By: Taha Ali
India’s defense R&D ecosystem has recently indicated that quantum science is a national priority now. In late May 2025, DRDO Chairman Dr. Samir Kamat formally opened a new Quantum Technology Research Centre (QTRC) in Delhi. The center has state-of-the-art labs for secure quantum communications, high-precision quantum sensing and quantum-enhanced navigation. DRDO specifically mentions Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) as being its main focus area – its mission statement demands ultra-reliable military communications in accordance with quantum physics. Such measures highlight the realisation that quantum technologies – previously the domain of long-term research – have tangible application to contemporary warfare and national security.
This Indian drive is a part of the quantum race globally. The United States has committed enormous efforts: the National Quantum Initiative Act (2018) aligns civilian R&D, and defense initiatives such as DARPA’s Quantum Benchmarking Initiative seek to deploy a useful quantum computer by the early 2030s. U.S. studies also emphasize quantum sensing: atomic interferometer sensors might provide “unmatched” navigation accuracy even when GPS is denied. China also considers quantum strategic. In 2020 President Xi Jinping was said to have informed officials that quantum technology is “another front” in international high-tech competition. Beijing sponsored the Micius quantum communications satellite (launched in 2016) – the first in the world – and now has thousands of kilometers of quantum key distribution links running. Observers estimate Chinese public expenditures on quantum to be approximately four times the U.S. level, ATEP’s data claimed, and undertake more than half the world’s public spending in quantum. These innovations demonstrate that prominent powers already see quantum technology as crucial for future military superiority – an imperative India cannot afford to overlook.
India’s Quantum Initiatives
India has initiated a multi-faceted initiative to establish its quantum strength. In April 2023, the Cabinet sanctioned a National Quantum Mission (NQM) (2023–24 to 2030–31) with an outlay of ₹6,003.65 crore (about US$750 million). The objectives of the NQM are to construct intermediate-scale quantum computers and facilitate satellite-based quantum communication. For instance, the goal focuses on quantum processors of 20–50 qubits in three years and expands to 50–1000 qubits in eight years. It also targets setting up quantum-secured links of more than 2000 km between ground stations, paving the way for a future QKD network.
Concurrent with the civilian program, DRDO’s new QTRC gives a specific defense R&D platform. As mentioned earlier, it will create QKD systems and other technologies for ultra-secure military communications. Concurrently, top research universities have established quantum centers. For instance, the Indian Institute of Science (IISc) recently initiated a Centre for Quantum Technologies to work on qubit processors, single-photon sources/detectors, photonic quantum networks and sensors. Several startups (frequently spun out of IITs and IISc) are also surfacing to commoditize quantum devices and networks. In the telecommunication sector, industry consortia are working out how to embed quantum key distribution into India’s 5G/6G backbones and defense networks. Combined, these activities seek to provide India with a quantum communication, computing and sensing footprint of its own before the technologies pervade.
Strategic Imperatives
The focus on quantum in defence policy is motivated by unambiguous strategic imperatives. Second, quantum communications can fundamentally enhance security. QKD-based connections are theoretically provably secure against any eavesdropper and would guarantee that even sophisticated adversaries cannot intercept encrypted military communication without being detected. Without domestic QKD capability, Indian troops could be left open to cyber interception or have to be dependent on international vendors for essential encryption. Second, sophisticated quantum sensing would be able to surmount current weaknesses. The U.S. analysis points out that atomic clocks and quantum inertial sensors can give “resilient” navigation and timing when GPS is jammed. For India, this is significant: its enemies might try to blind the navigation systems of Indian forces. Quantum gravimeters, magnetometers or accelerometers would make it possible for submarines, missiles and jets to travel stealthily, or find hidden underground or underwater structures, with far greater precision than available today. Gaining such technological advantage would be strategically valuable in any war. Third, quantum computing itself holds both peril and opportunity. A quantum computer sufficiently potent could model complicated processes (such as optimizing new materials or logistics) much more quickly than traditional machines. There are potential military R&D uses for this. Conversely, quantum computers pose a threat to current cryptography. U.S. GAO reports that a machine capable of compromising common encryption methods might come in 10–20 years’ time. If only other nations acquire such capability first, they may be able to decrypt Indian military communication and business secrets. The strategic need for India is thus twofold: to create quantum tech for itself, and to prepare (through post-quantum cryptography, secure networks, etc.) for the threat of quantum.
Potential Military Applications
Quantum technologies have the potential to revolutionize much of contemporary warfare. In computing, highly efficient quantum processors would allow defence planners to execute massive simulations of force deployments and enemy activity, improving strategic planning. They would also solve difficult optimization problems in logistics — for instance, calculating the best routes, resource apportionments, and supply chain solutions much more quickly than classical computers. Outside of computing, quantum abilities will revolutionize sensing and communications. Future advanced quantum sensors will significantly enhance navigation, imaging, and surveillance; as one military analyst noted, “advanced quantum sensors will revolutionize navigation, imaging, and surveillance” and may even make existing stealth technologies obsolete. In the air and sea environments, quantum radar research portends the ability to detect stealth aircraft or submarines by taking advantage of quantum effects, giving a significant advantage in monitoring concealed threats. Secure communications is also an important application. Quantum key distribution (QKD) makes it possible to generate cryptographic keys that are guaranteed secure; Indian military forces have already tested early QKD links to create communication channels that are impervious to hack attacks. A quantum computer advanced enough could decrypt today’s encryptions “in minutes,” defence officials cautioned, but quantum cryptography flips the script by requiring any eavesdropping to destroy the information itself. Likewise, quantum-enabled atomic clocks and gyroscopes can deliver accurate timing and navigation under GPS jammed or denial conditions. For example, ultra-small atomic clocks being developed would enable Indian troops to continue synchronized operations even in GPS-denied environments. Similarly, atomic magnetometers — based on quantum effects in alkali vapor cells — can detect very small magnetic anomalies, which can be exploited to detect concealed submarines or buried infrastructure. Overall, the convergence of quantum computing, sensing, and communications gives India the potential to secure military networks, accelerate ISR (intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance), and achieve optimized operations not currently feasible with classical technologies.
Challenges Ahead
Even with these possibilities, daunting challenges need to be overcome before quantum technologies can be trusted in the field. Technically, functional quantum computers do not yet exist. As one analyst points out, all machines currently in use are intermediate, delicate products and have to perform in conjunction with traditional computers always. The establishment of a strong quantum computer involves years of research, cryogenic infrastructure stability, and significant investment; India still does not have a locally-manufactured quantum computer and relies on foreign hardware. This is structurally vulnerable, since supply chains for main components globally are increasingly under export controls by leaders in the world’s quantum race. Essentially, India’s plans could be curbed by the fact that it cannot get advanced qubit chips and systems without foreign licenses.
Resource and procedural barriers also hang over it. Quantum laboratories are expensive to set up: one old physicist remembers that beginning a superconducting qubit laboratory from scratch now would probably take on the order of five million dollars. Government procurement and funding processes have at times been sluggish or disjoined, resulting in delays in obtaining equipment. As a defence analyst has contended, “full financial approvals are still pending” on a good number of quantum projects, and bureaucratic blockages can slow the pace. Human capital is another key issue that needs to be addressed: India requires an ongoing supply of quantum-trained scientists and engineers, but numerous top graduates are enticed overseas by more remunerative alternatives. Even in India, the academic establishment places draconian salary ceilings, making it difficult to hold on to talent. As one head of a laboratory said, if the researcher becomes “invaluable in a year’s time, institutions from across the world will offer them better pay packages.” Closing this talent deficit will need concerted efforts in education, incentive, and career advancement. Strategically, the speeding-up worldwide quantum race heightens the stakes and complexity. Adversaries such as China and the United States are already using quantum technologies in space and defense; for instance, China’s Micius satellite showcased secure quantum communication thousands of kilometers apart, and it is suspected to be developing quantum radars and cryptanalysis. The future battlefield might include adversaries who “decrypt military communications” or “counter this threat” using superior quantum decryption capabilities. Indian response to this will have to be ready for a new type of warfare with encryption and sensing as the linchpins. Nevertheless, incorporating quantum systems into current military doctrine will not be easy. Quantum computers are not silver bullets, experts warn—their role is that of expert tools supporting but not substituting traditional systems. It will be a long-term endeavor to develop new doctrines, train people, and harmonize quantum-safe technologies. In general, the technical underdevelopment, resource and cost limitations, shortage of skills, and rapid external developments all combined make the future way pretty difficult.
Policy Recommendations
Overcoming these challenges and capturing the military potential of quantum technology will necessitate an across-the-board policy approach. To start with, India must continue and increase its budgetary support to the National Quantum Mission (NQM) and allied defence R&D initiatives. This entails not just sustaining the budgetary support (of over ₹6,000 crore as recently increased) but also expediting the disbursement and procurement processes to prevent bureaucratic hold-ups. Specific funding needs to be allocated for developing indigenous hardware competency — e.g., by backing domestic companies and research labs to produce superconducting qubit chips, photonic devices, and cryogenic facilities. Along these lines, India’s defence setup has already set up a new Quantum Technology Research Centre capable of QKD, atomic clocks, and magnetometers; similar programs must be taken forward. Managing the supply chain — through efforts such as the DRDO’s drive for indigenous quantum devices — will make India not vulnerable to export controls or foreign technology deficits.
Second, India needs to develop its human capital and innovation ecosystem. The government, academia, and industry should strengthen collaborations to develop distinct career paths in quantum science and engineering. For example, exclusive scholarship and fellowship schemes may entice students into quantum research, while start-ups and private companies may be incentivized (for example, by grants or equity) to employ and retain top talent. Defence agencies need to cooperate with private quantum companies and foreign partners (the recent report of ORF proposes to look into cooperation with Taiwan, for instance) to speed up know-how transfer. Public-private partnerships have been emphasized as being important; as a commentator remarks, industry and startups “are more flexible” to hold onto talented researchers, so government seed money has to be complemented by private investment to establish a sustainable quantum economy.
Third, there must be an integrated approach to cryptography and standards. Policymakers need to make quantum-safe encryption standards a priority for development and incorporate them into military and civilian communications. India’s defence and telecom departments have already commenced developing post-quantum cryptographic protocols; these initiatives need to be expedited to “future-proof” command-and-control networks. Concurrently, India must use its convening power (e.g. through international conclaves and groupings) to contribute towards global quantum security standards. There is a need for tight coordination among government, private industry, and academia for policy to evolve as the technology continues to evolve. Since top officials have stressed, India possesses the intellectual capability and determination to dominate quantum technology, but “we must act with urgency”.
Lastly, tangible actions should facilitate quick deployment of promising tech. Military and DRDO should perform war-gaming and field-testing of quantum devices (like mobile QKD terminals or quantum inertial navigation units) under realistic environments. What they learn from experiments can be fed into doctrine and acquisition specifications. Simultaneously, India needs to secure its key infrastructure from nascent quantum threats. This means, among other things, investment in post-quantum cryptography to defend networks against future code-breaking attempts (something the US is already embarking upon through its Quantum Computing Preparedness Act). By integrating persistent investment, human-resource development, supply-chain robustness, and global collaboration, India can realize the promise of quantum into tangible defence capability and ensure strategic autonomy in the emerging era of technologies.
Conclusion
Quantum information technology could transform a lot of military life – from secure communications and reliable navigation to robust computing. India has recognised this by launching a National Quantum Mission and by setting up specialist research centres (e.g. DRDO’s QTRC). These are important steps towards future capability assurance. Nevertheless, current resources, infrastructure and manpower are still limited compared to international standards. India in the future will need consistent strategic focus: augmenting finance, cultivating expertise, and carefully linking R&D to defense needs. India can constrain the vulnerabilities of quantum and leverage these technologies to drive its defense profile in the coming decades through prudent policy and cooperation.
