By: Aasi Ansari, Research Analyst, GSDN
The recent expansion of China’s nuclear arsenal has put China’s Nuclear Program into limelight. Other Nuclear and Non-Nuclear states have always been a little sceptical about the China’s progress toward great-power status. Even during the most intense periods of Cold War rivalry, China managed to maintained remarkably vulnerable number of nuclear power that was assumed to be probably around 200 warheads. Chinese nuclear modernization continued after the Cold War ended, it has truly accelerated only over the last decade by more than doubling the number of warheads deployed since 2020. It makes clear that China’s historical reliance on a “minimum deterrent” has markedly shifted. Although, China is one of the P5 countries which has signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the credibility of China for never using the Weapon of Mass Destruction seems to be questionable.
China’s Nuclear Program
Since its first nuclear test in 1964, China has maintained a consistent narrative about the purpose of its nuclear weapons. China has the largest number of nuclear warheads in South-Asia including India, China, and Pakistan, although only China has signed the ‘Non-Proliferation Treaty’, ‘Credible Minimum Deterrence’ and ‘No First Use Policy’. This narrative was recently restated in China’s updated 2023 national defense policy: “China is always committed to a nuclear policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances”. Chinese production of weapon-grade plutonium reportedly ceased in 1980s. However, Beijing is combining its civilian technology and industrial sector with its defense industrial base to leverage dual-use infrastructure.
To extract plutonium from its spent nuclear fuel, China has nearly completed its first civilian “demonstration” reprocessing plant at the China National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC) Gansu Nuclear Technology Industrial Park in Jinta, Gansu province, which is expected to be operational in 2025. China has started the construction of a second plant at the same location, which should be up and running before the end of the decade. The 200 tonne-per-year fuel reprocessing capacity at Jinta and the 50 tonne-per-year capacity at Jiuquan (Plant 404) could support the plutonium needs of the two CFR-600 reactors, especially since the first of these reactors will begin operation with highly enriched uranium (HEU) rather than mixed oxide (MOX) fuel through a supply agreement with Russia.
The ambiguity of Chinese nuclear warhead types and uncertainty on the exact amount of fissile material required for each warhead design makes it difficult to estimate how many weapons China could produce from its existing HEU and weapons-grade plutonium stockpiles. Once both fast-breeder reactors come online, they could potentially produce large amounts of plutonium and, by some estimates, could enable China to acquire over 330 kilograms of weapon-grade plutonium annually for new warhead production.
China’s Nuclear Stockpile and Capabilities
How much and how fast China’s stockpile can grow will depend upon its inventories of plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU), and tritium. The International Panel on Fissile Materials assessed that at the end of 2022, China had a stockpile of approximately 14 metric tons of HEU and approximately 2.9 tonnes of separated plutonium available for nuclear weapons. The Pentagon assesses that China is expanding and diversifying its capability to produce tritium. In 2023, China also reportedly began operating two large new centrifuge enrichment plants, and also took a significant step forward with its domestic plutonium production capabilities.
The Pentagon’s 2023 report to Congress assessed that China’s nuclear stockpile now includes over 500 warheads. This is a significant growth since it used to be around 200 till 2019. According to Pentagon estimates, Beijing is on track to producing 1,000 nuclear warheads by 2030. If expansion continues at the current rate, the Pentagon’s previous projections say that China might field a stockpile of about 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035. The existing inventories were sufficient to double the stockpile over the past five years. However, as estimated by the Pentagon, additional production would require additional fissile material production.
It is estimated that China has produced a stockpile of approximately 440 nuclear warheads for delivery by land-based ballistic missiles, sea-based ballistic missiles, and bombers. Roughly 60 more warheads have thought to have been produced, with more in production, to eventually arm additional road-mobile and silo-based missiles and bombers. Many of these will probably be “deployed at higher readiness levels” and most “fielded on systems capable of ranging the continental United States”.
China has significantly increased the speed of the long-term modernization of its land-based, nuclear-capable missile force, with the construction underway of approximately 350 new missile silos that can deliver nuclear warheads and several new bases for road-mobile missile launchers. Most of China’s ballistic missile launchers are for short-range, medium-range, and intermediate-range missiles intended for regional missions, and most of those do not have nuclear strike missions. SIPRI estimates that the number of Chinese Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM) launchers exceeded 450, of which 142 are believed to be operational. From those missiles, about 135 can reach the continental United States, according to the Pentagon assumption.
Recently, the People’s Liberation Army Navy reportedly conducted its first test of the JL-3 in November 2018 and appears to have conducted at least two to three additional tests since. China currently fields a submarine force of 6 Jin-class (Type 094), second-generation nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), which are based at the ‘Yalong’ naval base near Longposan on Hainan Island. These SSBNs include a more prominent hump, which initially triggered some speculation as to whether they could carry up to 16 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), instead of the usual 12 (SLBMs).
The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) nuclear mission became dormant as the rocket force improved and older intermediate-range bombers were unlikely to be useful or effective in the event of a nuclear conflict. China used aircraft to deliver at least seven of nuclear weapons while developed several kinds of WMD by nuclear testing program between 1965 and 1979. According to US Department of Defense reported in 2018, currently China is focused on H-6 “Badger” bomber, which may have two distinct nuclear-capable variants. The first is H-6K version has “dual nuclear-conventional bomber” with extended-range than H-6. The H-6N is another variant accommodate a nuclear-capable air-launched ballistic missile (ALBM) that can be refuel in the air. To eventually replace the H-6, China is developing a stealth bomber with longer range and improved capabilities. The Pentagon asserts that the new bomber, known as H-20, will have both a nuclear and conventional capability with a range exceeding 10,000 kilometres, and may be revealed sometime during the next decade.
Impact on Global Security
Under Chinese President Xi Jinping, the increase in nuclear stockpile, combined with China’s defence investments in modernizing its armed forces, has caused deep concern in the world. In 2023, the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States insisted that China’s nuclear expansion should prompt U.S. policymakers to “re-evaluate the size and composition of the U.S. nuclear force.” However, the Biden administration has made clear that the United States has enough stockpile and does not currently need to increase its nuclear arsenal.
The Pentagon believes that China probably seeks a “lower-yield” nuclear warhead. Recently, the United States has publicly shared its concerns about activity at China’s Lop Nur nuclear test site. Open-source satellite imagery analysis indicates that China appears to be expanding the Lop Nur test site with the construction of what appears to be new drainage areas, drill rigs, roads, spoil piles, and covered entrances to potential underground facilities, as well as new construction at the main administration, support, and storage areas. If China did conduct low-yield nuclear tests at Lop Nur, it would violate its responsibility under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty it has signed but not ratified.
China’s nuclear capabilities also affect the military strategy in East Asia. China helps North Korea’s nuclear program in order to have more powerful allies on their side. North Korea’s value as leverage or a bargaining chip for China in Beijing’s relations with South Korea and the United States has been well recognized. In 2024, however, China may consider adding another layer to this leverage by supporting North Korea’s nuclear program. In response to that United States has significantly ramped up its military presence on and around the Korean Peninsula, in consultation with its ally, South Korea.
South Asia is considered one of the nuclear flashpoint due to the three nuclear armed bordering countries. India worries about the continuing deep links between China and Pakistan. The links between Pakistan and China for the developments if the nuclear weapon has been found multiple times. For instance, in February 2020, India caught items being shipped by China to Pakistan. According to the DRDO, this item can be used for the manufacturing of rocket motors for ballistic missiles. This has further deteriorated the bilateral relationship between India with China and Pakistan.
Conclusion
Historically, China has consistently rejected efforts at bilateral or trilateral engagement on its nuclear arsenal. However, recently China might be softening on its position toward talks related to nuclear and arms control. In November 2023, the counterparts of Bureau of Arms Control, Deterrence and Stability met with their Chinese counterparts for “candid and in-depth discussion on issues related to arms control and non-proliferation”. In January 2024, China participated in military-to-military dialogues for the first time in years. While these dialogues did not yield any concrete arms control agreements, they have the potential to be a meaningful foundation for future progress.
All these nuclear countries are developing their nuclear program and try to increase the nuclear arsenal in order to deter from the potential nuclear threat. For instance, Pakistan have nuclear weapon to deter from India, India have it to deter from China, China have it to deter United States, and United States have it deter from Russia. Therefore, the best way to reduce nuclear risks and prevent a nuclear arms race is for the United States and China to keep engaging in serious dialogue to explore possible transparency, crisis management, and confidence-building measures.
