By: Mahima Sharma, Research Analyst, GSDN

The Bay of Bengal has long been a vital maritime crossroads, connecting the civilizations of South and Southeast Asia. For centuries, the bustling ports and thriving trade routes around this inland sea fostered a shared sense of community and common destiny among the peoples living along its shores. However, in the aftermath of the mid-20th century decolonization, the Bay of Bengal region became fragmented, with newly independent nations pursuing separate goals and alliance systems. The region’s historic unity and economic integration eroded, replaced by a patchwork of competing interests and uneven development.

It was against this backdrop that the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC) was born in 1997, with the ambitious aim of reviving the Bay of Bengal’s role as a bridge between South and Southeast Asia. Bringing together Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand, BIMSTEC represented a bold attempt to reinvigorate the region’s shared heritage of commerce, culture and community.

Yet more than two decades later, as BIMSTEC marks its 27th anniversary, the question remains: has this regional grouping been a success or a failure? This is what we shall explore in this article.

Potential and Few Feathers

BIMSTEC represents a significant opportunity to revive the historic unity and economic integration of the Bay of Bengal region. By connecting the diverse economies and cultures of South Asia and Southeast Asia, BIMSTEC has the potential to leverage the collective resources and markets of its member countries – Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Myanmar, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Thailand.

The BIMSTEC region is home to around 1.5 billion people, approximately 21% of the global population, with a cumulative GDP of US$ 2.5 trillion. The annual GDP growth rate has averaged around 6%, indicating the significant economic potential of the grouping.

One of BIMSTEC’s key accomplishments has been in the area of connectivity. The grouping has made progress on important infrastructure projects like the Kaladan Multimodal Transit Transport Facility, which connects India’s northeastern states to the Sittwe Port in Myanmar.  Additionally, the Bangladesh-Bhutan-India-Nepal (BBIN) Motor Vehicles Agreement has facilitated cross-border road transport, enhancing regional integration.  These connectivity initiatives have the potential to boost trade, investment, and people-to-people linkages across the Bay of Bengal region.

BIMSTEC has also expanded its agenda to cover a wider range of cooperation areas, from counter-terrorism and disaster management to energy and agriculture. The MILEX-18 joint military exercise, for instance, was a major success and a positive sign for the future of BIMSTEC security cooperation.  The member states have demonstrated a willingness to work together on shared challenges, laying the groundwork for deeper regional integration.

Moreover, BIMSTEC has made strides in institutionalizing its framework, with the establishment of a Secretariat in Dhaka in 2014 and the recent adoption of a BIMSTEC Charter in 2022.  These developments have provided the organization with a more robust legal and institutional foundation to pursue its objectives.

Challenges and Failures

Despite the few hoorays outlined earlier, BIMSTEC has struggled to achieve meaningful progress and establish itself as an effective regional organization. The grouping has faced a number of persistent challenges that have hindered its development and impact.

One of the key issues plaguing BIMSTEC has been the inconsistent convening of high-level meetings. The organization’s founding charter called for summits to be held every two years and ministerial meetings annually. However, in the 25 years since its inception, BIMSTEC has managed to hold only five summits – in 2004, 2008, 2014, 2018 and 2022. This lack of regular engagement at the top leadership level has undermined the group’s momentum and decision-making capabilities.

Furthermore, BIMSTEC has also suffered from a lack of sustained commitment and engagement from its member states. India, the largest economy in the grouping, has tended to view BIMSTEC primarily as a fallback option when the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) failed to make progress. Meanwhile, other major members like Thailand and Myanmar remain more focused on the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). This uneven attention and prioritization by member states has prevented BIMSTEC from developing a strong institutional foundation.

Additionally, BIMSTEC’s agenda covers a wide range of 14 different cooperation areas, from trade and investment to counter-terrorism and disaster management. While this breadth reflects the diverse interests of the member states, it has also made it challenging to achieve tangible progress in any single domain. The lack of prioritization and clear sequencing of initiatives has diluted BIMSTEC’s impact. One of BIMSTEC’s key economic objectives has been the establishment of a Free Trade Agreement (FTA) among the member states. However, despite signing a framework agreement in 2004, the grouping is still far from finalizing a comprehensive FTA. Disagreements over tariff concessions and rules of origin have stalled the negotiations, hampering the group’s economic integration agenda.

Lastly, BIMSTEC has also had to contend with various bilateral tensions and disputes among its member states. Issues like the Rohingya refugee crisis between Bangladesh and Myanmar, and the border conflict between Myanmar and Thailand, have posed challenges for regional cooperation and trust-building. These political frictions have hindered BIMSTEC’s ability to forge a cohesive agenda. The emergence of alternative regional frameworks, such as the Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Forum, has created doubts about BIMSTEC’s unique value proposition. With China’s involvement in BCIM, some member states may be tempted to prioritize the initiative over BIMSTEC, further undermining the group’s centrality in the Bay of Bengal region.

Conclusion

BIMSTEC’s performance over the past 27 years has been a mixed bag, with both successes and failures. On the one hand, the grouping has made tangible progress in areas like connectivity, institutional development, and expanding its cooperation agenda. However, it has also faced shortcomings like inconsistency, unfocused agenda, unfinished projects and regional tensions.

So as BIMSTEC slowly inches toward its fourth decade, it finds itself at a crossroads. Can this regional organization overcome its structural and operational hurdles to become a truly effective platform for economic integration and geopolitical cooperation in the Bay of Bengal? Or is BIMSTEC destined to remain a well-intentioned but underperforming initiative, overshadowed by the ambitions of its member states and the shifting tides of regional power politics? The answers to these questions will help determine whether BIMSTEC ultimately succeeds or fails in its mission to revive the Bay of Bengal’s historic role as a vital link between South and Southeast Asia.