By: Pritam Sarbabdiya
The recent Pahalgam terror attack in Kashmir underscores a hard reality in the realm of intelligence, strategic, and security affairs, the idea of achieving or ensuring permanent or absolute solutions to security threats like that of terrorism remains an elusive myth. Despite years of progress and preparedness through intelligence gathering, counter-terrorism strategies, and military presence, the attack has revealed an inherent limitation that no amount of planning or technology can ensure complete security. This piece delves into why the notion of a permanent solution is a myth, highlighting the realistic objectives of any state about the idea of security is about: minimising, retaliating, and safeguarding threats and risks.
The immediate reaction that ruled the entire discourse points out various aspects that resulted in the deadliest Pahalgam terrorist attacks, many experts and certainly politicians have stressed various reasons whether its ‘intelligence failure or miscalculation’, to that of the government’s incapacitation to ensure absolute security in Jammu Kashmir, which can be unfolded before the citizens in future investigation. Watching the horrors, that have sent shockwaves across India and the world many asked a significant ‘What is the permanent solution’ to this decade-old problem? After the abrogation of Article 370 and extensive military presence in the valley, many expected that the issue of terrorism would be eradicated from the land of Jammu & Kashmir, resulting in chronic normalcy both in the lives of people and the heaven on earth. However, this attack has brought everything back to square one and brought out a debate on the table about ‘Can States ensure complete security?’
The notion of a permanent solution or absolute security to terrorism and strategic threats is not new but remains constantly evasive. Security threats today are no longer traditional, those days are gone when enemies or elements of threats were easily identifiable, the modern threat prospect includes trans-national terrorist networks, equipped with the same modern advantages that the states are also equipped with, for instance, when states rely on intelligence, the adversaries opt for significant counter-intelligence, simultaneously, no matter how many troops are deployed to ensure security, it is not practically possible to secure every inch or corner of the landmass.
Terrorists with the advantage of hiding their identity using both money and influence also succeed in carrying out operations using strategic loopholes employed by security agencies. The challenge is not just limited to India, internationally, for instance countries around the world struggle to guarantee complete protection against threats, whether it’s the United States of America or Israel who are seen as countries having both technology and intelligence to counter threats from enemies. However, history shows a different picture, the 9/11 in America or the recent Hamas attack on Israel on October 07, 2023 question the very claim of strategic edge these countries possess and exemplify how most tactically advanced systems can be circumvented by unforeseen situations. The United States and Israel even after having internationally acclaimed intelligence agencies namely, the CIA and the Mossad failed to stop the mentioned events.
Similarly, in India’s case, the tragic incidents of the 2008 Mumbai attack, the Uri attack in 2016, and later the 2019 Pulwama attack, epitomise that even after extensive efforts of intelligence agencies, and armed forces, the government cannot promise total protection or absolute security. As, ‘Security is a matter of degree, not of totality’, it should be understood in relative terms, as today’s security may be tomorrow’s crisis. Acknowledging, the limitation of ensuring complete security, governments and security agencies must focus on three achievable and practical goals encircled around, minimise risks, retaliate against attacks, and safeguard their citizens and country’s interests. Firstly, minimisation involves reducing the vulnerability and impact of potential attacks by employing a robust intelligence-gathering framework based on both human intelligence (HUMINT) and technology, risk assessments, preventive security measures, and awareness programs.
Secondly, Retaliation serves as a deterrent and a mechanism of signalling that terrorist acts have consequences, not only for immediate perpetrators but also for their subsequent direct and indirect sponsors and supporters. This can be through diplomacy, economic action, and also demonstrative military action. Thirdly, Safeguard is about actions and policy decisions focused on protecting resources, and citizens, at the time of crisis, and even beforehand using a threat prediction system. These proactive strategies do not fully claim to prevent all attacks but try or aim to mitigate as much as causalities, preserve subsequent order in the state, ensure a sense of confidence among the public, and maintain the continuity of further action.
In conclusion, The Pahalgam terrorist attack should serve not merely as a moment of grief but as an occasion for strategic introspection. It reminds us that the pursuit of absolute security is not just only futile but also very impractical to promise. As a result, India and other countries must embrace and elevate a strategic doctrine rooted in pragmatic realism, like the one that is currently driving India’s foreign policy, one that emphasises threat minimisation, demonstrative retaliation, and robust safeguarding.
