By: Anuraag Khaund, Guest Author
As the western front of India remains at boil in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor, further west in Afghanistan, a new strategic re-alignment was being attempted. On 21 May, Beijing was witness to the coming together of the Foreign Minister of China Wang Yi, Pakistan Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammad Ishaq Dar and the Acting Foreign Minister of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi on the occasion of the informal China, Pakistan, and Afghanistan Trilateral Foreign Ministers’ Meet. The meeting coming on the heels of the recent India-Pakistan conflict as well as in the immediate aftermath of the first ministerial level contact between Indian External Affairs Minister (EAM) Dr S Jaishankar and his counterpart in the Taliban regime has raised eyebrows regarding the said trilateral meeting.
Most voices have raised concerns whether the latter is an attempt to rope in Afghanistan or specifically the Taliban to be a part of the China-Pakistan axis aimed at encircling India which now also includes a hostile Bangladesh. What further vitiates the above sentiment are some of the outcomes of the Trilateral Meeting which appear inimical to India’s strategic and security interests. Foremost amongst them is the elevation of diplomatic ties between Pakistan and Afghanistan including exchange of ambassadors under the aegis of Chinese facilitation and the promotion of the extension of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) into Afghanistan thereby making Kabul a part of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). Such actions are aimed only at embedding the Taliban regime into the China-Pakistan strategic nexus and political- economic networks but also undermining India’s position in Afghanistan and the broader sub-continent.
The unprecedented show of solidarity exhibited by the Taliban in its condemnation of the Pahalgam terror attack labelling it as ‘undermining regional security and stability’ has rattled Pakistan, especially its military- intelligence establishment which once welcomed the Taliban’s capture of Kabul in 2021 as the return of its ‘strategic depth’ in Afghanistan. However, such hopes were dashed with the rise in tensions between the new Afghan rulers and their former patrons which culminated in the airstrikes and cross border skirmish of December 2024. The eruption of conflict was paralleled by the increase strategic outreach undertaken by India as seen in the meeting between Foreign Secretary Vikrant Misri and Muttaqi in UAE during January 2025 which was preceded by the Indian interactions with figures such as Acting Defense Minister Mullah Yaqoob and the presence of an Indian ‘technical team’ in Kabul since 2022 to maintain New Delhi’s engagement with the Afghan people. Such strategic alignment and the resultant strengthening of India’s position in Afghanistan coupled with strained ties with Taliban would have rendered Pakistan into a disadvantageous position and faced with the prospect of conflict on its eastern as well as western fronts.
Hence, the elevation and strengthening of diplomatic ties through the exchange of ambassadors would not only strengthen the channels of communication between Islamabad and Kabul but also create stakes especially for the Taliban regime in maintaining a stable bilateral relationship. The exchange of ambassadors would further elevate the level of Pakistan’s relationship with the Taliban as compared to the junior technical level Indian presence. For China, the cessation of hostilities between Pakistan and Afghanistan is crucial not only for its interests of stability along its borders with the latter two and the protection of investments like CPEC but also the undermining of Indian opportunity to bolster its position by exploiting the tensions between Kabul and Islamabad.
The extension of the CPEC into Afghanistan not only reflects the long-standing Chinese interest in enhancing its economic footprint in Afghanistan through connectivity and cooperation projects but also ulterior strategic designs specifically aimed at India. Firstly, the above extension into Afghanistan would transform the Taliban into a stakeholder in the CPEC which passes through the Gilgit- Baltistan area of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) thereby complicating Indian calculations and any actions regarding the area. In addition, the inclusion and participation of Afghanistan in the CPEC would allow Kabul access to the port of Gwadar thereby affecting the prospects of Chabahar as an alternative outlet for Afghan international trade while also diluting its strategic value in enhancing India-Afghanistan economic and humanitarian linkage and connectivity.
At the same time, the embedding of Afghanistan into CPEC by extension, the BRI would also allow Beijing greater influence over the Taliban which it can be used to achieve objectives ranging from unfettered access to Afghanistan’s reserves of Rare Earth Elements (REE) to facilitating Pakistan’s proxy war with India. Reportedly, intelligence agencies have raised concerns that the above expansion of the CPEC and the construction of logistical hubs in Afghanistan could lead to the creation of a ‘Terror Corridor’ allowing Pak-supported outfits as well as ideological bedfellows of the Taliban like Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT) and Jaish-e-Mohammad (JeM) along with groups based on Afghan soil such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) to send militants over to Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) along with the cross-border funneling of weapons, funds and drugs. All of these occurring under the plausible deniability of China and in collusion with Pakistan and a pliant Taliban regime bound into a relationship of dependency with both Islamabad and Beijing through Gwadar and CPEC. Such fears are not unfounded given the threat issued by the Afghanistan based outfit Al- Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor and a Pakistan seeking to settle scores after its humiliation in the current conflagration with India.
The extension of the CPEC also lays the possibility for its joining with the strategic Wakhan Corridor sharing borders with Pakistan (PoK) as well as China and Tajikistan. While attitudes of both China and the Taliban are at odds vis-a-vis the feasibility and safety of the aforementioned corridor, yet the possibilities created by a pliant Taliban regime and an economically interconnected non-hostile Af-Pak landscape might tempt Beijing to link CPEC with Wakhan thereby creating another outlet for the Terror Corridor utilizing the proximity to PoK. From Chinese perspective, security challenges such as the Uyghur militants and ISKP could be managed by exploiting Taliban’s conflict with the latter as well as using the ‘good offices’ of Pak sponsored groups like JeM in re-directing the accumulated ‘jihad momentum’ towards India through the CPEC-Wakhan into J&K.
The above-described situation, undoubtedly would put India in a tight spot critically affecting its foothold in an already constrained space in the Af-Pak region. The ‘restriction of Indian influence in Afghanistan’s political and security landscape’ as being the aim of the trilateral meeting was also confirmed by local media outlets. Hence, there should be no qualms about the urgency of India to step up its game to counter the nefarious designs of the China- Pakistan ‘iron brotherhood.’
First and foremost is the need to urgently expedite the development of the Chabahar port and the related infrastructure such as the railway line connecting the port to the city of Zahedan along the Iran-Afghanistan border and further extension of the same to Zaranj in Nirmuz province of Afghanistan. The swift completion of the above railway stretch from Zaranj to Chabahar will facilitate seamless utilization of the port and accomplish Afghanistan integration into the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) connectivity project spearheaded by India, Iran and Russia. In addition, New Delhi should also emphasize the benefits and advantages offered by Chabahar and the INSTC vis-a vis CPEC especially in terms of stability and security. Given the frequency of insurgent attacks and blasts along the CPEC and its transit through the restive province of Balochistan, the Taliban’s quest for international trade and commerce would be better suited by Chabahar and the Zahedan-Zaranj line. Iran should also be roped in to highlight the advantages and benefits of the same not only because of Iranian stakes in Chabahar but also the because of shared concerns regarding the re-emergence of a Pakistan-controlled or aligned Afghanistan given the strained relations between Tehran and Islamabad over Pakistani support for anti-Iran militants.
While concerns might arise due to the Trump administration’s rescinding of the earlier sanction-waiver on Chabahar in February 2025 as well as the uncertainty over the future shape of US-Iran ties in the midst of the Gaza conflict and nuclear talks, India should not budge and remain steadfast in the pursuance of its own interests and issue-based alignment with Iran as an exercise of New Delhi’s strategic autonomy vis a vis Washington and Tehran. The practice of strategic autonomy by India without any hesitation for apparent American displeasure or ire is justified in light of the hastily Trump imposed ceasefire in the aftermath of Operation Sindoor and the facilitation of IMF bailout to Pakistan despite evidence of its usage in funding terrorism by Islamabad. Not to mention the detrimental effects to Indian interests in Chabahar on adhering to US preferences. Even as American military assistance for Pakistan continues unabated along with the signing of lucrative cryptocurrency deal between Trump and Islamabad. Faced with such blatant disregard of Indian interests, should New Delhi reciprocate?
Coming to US again, its reviewing of whether to designate the Afghan Taliban as a ‘Foreign Terrorist Organisation’ is itself an indication of Washington according primacy to national interest over the concerns of others or the wider international community. Similarly, Trump’s outreach to Syrian interim president Ahmed-al Sharaa, a former US Specially Designated Global Terrorist and the lifting of sanctions upon Syria again underlines the importance attached to pragmatism and strategic interest over consideration of norms or perceptions of others. Hence, it would be duplicity on the part of US to call out India over the pursuance of its own strategic interests regarding Iran. Moreover, the Trump’s administration’s quest of re-establishing its presence in the Bagram air base and the seeking of ‘limited intelligence presence’ ( intelligence cooperation) in Taliban ruled Afghanistan have no chance of fructifying with a Kabul under the control of China and Pakistan. Therefore, it would be in America’s own interest to allow the strengthening of India’s footprint in Afghanistan which is only possible through successful execution of strategic projects such as Chabahar and the INSTC. Vice-versa US presence as a counter to Chinese influence in Afghanistan would also benefit India.
Finally, in view of the fluid and unstable nature of the variables affecting India’s Afghan interests, it would be not be wise for New Delhi to keep all its eggs in one basket or bank only upon a single actor (Taliban regime)− a mistake repeated during the Afghan republic era of Ashraf Ghani and Hamid Karzai administrations. Simultaneous to its incremental engagement with the ruling Taliban regime, New Delhi should also reach out and establish contacts with the exiled anti-Taliban resistance groups such as the National Resistance Front (NRF) based in Tajikistan and led by Ahmad Massoud. In this regard, India can draw upon its legacy of providing support to the erstwhile Northern Alliance, the earlier anti-Taliban resistance from 1996-2001 led by Ahmad Shah Massoud, the father of the current NRF leader.
In addition, New Delhi should also utilize the goodwill towards India present among prominent members of the resistance such as ex Afghan Vice President Amrullah Saleh as evident in the latter’s vocal support for India’s conduction of Operation Sindoor against Pak-based terrorism. However, India should double down in its efforts before it is outmaneuvered by Pakistan whereby Islamabad was reportedly exploring channels of communication with the NRF as well as partnership with Tajikistan aimed against the Taliban in the immediate aftermath of the December 2024 border clash.
Let not the winds blowing from the Hindukush and Pamirs blow us away from the soil of Kabul as we hold on.
Anuraag Khaund is pursuing PhD in International Politics from the School of International Studies, Central University of Gujarat. He has published opinion pieces in The Diplomat, Deccan Herald, Kashmir Observer and Modern Diplomacy. His interests include International Relations and Geopolitics with a focus on Eurasia, East, West, South and Southeast Asia. In addition to geopolitics, he also looks at the intersection between civilizational histories and current global politics. The author can be contacted at khaundanuraag@gmail.com
