By: Khushbu AhlawatConsulting Editor, GSDN

INTRODUCTION 

Regionalism in South Asia represents the shared endeavour of nations to manage common challenges, strengthen economic development, and promote political stability through cooperation. Amidst diverse cultures, historical rivalries, and developmental disparities, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), established in 1985, has emerged as the primary institutional framework embodying this regional aspiration. By bringing together eight member states—India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Bhutan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Afghanistan—SAARC seeks to harmonize policies, facilitate socio-economic integration, and promote people-to-people exchanges, creating a platform where collaboration can transcend bilateral tensions.

In the context of globalization, where interdependence spans trade, security, and technology, regional organizations serve as vital instruments for coordinated action and collective bargaining. Headquartered in Kathmandu, Nepal, SAARC’s observer status at the United Nations and engagement with extra-regional actors such as China, Japan, the European Union, and the United States underscores its international relevance. Despite challenges, SAARC reflects both the promise and complexity of South Asian regionalism, making it central to the region’s pursuit of peace, prosperity, and integration.

MAJOR ACHIEVEMENTS OF SAARC IN THE CONTEXT OF REGIONAL COOPERATION 

Since its establishment in 1985, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) has progressively evolved as a platform for fostering regional cooperation, dialogue, and collaboration among its member states. Some key achievements are as follows:

• Deepening Cooperative Frameworks
  Since its establishment in 1985, SAARC has aimed to strengthen cooperation among South Asian states to improve living standards, promote socio-economic development, and foster regional engagement. Functional cooperation has translated into practical initiatives such as the South Asian University, SAARC International College, the SAARC Development Fund, SAARC Food Bank, and agreements on judicial cooperation and counter-terrorism. Sector-specific programs, including the SAARC telemedicine network, SAARC Writers and Literature Foundation, and South Asia Foundation, have promoted cultural and people-to-people connectivity. Post-2020, SAARC has remained relevant through issue-based collaboration, particularly in disaster management, climate resilience, and public health. The SAARC COVID-19 Emergency Fund, virtual leaders’ meetings, and ongoing initiatives in food security, environmental protection, and women’s empowerment underscore the organization’s role in incremental, sector-driven regional cooperation despite persistent political constraints.
•  Advancing Trade and Economic Integration
  Economic cooperation is a core objective of SAARC, aimed at enhancing regional growth and integration. The transition from SAPTA to the South Asian Free Trade Area (SAFTA) marked a significant step toward reducing tariffs and promoting intra-regional trade through phased tariff liberalization. However, implementation has remained uneven due to political tensions, extensive sensitive lists, and non-tariff barriers. Despite these constraints, member states continue limited engagement through SAFTA concessions, trade facilitation measures, and development projects supported by the SAARC Development Fund. The importance of regional economic coordination was also evident during supply-chain disruptions in the COVID-19 period. Critically, intra-SAARC trade accounts for only about 5–6% of the region’s total trade, compared to over 25% in ASEAN, highlighting the gap between SAARC’s economic potential and its actual performance.
• Cooperation with Observer Countries
  SAARC’s engagement with observer countries and international organizations reflects its recognition of South Asia’s developmental constraints in areas such as capital availability, technology, infrastructure, and human resources. Observer states—including the United States, Japan, China, South Korea, Iran, and the European Union—have expressed interest in supporting the region through development assistance, technical cooperation, and capacity-building initiatives. To institutionalize such engagement, SAARC has concluded agreements and Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) with several multilateral organizations, notably UNDP, ITU, UNCTAD, UNICEF, UNDCP, and the Asia-Pacific Telecommunity, covering sectors such as development planning, telecommunications, trade facilitation, drug control, and education.

In recent years, cooperation with observers has been most visible in issue-based and technical domains rather than through SAARC-led political initiatives. Japan and the European Union have supported regional connectivity, disaster management, and development projects, while China’s observer engagement has focused on infrastructure financing and development assistance through bilateral and multilateral channels. During the COVID-19 pandemic, collaboration with UN agencies, particularly WHO and UNICEF, played a key role in public health coordination and humanitarian support across SAARC states. Critically, while observer engagement has enhanced resources and technical expertise, much of this cooperation remains project-based and fragmented, often bypassing SAARC as an institution in favour of bilateral arrangements. This underscores both the utility and the institutional limitations of SAARC in leveraging extra-regional partnerships for sustained regional integration.

• Enhancing People-to-People Contacts
  SAARC recognizes that fostering people-to-people relations is a crucial goal of regional cooperation, complementing formal diplomatic and economic initiatives. Despite structural and political constraints, the organization has undertaken several initiatives to promote social and cultural connectivity across South Asia, including South Asian Festivals, the Association of SAARC Speakers and Parliamentarians, SAARC Law, cooperation with NGOs, the SAARC Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the SAARC Scheme for Promotion of Organised Tourism, and the SAARC Documentation Centre. Civil society, including academics, writers, journalists, and retired officials, plays a vital role in establishing communication networks and supporting Track II diplomacy, especially between India and Pakistan. Indian Prime Minister I. K. Gujral described this process as “New Regionalism,” reflecting its regional significance. Recent developments, such as virtual cultural exchanges during COVID-19, the SAARC University Network, and online regional research collaborations, have strengthened youth and academic linkages. 
• Financial Cooperation and Regional Integration

SAARC has prioritized financial cooperation as a key component of regional integration, institutionalized through regular SAARC Finance Ministers Meetings, held in member states including Pakistan, India, the Maldives, and Bhutan. Early initiatives, such as the formation of the Inter-Governmental Expert Group on Financial Matters and the SAARC Expert Group on the Development of Capital Markets, aimed to chart a phased roadmap toward a South Asian Economic Union (SAEU). Member countries have exchanged concept papers and explored mechanisms for harmonizing financial regulations, promoting investment, and facilitating regional capital flows. While progress was modest in the first two decades, recent years have seen renewed emphasis on regional financial coordination. Notably, the SAARC Development Fund (SDF) has expanded its focus to include infrastructure, energy, and social sector projects, while discussions on regional payment systems, disaster risk financing, and SME financing mechanisms have gained momentum.

• Regional Security Cooperation and Counter-Terrorism

SAARC has recognized terrorism and transnational crime as major regional threats, formalized through the SAARC Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (1987) and its Additional Protocol (2005) under the framework of UN Security Council Resolution 1373. However, practical cooperation has been limited, with member states often prioritizing bilateral initiatives over multilateral engagement. The SAARC Terrorist Offences Monitoring Desk (STOMD) and SAARC Drug Offences Monitoring Desk (SDOMD) in Colombo illustrate institutional mechanisms for monitoring and intelligence sharing, though their impact has been modest.

In recent years, regional security concerns—such as cross-border terrorism in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Bangladesh, and rising radicalization in the region—have underscored the need for stronger collaboration. Joint exercises, intelligence-sharing platforms, and discussions on cyber-security and counter-radicalization, including efforts coordinated with the UN and observer states like China and the EU, represent emerging areas of engagement. 

• Integrated Program of Action: Multi-Sectoral Cooperation

The Integrated Program of Action (IPA) is SAARC’s key mechanism for coordinating multi-sectoral cooperation across 12 areas, including agriculture, education, health, environment, rural development, tourism, science and technology, and women in development. Each sector is overseen by a Technical Committee, with progress reported to the Standing Committee. IPA has facilitated structured collaboration, capacity-building, and policy harmonization among member states. Recent initiatives include regional disaster management programs, climate resilience projects, telemedicine networks, and cross-border educational collaborations through the SAARC University Network, which were particularly useful during COVID-19.

CHALLENGES AND LIMITATIONS OF SAARC IN REGIONAL COOPERATION

• Challenges of Political Rivalries and Trust Deficit

SAARC’s effectiveness has been persistently undermined by historical inter-state disputes, mistrust, and security concerns, particularly between India and Pakistan. Colonial legacies, territorial conflicts, and communal tensions have created enduring suspicion, impeding multilateral cooperation. The 19th SAARC Summit in 2016 was indefinitely postponed due to deteriorating India-Pakistan relations, highlighting the fragility of consensus-driven decision-making. Political differences, cultural divergences, and the “clash of civilizations” narrative, as noted by Samuel Huntington, exacerbate these divisions. Smaller member states, including Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and Bhutan, have often expressed fear of Indian dominance, resulting in reluctance to fully engage in SAARC initiatives, while India has increasingly invested in alternative platforms like BIMSTEC, marginalizing Pakistan and weakening SAARC’s cohesion.

• Economic and Structural Constraints

SAARC’s economic integration has been limited despite initiatives like SAFTA (2006). Intra-regional trade remains below 6% of total trade, reflecting poor financial coordination, asymmetry between India and smaller members, and lack of complementary economic structures. Most member states export similar goods, while China and other external powers exploit South Asia’s markets through competitive pricing, infrastructure investment, and bulk production, reducing SAARC’s economic leverage. Divergent political systems, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and inconsistent commitment to regional projects further undermine financial cooperation. Recent economic crises, such as Pakistan’s FATF grey listing and Afghanistan’s humanitarian challenges post-Taliban takeover, have heightened regional instability, limiting SAARC’s capacity to respond effectively.

• Institutional and Operational Limitations

SAARC’s structural framework imposes additional constraints. The charter prohibits discussion of bilateral disputes, while the requirement for unanimity slows decision-making. Different governance systems—from India’s democracy to Nepal’s monarchy and Sri Lanka’s presidential system—complicate policy harmonization. Initiatives like STOMD, SDOMD, IPA, and regional development funds demonstrate potential, yet implementation has been largely project-based and fragmented. The lack of visionary leadership, limited cost-benefit analysis, and bureaucratic inertia impede SAARC’s ability to address emerging challenges, including terrorism, cross-border migration, climate risks, and water disputes. While SAARC remains a symbolic platform for dialogue, these political, economic, and structural shortcomings continue to restrict its effectiveness in achieving meaningful regional integration.

NEED FOR COMPREHENSIVE POLITICAL, ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN SAARC

• Political Reforms

SAARC’s political effectiveness is constrained by mutual mistrust, bilateral disputes, and India’s perceived dominance. To rebuild trust, member states—particularly India—need to adopt a cooperative, equitable approach rather than a hegemonic stance. Proposals such as Conflict Coordination Groups (CCGs) to address bilateral disputes, the inclusion of international concerns like peace, security, and technological cooperation in summit discussions, and mechanisms for peaceful conflict resolution could strengthen political collaboration. India’s proactive role during COVID-19, including coordinating virtual SAARC meetings and providing vaccines to all member states, including Pakistan, highlights the potential of political leadership to restore confidence and demonstrate SAARC’s relevance. A joint UN Peacekeeping Force proposal in response to the Afghanistan crisis reflects how SAARC could coordinate on regional security challenges if political will exists.

• Economic Reforms

Regional economic integration remains weak due to trade imbalances, low intra-SAARC trade, and inadequate infrastructure. Reforms should focus on establishing common standards, investment regimes, and free trade zones, along with improved road, rail, and air connectivity to facilitate cross-border commerce. Joint ventures in services, education, and technology can enhance people-to-people collaboration while promoting economic interdependence. India’s COVID-19 humanitarian outreach—including vaccine and aid support to member countries like Sri Lanka and Nepal—can serve as a springboard for restoring regional trade, market activity, and interdependence, moving toward a self-reliant “Atmanirbhar SAARC.” Sub-regional cooperation, such as Bangladesh–India–Nepal economic corridors, could provide practical models for broader integration.

• Social and Institutional Reforms

Social reforms should strengthen civil society and cultural exchanges to build a shared South Asian identity. Greater interaction among academics, writers, media, and historians can reduce historical misconceptions and foster trust. Institutional reforms are also critical: the SAARC Secretariat requires expansion, increased funding, and greater autonomy to prepare position papers and manage IPA initiatives. Proposals such as establishing a SAARC Parliament or Assembly, increasing the frequency of ministerial and summit-level meetings, and improved coordination with NGOs could significantly enhance operational efficiency and decision-making capacity. Recent initiatives like the SAARC University Network and digital youth forums demonstrate the potential of technology-enabled institutional reforms to support regional integration.

ENHANCING INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS FOR EFFECTIVE SAARC FUNCTIONING

Improving India‑Pakistan relations is critical for revitalizing SAARC, as bilateral tensions have repeatedly stalled multilateral cooperation and impeded regional summits.  It emphasizes the importance of regular SAARC meetings as mandated by the Charter, including virtual summits, which were used effectively during the COVID‑19 pandemic to coordinate responses and sustain dialogue. India’s leadership in convening these virtual sessions and providing vaccines to all member states demonstrated the potential of collaborative engagement even amid strained ties. However, recent developments underscore the fragility of bilateral relations; the 2025 India‑Pakistan conflict following the Pahalgam attack and subsequent military exchanges, suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, and diplomatic downgrades have heightened mistrust, reopening old fault lines and disrupting initiatives for cooperation. Despite this, there are glimmers of dialogue: Pakistan has at times signaled willingness for talks, and any sustained confidence‑building measures—such as trade facilitation, cultural diplomacy, and people‑to‑people exchanges—could lay groundwork for broader engagement.

Multilateral platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) provide alternative avenues for structured interaction, potentially easing tensions and building mutual confidence that could translate back to SAARC. Cultural diplomacy, including sports and arts exchanges, remains an underutilized but valuable tool for reducing political tension and fostering grassroots goodwill. While complex geopolitical dynamics and security concerns persist, sustained diplomatic efforts, confidence‑building measures, and inclusive dialogue between India and Pakistan are essential for SAARC to function as an effective regional cooperation mechanism. 

CONCLUSION

Nelson Mandela’s observation—“If you want to make peace with your adversary, you have to cooperate with your opponent, then he joins you as a partner”—aptly underscores SAARC’s potential as a platform for regional cooperation, even among historically contentious nations. Despite persistent political tensions, economic disparities, and institutional limitations, SAARC’s continued existence reflects the shared commitment of South Asian leaders to dialogue, coordination, and incremental collaboration. Revitalizing the organization requires enhanced political will, stronger leadership, effective branding, and active engagement at all levels, including people-to-people, economic, and security initiatives. While SAARC may face periodic setbacks, it remains more than an intergovernmental body—it embodies a vision of regional peace, integration, and collective prosperity, serving as a vital framework for addressing shared challenges and fostering cooperation in South Asia.

About the Author

Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.

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