By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN
Introduction
In an era defined by shifting power balances and intensifying competition in the Indo-Pacific, the United States’ release of its National Defense Strategy (NDS) represents more than a bureaucratic update — it is a signal flare illuminating Washington’s evolving worldview and strategic priorities. Unlike previous defence blueprints, the 2026 NDS boldly recasts American global posture around a renewed focus on homeland defence and hemispheric security, while tethering overseas engagements to clearly defined, self-interested aims. This recalibration comes at a time when the US is asserting tougher rhetoric and actions closer to home — from the reported capture of Nicolás Maduro to President Donald Trump’s strategic pursuit of Greenland — moves that symbolise a shift toward territorial security and hemispheric consolidation.
But beneath this American introspection lies a message with global reverberations: for emerging powers in the Indo-Pacific — and India in particular — the era of relying on US unilateral security guarantees is drawing to a close. Although Washington still acknowledges the Indo-Pacific’s importance, it now insists that allies and partners take on significantly greater responsibility for their own defence. Most tellingly, the new strategy omits any explicit reference to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) — a grouping long viewed as a linchpin of regional deterrence against strategic challengers — triggering debate in New Delhi about the durability of American commitments. The implicit message is clear: the Indo-Pacific remains central to global geopolitics, but India’s security calculus must now be grounded not in rhetoric, but in enhanced material capability — especially enhanced naval power projection to secure its interests across increasingly contested seas.
From Post–Cold War Primacy to Burden Sharing
To understand the strategic import of the National Defense Strategy (NDS), it is essential to situate it historically. After the Cold War, the United States emerged as the sole superpower, underwriting global security through alliance systems in Europe and Asia. From the expansion of NATO to bilateral security treaties with Japan and South Korea, Washington positioned itself as what scholars termed the “apex security provider.” The 1991 Gulf War and subsequent interventions in the Balkans reinforced perceptions of uncontested American military dominance.
The Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia” institutionalized Indo-Pacific centrality, later reframed under President Donald Trump and his successor as the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific.” The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad)—comprising the US, India, Japan, and Australia—was revived in 2017 as a consultative mechanism to balance China’s assertiveness. The First Island Chain (FIC), stretching from Japan through Taiwan to the Philippines, became central to deterrence strategy against Beijing, particularly amid tensions in the South China Sea and around Taiwan.
However, Trump’s strategic worldview departs from liberal internationalism. His doctrine of “peace through strength” emphasizes military superiority but rejects unconditional alliance commitments. The NDS bluntly argues that allies have become “dependencies,” urging greater burden sharing. Europe is expected to shoulder more responsibility against Russia; South Korea must bolster deterrence against North Korea; West Asian partners are pressed to counter Iran. The implication for Asia is unmistakable: the US will deter China, but not at disproportionate cost.
Scholars such as Barry Posen have long argued for “restraint,” advocating reduced US overextension and greater allied responsibility, while others like John Mearsheimer frame burden sharing as a natural correction in a multipolar order. Recent events—including the Ukraine war’s strain on US stockpiles and China’s rapid naval expansion—have reinforced arguments that America must husband resources. The NDS’s pledge to “supercharge” the Defence Industrial Base (DIB) reflects anxieties over munitions shortages and shipbuilding gaps vis-à-vis Beijing. In essence, Washington seeks strategic economy: concentrate power where indispensable, incentivize partners to invest more, and preserve long-term deterrence without unsustainable commitments.
The Indo-Pacific and the Missing Quad: Strategic Implications for India
One of the most striking omissions in the National Defense Strategy (NDS) is its silence on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad). Unlike the National Security Strategy (NSS), which briefly acknowledged India’s regional role, the defence document offers no direct reference to the grouping. This has led some analysts to speculate about a possible G-2 accommodation between Washington and Beijing—though such an interpretation may be premature. The absence masks continuing operational cooperation. The four Quad partners recently conducted a field training exercise under the Indo-Pacific Logistics Network (IPLN), aimed at rapid contingency response and military aid coordination. Bilateral engagements between Washington and New Delhi remain steady, including complex naval exercises such as the Malabar series and expanding logistics interoperability under foundational agreements like LEMOA and COMCASA.
Recent years have also witnessed tangible defence deals reinforcing India-US strategic convergence. India has moved forward on procuring MQ-9B SeaGuardian drones from the United States, enhancing maritime domain awareness across the Indian Ocean. The 2023–25 period further saw progress under the Initiative on Critical and Emerging Technology (iCET), linking defence innovation ecosystems and facilitating co-production discussions in jet engines and armoured platforms. Simultaneously, India has deepened defence ties with Japan and Australia, signalling that the Quad’s operational relevance extends beyond declaratory politics.Yet symbolism matters in strategy. By not naming the Quad, Washington signals that formalized collective security arrangements are secondary to bilateral or flexible alignments. The NDS prioritizes defence of the American homeland and the First Island Chain through “denial-based deterrence”—preventing China from achieving its objectives rather than threatening retaliatory escalation.
For India, this has layered implications. First, US commitment to Indo-Pacific stability persists, but conditionality has increased. Second, American strategy remains primarily maritime and Pacific-centric, focused on constraining China’s advances near Taiwan and the South China Sea. Third, Washington expects Eurasian actors—including India—to shoulder primary responsibility for their own security environment.
Scholars such as C. Raja Mohan argue that India must transition from being a “balancing power” to a “leading power” in maritime Asia, while Ashley Tellis emphasizes that long-term deterrence credibility depends on India’s indigenous military modernization rather than external guarantees. The NDS’s clinical clarity thus suggests a world where partnerships endure, but self-reliance is indispensable. India cannot assume that US presence automatically translates into guaranteed strategic cover—whether along the Line of Actual Control or across the Indian Ocean Region. Strategic autonomy, backed by credible naval capability, becomes not merely a doctrinal preference but a structural necessity.
India’s Naval Imperative: East of Malacca and Beyond
In the twenty-first century, power will be measured not merely by territorial control, but by command of the seas. The Indo-Pacific has emerged as the primary arena of geopolitical competition, where maritime routes carry the lifeblood of global trade and naval fleets signal strategic intent. Against this backdrop, the latest National Defense Strategy underscores the defence of the First Island Chain as central to American deterrence strategy. For India, however, the maritime canvas is even broader—stretching from the Arabian Sea across the Bay of Bengal to the Western Pacific. If New Delhi seeks to be recognised not just as a balancing power but as a shaping force in regional order, it must expand credible naval power projection, particularly “east of Malacca,” where the strategic contest is intensifying and long-term influence will be decided.
Historically, India’s maritime orientation was continental, shaped by land wars and unresolved borders. However, post-1991 economic reforms and the Look East—later Act East—policy began shifting attention seaward. The Indian Navy has since developed blue-water aspirations, commissioning aircraft carriers such as INS Vikrant, operating nuclear-powered submarines like INS Arihant, and expanding long-range maritime surveillance through P-8I aircraft. These assets signal intent, but intent must be matched with sustained investment.
Recent years have witnessed significant defence partnerships. India has deepened interoperability with the United States through logistics agreements and joint exercises such as Malabar. The 2023 approval of the MQ-9B SeaGuardian drone acquisition strengthened maritime domain awareness across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR). The GE–HAL agreement to co-produce F414 jet engines reflects growing trust in high-end defence technology collaboration under the broader iCET framework. With France, India continues submarine and carrier cooperation, while with Australia and Japan it has expanded coordinated patrols and intelligence-sharing mechanisms. Domestically, Atmanirbhar Bharat has accelerated indigenous shipbuilding, including Visakhapatnam-class destroyers, Scorpene-class submarines, and the development of the next-generation aircraft carrier debate (IAC-2). However, scholars such as Ashley Tellis argue that without sustained capital allocation and faster procurement cycles, India risks capability gaps vis-à-vis China’s rapidly expanding PLA Navy. China now fields the world’s largest navy by hull count, increasing its deployments in the IOR and Western Pacific.
Projecting presence east of Malacca—towards the South China Sea and Western Pacific—serves three purposes: signalling resolve, safeguarding sea lanes, and embedding India in regional security architecture. It also reassures Southeast Asian partners wary of great-power rivalry. Defence spending, therefore, becomes critical. Incremental increases are insufficient; structural reallocation toward capital-intensive naval assets—aircraft carriers, submarines, replenishment ships, amphibious platforms, and integrated undersea surveillance networks—is essential. Maritime power will determine whether India shapes Indo-Pacific order or merely adapts to it.
Calibrated Power Politics: Between Strategic Autonomy and Strategic Convergence
Scholars remain divided on India’s optimal response to American recalibration under the National Defense Strategy. Realist analysts argue that greater burden sharing aligns with India’s long-standing doctrine of strategic autonomy. Rather than free-riding on US power, India enhances its leverage by becoming indispensable to regional stability. Contributing more meaningfully to maritime security—whether through expanded naval deployments, logistics access agreements, or joint exercises—could insulate New Delhi from policy volatility in Washington, especially amid transactional shifts in US foreign policy.
Others, however, caution that overextension carries risks of entrapment. If US-China rivalry intensifies—particularly over Taiwan or the South China Sea—India may face mounting pressure to align explicitly with Washington. The NDS’s emphasis on denial-based deterrence suggests calibrated competition rather than outright confrontation. Some scholars view this as strategic prudence; others interpret it as subtle accommodation toward Beijing, shaped partly by economic interdependence.
Recent developments reinforce this debate. The strengthening of India-US defence industrial cooperation under iCET, the expansion of Malabar exercises, and India’s participation in multilateral maritime initiatives signal growing convergence. Yet India has simultaneously maintained engagement with Russia and deepened ties with Southeast Asia, reflecting hedging rather than alignment.Within India’s strategic community, voices such as C. Raja Mohan advocate a shift from “non-alignment” to “multi-alignment,” while Ashley Tellis emphasizes capability-building as the foundation of credible autonomy. The absence of India by name in the NDS is instructive: symbolism matters, but power commands respect. If India consolidates its role as a net security provider in the Indian Ocean and an active maritime actor in the Western Pacific, its strategic relevance will be embedded not in rhetoric, but in reality.
Conclusion
The release of the National Defense Strategy does not herald American retreat from the Indo-Pacific; rather, it formalizes a shift from primacy to conditional engagement. Washington remains committed to deterring China, defending the First Island Chain, and preserving a favourable balance of power. Yet it is equally clear that the United States no longer sees itself as the unquestioned guarantor of regional order. The language of “burden sharing,” the silence on the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, and the emphasis on denial-based deterrence collectively signal a doctrine of selective strength. Allies are partners—but not dependents.
For India, this strategic recalibration is not a setback; it is a clarifying moment. The debate is no longer about whether the Indo-Pacific matters—it unquestionably does. The real question is whether India possesses the material capability to shape outcomes within it. Geography has already conferred strategic advantage: India sits astride critical sea lanes linking the Middle East, Africa, and East Asia. But geography without power is vulnerability. As China expands its naval footprint from the South China Sea to the Indian Ocean, India’s response cannot remain incremental.
Naval power is not merely a military instrument; it is a political signal. Aircraft carriers, submarines, logistics agreements, and maritime partnerships communicate resolve, credibility, and staying power. If India seeks insulation from volatility in Washington and coercion from Beijing, it must build strategic insurance through sea control, sea denial, and sustained maritime presence east of Malacca.
The NDS ultimately offers India a strategic opportunity disguised as a warning. It underscores that partnerships endure, but guarantees diminish. In this emerging order, influence will accrue to those who contribute meaningfully to regional stability. If New Delhi invests decisively in naval modernization, defence industrial capacity, and interoperable partnerships, it will not merely respond to American recalibration—it will shape the Indo-Pacific balance itself. The age of rhetorical alignment is over. The age of maritime capability has begun.
About the Author
Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.
