valley and Pangong Tso− would remain the same as reached in 2022 with the creation of mutually agreed upon buffer zones. The current agreement would entail Indian troops having access to patrol points in the sector of Depsang and Demchok which were blocked since 2020 and the same are being confirmed with the onset of verification patrolling by the Indian Army. In addition, the agreement also entails ‘coordinated patrolling’ between the both the armies to prevent the flaring up of violent face-offs during patrolling while the Chinese troops would be allowed to patrol till the Yangtse sector along the eastern part of the LAC in Arunachal Pradesh which was the site of a major confrontation in 2022.
Most importantly, it should also be noted that the above Sino-Indian disengagement have been endorsed by both PM Modi and President Xi Jinping during their bilateral meet in the sidelines of the recently concluded BRICS Summit in Kazan Russia from 22nd to 24th October. In the bilateral summit, both the leaders welcomed the ‘recent agreement for complete disengagement and resolution of issues’ while emphasizing that ‘stable, predictable, and amicable bilateral relations’ between the two Asian giants were crucial not only for the region, but for the wider world. In addition, both sides asked their respective Special Representatives (SR) on the border issue− National Security Adviser (NSA) Ajit Doval and Foreign Minister Wang Yi− to expedite and carry forward the process of disengagement.
While the agreement has generated enthusiasm or a sense of it in official statements as the thawing of relations which would pave the way for greater engagement, yet there have also been expressions of skepticism and cautious reception of the same. This has especially been regarding the yet unrevealed details of the agreement and the status of the ‘buffer zones’ created because of the earlier disengagement dialogues following the 2020 clash. The fact that the current agreement focused only on Demchok and Depsang sectors without any mention of revision or settlement over the above zones has led to the perception that the latter’s existence would hinder any sort of return to the pre-2020 status. In addition to sketchy details about the agreement released in the public domain, another reason why the agreement hasn’t generated much excitement in policy and strategic circles is the latter’s focus only on ‘disengagement’ which precedes the more important steps of de-escalation and de-induction of troops on the border. While both sides have hailed the current phase of disengagement, there has been no clear signals from any side regarding the steps to be taken for de-escalation and de-induction as of now.
The challenge of de-escalation is further compounded by the lack of trust between the populace of both the sides as well as the systemic and geopolitical challenge posed by China to India’s global ambitions in its immediate and extended neighbourhood which goes beyond the boundary dispute. This sense of mistrust and skepticism was also witnessed in speculations that the talk surrounding the disengagement was designed to provide optics to pave the way for the Modi- Xi Summit as well as providing a convenient cover for New Delhi to continue the unequal but vital trade and economic relationship with Beijing. On the same note, the ‘convenient cover’ also provided justification for India sharing dais as well as having summits with fellow BRICS countries such as China, Russia and Iran− dubbed as the ‘Axis of Evil/ Upheaval’ by Western strategic circles and thinkers.
However, in addition to the above, the LAC disengagement would also have repercussions on two major areas of importance for both India and China− leadership of the Global South and Taiwan. These ramifications might also add to the skepticism and mistrust around the current Sino-Indian ‘thaw’ or ‘rapprochement’.
As the two largest economies and markets of the non-Western world accounting for around 35% of the global population and around 29% of the global GDP, both India and China have aspired for the leadership role of the non-Western world of developing and underdeveloped countries also known as the Global South. However, both sides have held different perceptions of the Global South vis a vis the West− while New Delhi views itself as a ‘Southwestern power’ acting as the bridge between the West and the non-West world; Beijing, on the other hand, sees itself as leading the developing countries of the world in a bid to replace the current Western origin global international system with a new one which is more ‘just and representative’. In addition, as per some quarters, China is not considered by India to be a part of the ‘Global South’ which was reflected in New Delhi’s non-invitation to Beijing to join the Voice of Global South Summit held last year under the aegis of India’s G20 Presidency in 2023 as well as in August this year. But, China has in recent years picked up the narrative of itself being a ‘natural partner of the Global South’ by virtue of being ‘the largest developing country’. This sentiment of Global South leadership has also been echoed in the launch of the three Global Initiatives by China on Development, Security and Civilizational Dialogue.
The link between the Global South and the current LAC disengagement was highlighted in the official readout of the Modi-Xi Summit by the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA). As per the readout, President Xi called upon both the countries to ‘to keep to the trend of history and the right direction of bilateral relations’ given the importance of India and China as ‘time-honored civilizations, large developing countries and important members of the Global South’ with ‘both stand(ing) at a crucial phase of their respective modernization endeavours’. What also adds to the salience of the Global South is the fact that the Summit took place in the sidelines and in the immediate aftermath of the 16th BRICS Summit which in recent years has emerged as an important and crucial platform for advocating the concerns of the Global South on matters such as reform of multilateral and international institutions, just and equitable development and security for all. Any action of goodwill such as ‘taking the initiative’ of promoting peace by mending of long-standing strained ties is bound to attract the attention of all the member states, and by extension, highlight and justify one’s claim of possessing the qualities to lead the non- Western world. It cannot be ruled out that this might have been one of the primary motives underlying the actions on the part of both China and India to seek disengagement at this point of time.
However, what needs closer scrutiny is the way China has shaped the narrative on the disengagement agreement. While lauding the latter as the first step towards heralding peace between two major Asian countries, comments from scholars such as Lin Minwang of ‘China ha(ving) always maintained a positive attitude and hope to improve India- China relations, but India has always set thresholds for border issues’ appears to give the impression that Beijing had been willing all along to resolve the long-standing border issues, but it was New Delhi who was stubborn and inflexible and hence, not interested in peace. Such a statement should also be seen in the backdrop of Beijing earlier laying the blame for the 2020 confrontation squarely on Indian ‘illegal encroachment on Chinese territory’. Moreover, Lin also goes to state that ‘the uncertainty of the United States (as well as the US election outcomes) is an important factor that prompted India to soften its stance toward China’ thereby implying that more than the internal wish for peace and tranquillity, it was the unfavourable external environment which pushed India to seek peace. As a corollary, such a view also reinforces the Chinese misperception of New Delhi having no existence of its own without the support of US− the propagation of such would also put a dent into Indian image of a credible leader of the Global South. This perception of Indian ‘dependence on US’ was also carried in the Global Times editorial on the disengagement which emphasised on China’s unwavering maintenance of its position in the face of ‘strengthening India- US cooperation’ as well as Washington’s ‘attempt’ at using ‘India to exhaust China’ (which was realised by New Delhi as per the editorial). In addition, the editorial also goes to list the ‘internal reasons’ which ‘compelled’ India to seek disengagement− increasing burden of defence expenditure, the rising Sino- Indian trade and interdependence despite the calls for ‘de-coupling’ and difficulties faced by Indian technological and production companies due to visa restrictions imposed by New Delhi. The above focus on ‘internal factors’ not only exposes the level of Indian dependence on China (which can be weaponised by Beijing in the future) but also attempts to showcase New Delhi as a junior partner who is not capable of providing leadership to the Global South.
The competition between India and China to claim leadership of the Global South is not new and can be traced to the early years of the Independence and formation of both the countries in the 1940s and 60s. By framing Nehru-led India as part of the ‘imperial and expansionist bourgeoisie’, Mao painted the 1962 war as Beijing’s ‘revolutionary’ defence against the creation of a ‘Great Indian Empire’ by Nehru and his masters in the Western World. This narrative allowed Mao and revolutionary China to become the icon of liberation in the then Third World (colonised countries of Asia and Africa). Drawing parallels to current times, Beijing can be said to be striving for leadership in the eyes of the Global South by portraying itself as the active initiator of the disengagement while painting New Delhi as the recipient who has been ‘forced’ to come to the negotiating table because of external complications.
The other major area subject to potential LAC disengagement ramification is Taiwan. Weeks before the announcement of the LAC disengagement, Taiwan had grabbed headlines when its President Lai Ching-te, during his National Day speech on 10 October, rejected the claim of China or the People’s Republic of China (PRC) being the ‘motherland’ of Taiwan or the Republic of China (ROC)− the official name of the self-governing island nation. Lai rooted his rejection in the fact that while the PRC was founded in 1949, the ROC came into being in the aftermath of the 1911 Revolution that had overthrown the Qing dynasty and established a Republican government, thereby making it older and deserving of much more respect than the Communist ruled regime led by Mao Tse Dong. This statement by the Taiwanese president was preceded by Xi’s own remarks on the National Day of the PRC on 1st October where he reaffirmed his commitment to ‘achieving complete national reunification’ which is the ‘common aspiration of the Chinese people’ (on both sides of the Taiwan Straits).
The comments by Lai were rejected by the Taiwan Affairs Office of Beijing which lambasted the latter for ‘fabricating fallacies about “Taiwanese independence, advocating separatist views, and inciting hostility and confrontation across the Straits’ while reiterating the ‘unstoppable’ nature of the ‘historical trend of national rejuvenation and reunification’. This reiteration was followed by the conduction of ‘Joint Sword-2024B’ military exercise on 14 October by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s Eastern Command which saw the participation of the PLA Army, Navy, Air Force and Rocket Force and was conducted in the Taiwan Straits as well as in the northern, southern and eastern vicinity of Taiwan.
In the midst of the above disturbance in the Straits, on 16 October, India allowed Taipei to open its third Taipei Economic and Cultural Centre (TECC) in Mumbai which would cater to the services of Indian nationals in four states− Maharashtra, Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, and Goa and the Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman & Diu. The opening of this new office marking the 113th National Day of Taiwan is a sign of the increasing ties between Taipei and New Delhi on areas such as semiconductors, technology, and trade as well as strategic convergence in areas such as the Indo- Pacific. As expected, the development of such Indo-Taiwan ties has not been to Beijing’s liking which called upon New Delhi to adhere to the One-China principle and ‘avoid interference in the improvement of Sino- Indian ties’ by handling the ‘Taiwan issue with caution’.
Given the precedence of the above events before the announcement of the LAC Disengagement, can it be reasoned that the sudden Chinese interest in rapprochement with India is also linked with its strategic calculus on Taiwan?
From Beijing’s perspective, the thawing of strained relations with India and further improvement would provide an opportunity to incentivize New Delhi to re-examine its burgeoning ties with Taiwan. However, given the new normal of ‘cautious engagement’ such a scenario seems unlikely as of now. On the converse, the instance of ‘thawing’ and ‘normalisation’ of Sino-Indian ties could be weaponised in a misinformation campaign to dissuade Taipei from relying upon India as a credible partner who will support it against Chinese manoeuvres.
At the same time, the proximity between the current tensions and military exercise across the Taiwan Straits and the seeking of disengagement with India could also be interpreted as China’s tactic of avoiding pressure on two fronts as it prepares to realise the goal of ‘national reunification.’ This speculation is partially buttressed by the fact that the latest Joint Sword-2024B exercise was much more aggressive in nature which included drills focused on ‘capture of key ports and islands and the joint seizure of comprehensive superiority’. This exercise, involving, 153 sorties by PLA aircraft and quarantine operations of maritime cargo by Chinese Coast Guard (CCG), was conducted on a larger scale unseen till date and in much closer proximity to Taiwan as compared to the drills of the past− hinting at the possibility of it being a preparation exercise for the eventual invasion to be conducted in near future. Moreover, the ‘near future’ would seem to be approaching soon, if one considers the recent published work of Lt Col (Retd) JS Sodhi titled ‘China’s War Clouds’ focusing on China’s long term military strategy of the future. Here Sodhi cites an article published by the pro- Beijing daily Wenweipo in 2013 which mentioned six wars or military campaigns to be undertaken by the PLA in the next 50 years− the invasion of Taiwan in 2027 which precedes the two-front war with India in 2035-40. As per Sodhi, 2027 would be the year when Xi would seek a fourth term to his Presidency and the ‘reunification’ of Taiwan would not only justify the latter but also cement his legacy. Moreover, with the pacification of Taiwan, the PLA would be free to re-direct their energy in the confrontation with India via both land and sea.
Other factors buttressing the above speculation is the return to power of Republican candidate Donald Trump as US President. The latter’s aversion towards long-term military commitments and wars as well as comments accusing Taiwan of ‘stealing jobs from the American chip industry’ and ‘not paying for defence’ has brought uncertainty in Taipei over US commitment to its defence in the face of Chinese onslaught. In addition, reports of American company Space X led by Elon Musk asking Taiwanese suppliers to move manufacturing away from Taiwan because of ‘geopolitical concerns’ further adds fuel to such interpretations of an ‘imminent Chinese invasion’ about to come. Combing the above with US involvement in the wars in Ukraine and West Asia, and the possible pacification of border dispute with India, Beijing might be tempted not to derive the upmost opportunity of this moment vis a vis its ambitions on Taiwan. History is replete with examples when Beijing did not deter from the using moments of global crises to further its own strategic ends− the 1962 war with India in the backdrop of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the 2020 eastern Ladakh clashes during the n-COVID 19 pandemic.
While only time will tell whether the LAC Disengagement is a genuine effort at seeking peace or an elaborate eyewash for ulterior motives, India should not let its guard down and repeat mistakes of the past.
As Sun Tzu said- “Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.”
About the Author
Anuraag Khaund is pursuing PhD in International Politics from the School of International Studies, Central University of Gujarat. He has published opinion pieces in The Diplomat, Deccan Herald, Kashmir Observer and Modern Diplomacy. His interests include International Relations and Geopolitics with a focus on Eurasia, East, West, South and Southeast Asia. In addition to geopolitics, he also looks at the intersection between civilizational histories and current global politics. The author can be contacted at khaundanuraag@gmail.com
