By: Megha Mittal, Research Analyst, GSDN
India-China relations have always been portrayed as a fine balancing act between cooperation and confrontation. They share civilizational linkages and a long history of cultural exchanges, but mostly, their modern political relations have been shaped by contested borders, security concerns, and shifting power equations. The violent clash on the border after about four decades, resulted in 20 Indian soldiers being killed in action along with an unknown number of Chinese troops dead in the month of June 2020 in the Galwan Valley. It has come to represent, more than just a military confrontation, the erosion of trust built in decades of agreements and dialogues since the 1990s.
For India, Galwan was not only a territory dispute: it was questioning whether China respects the principles of peaceful coexistence that it once promised under Panchsheel. For China, the incident was a reflection of strategic assertiveness, not just along the LAC but all over Asia in pursuing its geopolitical ambitions. The clash significantly changed perceptions in India both at the government and society levels, asking the vulnerable question: Can India ever again trust China?
For India, Galwan was not only a territory dispute: it was questioning whether China respects the principles of peaceful coexistence that it once promised under Panchsheel. For China, the incident was a reflection of strategic assertiveness, not just along the LAC but all over Asia in pursuing its geopolitical ambitions. The clash significantly changed perceptions in India both at the government and society levels, asking the vulnerable question: Can India ever again trust China?
Historical Context of India–China Relations
India, until the mid-20th century, hosted one of the oldest civilizations whose interstate relations were interwoven with the diversity and shifted between cooperation and confrontation. Especially after the end of British colonial rule, a feeling of solidarity was evoked between the two neighbors on account of their being cradled in history under the subjugation of foreign powers and a desire for Asian resurgence. During the 1950s, this era of goodwill was immortalized in popular songs heralding the age of “Hindi-Chini Bhai-Bhai” after the 1954 Panchsheel Agreement that specifically worked to strengthen the spirits of peaceful coexistence and mutual non-interference conjured between the two sovereign nations. However, this cycle of goodwill was to be surprisingly short-lived.
The year 1962 was an ominous epoch in the Indian expectation of China as a friendly neighbor. This humiliation drilled into India how ill-prepared she was for these defense contingencies. These events were at the heart of the Indian national psyche. Stiffness returned, along with suspicion and doubt, and a slow healing of diplomatic relations went on through the 1970s and ’80s. Attached to memory is that 1988 day when the historic visit of Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was made to Beijing to initiate dialogue and confidence-building measures. But, the key problem of the border stood unaired.
The rapid growth of commercial and economic cooperation had in a way created an illusion of convergence between the two Asian Giants after the Cold War. By the turn of the millennium, China had firmly set its grounds as one of the major trading partners of India. India and China began negotiations on a series of cooperative agreements along the LAC with the intent of maintaining peace between the two sides. Over time, however, the spirit of the agreement took a series of hits because of border incidents, with the incidents of Depsang, 2013, and Doklam, 2017 standing out on sharp reminders on margins for both sides on how fragile such engagement can become. Galwan in 2020 offered strong testimony to the fact that, at the end of the day, foundational grievances and un-agreed borders take precedence over the relationship itself with the result being almost an impossibility for trust-building.
The Galwan Valley Clash: A Turning Point
The Galwan Valley confrontation in June 2020 stands as a major landmark in Indo-China bilateral relations. Situated in eastern Ladakh, Galwan had not been a big flashpoint in the past, but the place suddenly turned into the deadliest confrontation in over 40 years. The clash killed 20 Indian soldiers, including one commanding officer, whereas the Chinese side was pretty much silent on their casualties at first but later admitted of losing several troops. Apart from the whole casualty aspect, this incident also really symbolized a breach of trust between India and China.
For decades, India and China had several CBMs and protocols in place-along the lines of the 1993 Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility along the LAC and the 1996 Agreement on Military CBMs-to ensure that even if patrols clashed, they would do so without violence. But the Galwan incident showed that these mechanisms had failed. This was the first violent encounter since 1975, and the first deadly one since the 1962 war.
The Indian response was quick, multifaceted, and comprehensive. Militarily, New Delhi reinforced LAC positions, brought in additional troops, and sped up infrastructural developments in the bordering areas. Economically, the attempt was to water down India’s dependence on China through banning over 200 Chinese apps, stopping Chinese investments in strategic sectors, and promoting alternate supply chains. On the diplomatic front, India has engaged China in several rounds of talks, becoming unwavering on the bottom line of peace on the border before proceeding to normal relations.
The Galwan clash was not just another skirmish: it has changed strategic calculations. It shattered the notion that economic interdependence aspired to stability. Public mistrust of China and against China rose in India, emphasizing the national security and self-reliance bases. In certain ways, Galwan is the 21st-century Rubicon that reawakened old traumas and laid bare the inherent volatility of an indefinite border.
China’s Strategic Behaviour and India’s Concerns
The sustained actions of China over the last two decades have undoubtedly created an aura of assertiveness rightly viewed with suspicion by India. The Galwan clash, it seems, was never to be a singular case: it stands as yet another facet of Beijing’s grand design for military expansion, economic penetration, and geostrategic engineering south of the Himalayas and beyond. From a military point of view, the PLA has developed advanced infrastructure all across Tibet and Xinjiang, from which it can quickly deploy its forces against the LAC. Incursions have been increasing; salami-slicing tactics began to erode India’s capacity to hold up deterrence, with the changing attempts at altering the status quo slowly undermining deterrence on the Indian front.
On the economic end, trade imbalances have been exploited to hold India vulnerable. Even though China has been India’s largest trading partner, the relationship has been disproportionately skewed in favor of China, because India has run enormous deficits and has become an exporter and importer of Chinese goods in critical sectors such as electronics, pharmaceuticals, and technology. The Galwan incident demonstrated that economic interdependence might not translate to peace, and thus India was compelled to restrict Chinese investments and diversify its supply chains.
Anyhow, China’s growing influence in South Asia had become another cause of concern. Its close relationship with Pakistan, especially through CPEC, along with growing outreach in Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Maldives, had carved out India’s traditional sphere of influence. All the while, the increasing Chinese naval power and assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific present the maritime security concern to India. Such developments present a clear evidence of China’s comprehensive thrust toward altering the regional order in its favor. For India, Galwan stood as an unfortunate reminder that neither past agreements nor economic relations can guarantee stability and practically deepened the trust deficit, thereby maintaining the demand for vigilance.
Trust Deficit: Why Galwan Changed Everything
The Galwan clash was a pivotal event that broke the delicate trust framework that had kept India–China relations together since the 1990s. The previous three decades had seen both sides relying on confidence-building measures and border agreements to provide a shield from violence even during moments of tension. June 2020 saw this mechanism fail with the deaths of Indian soldiers, prompting India to revisit China’s credibility as a negotiating partner. China now showed a blatant disregard for its agreed understandings, sending across clear signals that whenever hard-nosed strategic interests come into play, they would willingly take precedence over diplomacy.
The ripples, however, spread beyond the battlefield. Galwan incident created an odium against China, pushing India for stronger border security and economic self-reliance. From a strategical point of view, this proved that Beijing could no longer be considered to honor its commitments, as those commitments once were supposed to stabilize the upward curve on escalation. Perhaps, this incident also exposed the asymmetry of intent-there, where India was pushing for keeping the peace and stability along the Line of Actual Control, China appeared intent on altering the facts on the ground by measured aggression.
In essence, Galwan was not merely a soldiers’ clash; rather, it represented a clash between expectations. It displayed how fragile diplomatic commitments could be and afterwards transformed that very relationship into one defined by suspicion. For India, the lesson was clear: once trust is lost, it is hard to rebuild it, especially if issues of sovereignty and national security are involved.
India’s Strategic Dilemma: Engage, Compete, or Confront?
After the Galwan clashes, India followed a difficult strategic dilemma—whether to engage with China, compete by pursuing capability-building, or confront Beijing directly. Engagement remains essential because the two countries enjoy a long border, are members of multiple forums such as BRICS and SCO, and have significant trade between them. Cutting all ties is neither feasible and nor desirable. India, however, acknowledges the dangers of over-dependence and has therefore competed by building up border-side infrastructure, upgrading armed forces for modern requirements, and more recently, inked closer partnerships with like-minded countries through platforms like the Quad. Confrontation carries maximum risk, given that initiation of escalation along the Line of Actual Control could spiral into detonation of a wider conflict between these two nuclear powers, thereby destabilizing the entire region.
Thus, India’s approach has been cautiously balancing China—diplomatically whenever necessary, economically and strategically in order to reduce vulnerabilities on its side, and militarily to deter further aggression. The dilemma does not lie in choosing one path and traversing it exclusively but in going down all three simultaneously, to make sure India hangs onto her sovereignty without closing the door on a dialogue.
Should India Trust China? Different Perspectives
The issue differentiating analysts on whether India should trust China post-Galwan has perspectives falling into a few strategic schools of thought. Realists deny trust, for states act only in the interests of self-security. In Chinese conduct at Galwan, the Chinese put territorial claims and strategic advantage above agreements, so India must gear for a long-term conflict rather than cooperation with China. Liberals, on the other hand, consider that channels of engagement cannot be closed entirely despite tensions. The existence of shared interests, such as trade, climate change, and regional stability, forces engagement, although in this case, reduced trust remains a factor. Constructivist thinkers would point to the underlying issue of perception: that memories from the 1962 war, nationalism, and competing narratives fuel distrust, making reconciliation as much about the transformation of mindsets as about negotiating borders.
In a nutshell, India finds itself caught in-between reality. While repeated violations of agreements should perhaps have put absolute trust in China out of reach, an economic and geographical dependency should have at the same time deterred total disengagement. The pragmatic way should be to adopt a policy of managed mistrust-by engaging with China only when it is mutually beneficial and never by putting trust on goodwill alone. Through such a policy, India will keep her sovereignty intact but maintain some dialogue.
Conclusion
The Galwan Valley incident of 2020 set a serious tone in India-China relations. What had been a fragile balance maintained by drafting agreements and ensuring economic engagement, broke apart on bickering over mistrust and strategic rivalry. For India, the incident was no mere sterile matter; the very question put forward challenged whether China is ever to be trusted to keep its word. Historical acts and experiences have taught India to lean heavily toward suspicion, if not downright caution.
Building trust in international relations is never absolute in nature, but Galwan made it clearly understood that building trust with China was an uphill task. Diabolical transgressions of agreements, adverse military and geopolitical posturing constitute a consistent pattern of behavior that India cannot brush aside. Simultaneously, however, geography and economics simply prohibit disengagement. India must therefore, tread a razor-edged pathway of engaging when necessary, competing strategically to protect its interests, and deterring aggression with military preparedness and partnerships.
In essence, the question is less about whether India should trust China and more about how it should manage mistrust. By strengthening its internal resilience, diversifying its external partnerships, and maintaining firm vigilance along the border, India can deal with China from a position of confidence. After Galwan, blind trust is not an option—but pragmatic caution is.
About the Author
Megha Mittal is a scholar of International Relations with an academic foundation in Spanish language studies. Her work engages with the study of geopolitics, foreign policy, and global governance, reflecting a broad interest in the dynamics that define and influence international affairs.
