By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN
The Changing Nature of Warfare and the Need for Multi-Domain Deterrence
India’s security environment is undergoing a profound transformation, driven by the rapid evolution of military technologies and the emergence of complex, hybrid threats. Traditional warfare, once defined by territorial control and conventional force deployment, is now being reshaped by cyber operations, space-based assets, artificial intelligence, and precision-guided systems. In this changing landscape, deterrence can no longer rely solely on numerical strength or legacy platforms; instead, it must evolve into a multi-domain construct that integrates capabilities across land, air, sea, cyber, and space.
The concept of multi-domain deterrence (MDD) emphasizes synergy—where different military domains operate in coordination to create a cumulative strategic effect. For India, this shift is particularly critical given the challenge posed by technologically advanced adversaries like China, whose military modernization has been both rapid and comprehensive. China’s ability to combine conventional forces with cyber warfare, electronic warfare, and space capabilities gives it a decisive edge in shaping the battlefield. Therefore, India must move beyond fragmented responses and adopt a synchronized, multi-domain strategy that ensures faster decision-making, real-time intelligence sharing, and precision strike capabilities.
However, adopting MDD is not merely a doctrinal shift—it requires a rethinking of how India conceptualizes power. It demands integration across services, the breaking down of silos, and the creation of a unified command structure capable of executing complex operations. Without such transformation, India risks remaining reactive rather than proactive in its deterrence posture.Recent global conflicts have powerfully demonstrated that the future of warfare lies in the seamless fusion of multiple domains, reinforcing the urgency of India’s transition toward multi-domain deterrence. The ongoing Russia–Ukraine war has highlighted the decisive role of drones, satellite intelligence, cyber operations, and precision-guided munitions in shaping battlefield outcomes, often compensating for asymmetries in conventional force strength. Similarly, the Israel–Hamas conflict (2023–present) has underscored the importance of integrated air defence systems, real-time intelligence fusion, and rapid response mechanisms in countering both state and non-state threats. These conflicts reveal that dominance is no longer achieved solely through territorial control but through information superiority, speed of decision-making, and technological integration. For India, these lessons are particularly relevant in the context of its contested borders and evolving security challenges in the Indo-Pacific region. China’s advancements in hypersonic weapons, cyber warfare, and space militarisation further intensify the need for India to accelerate its own transformation. Additionally, the increasing militarisation of emerging domains such as outer space and cyberspace indicates that future conflicts may begin long before traditional military engagement occurs. Consequently, India must prioritise not just capability accumulation but capability integration, ensuring that its forces can operate cohesively across domains in real time. These contemporary developments make it evident that multi-domain deterrence is not a theoretical construct but an operational necessity, critical to maintaining strategic stability and preventing conflict in an increasingly volatile global order.
Hard Choices and Systemic Vulnerabilities in India’s Defence Preparedness
A central theme emerging is the presence of hard strategic choices that India must confront. One approach involves aggressively investing in emerging technologies and building entirely new capabilities. While this may offer long-term advantages, it carries significant risks—particularly if such investments fail to mature in time or create gaps in current operational readiness. The second approach is more conservative: integrating new technologies into existing systems to enhance their effectiveness. Though less risky, this strategy may not significantly alter the balance of power.Recent policy and budgetary trends further highlight both the progress and persistent gaps in India’s defence preparedness. The Union Budget 2025–26 has continued to prioritise capital outlay for defence modernization, with a growing share allocated to domestic procurement under the Atmanirbhar Bharat initiative. This reflects a strategic push to reduce import dependency, which historically accounted for a significant portion of India’s defence acquisitions. However, despite these efforts, challenges remain in terms of absorptive capacity and timely fund utilisation, often leading to under-execution of allocated budgets. On the innovation front, initiatives such as the Innovations for Defence Excellence (iDEX) programme and the expansion of defence corridors in Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu are encouraging start-ups and MSMEs to contribute to next-generation military technologies, including unmanned systems, AI-based solutions, and advanced materials. At the same time, global supply chain disruptions and geopolitical uncertainties—exacerbated by ongoing conflicts and great power competition—have exposed vulnerabilities in India’s reliance on foreign components and critical technologies. Furthermore, the increasing role of private sector giants and strategic partnerships in defence production marks a shift toward a more diversified industrial base, yet coordination challenges with public sector undertakings persist. These developments indicate that while India is moving in the right direction, bridging the gap between policy intent and execution remains crucial. Strengthening institutional mechanisms, improving procurement efficiency, and ensuring synergy between stakeholders will be key to transforming India’s defence preparedness into a truly resilient and future-ready system.
India’s dilemma lies in balancing these competing priorities. The country continues to rely heavily on legacy platforms, many of which are ill-suited to modern warfare. At the same time, its defence-industrial base lacks the scale and efficiency needed to rapidly produce advanced technologies. This creates a dual vulnerability—technological lag and industrial insufficiency—which adversaries could exploit. Moreover, India’s procurement processes remain slow and bureaucratic, often leading to delays in capability acquisition. The lack of coordination between the armed forces, research institutions, and industry further exacerbates the problem. The issue is not merely technological competence but the absence of a structured system capable of delivering at speed and scale. To address these vulnerabilities, India must adopt a pragmatic approach—one that combines incremental improvements with targeted investments in disruptive technologies. This includes strengthening domestic manufacturing, encouraging innovation, and reducing dependence on foreign suppliers. Without such reforms, India’s deterrence strategy will remain constrained by systemic inefficiencies.
Building Enabling Layers: The Backbone of Effective Deterrence
Another is the importance of “enabling layers” in shaping India’s multi-domain capabilities. These layers—Command and Control (C2), Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR), and advanced communication networks—form the foundation upon which effective deterrence is built. Unlike visible military assets such as tanks or fighter jets, enabling systems operate behind the scenes, ensuring coordination, situational awareness, and rapid response.Recent developments underscore how rapidly the character of enabling layers is evolving in India’s strategic framework. The growing deployment of space-based surveillance assets, such as improved satellite constellations for real-time tracking and communication, has significantly enhanced India’s situational awareness along contested borders. Parallelly, the integration of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning into intelligence processing is reducing decision-making time, enabling predictive threat analysis rather than reactive responses. India’s increasing focus on network-centric warfare, reflected in systems like integrated air command and control networks and battlefield management systems, is gradually linking sensors, shooters, and decision-makers into a unified digital grid. This transformation is particularly crucial in light of recent border tensions and evolving grey-zone tactics, where information dominance often determines strategic advantage without full-scale conflict. Additionally, the rapid expansion of drone and counter-drone capabilities, especially after lessons drawn from global conflicts such as the Russia–Ukraine war, has pushed India to invest in swarm drone technologies and electronic warfare systems capable of neutralising unmanned threats. The emphasis on secure and resilient communication networks—including quantum communication research and anti-jamming technologies—further reflects an understanding that future wars will be fought as much through data integrity as through firepower. Collectively, these advancements highlight that enabling layers are no longer supportive elements but decisive instruments of deterrence, capable of shaping outcomes even before conventional forces are deployed.
For India, strengthening these layers is critical. A robust ISR system, for instance, allows for continuous monitoring of adversary movements, enabling preemptive action when necessary. Similarly, advanced C2 systems ensure that information flows seamlessly across different units and services, reducing response time and improving operational efficiency. In a multi-domain environment, where decisions must be made in seconds, such capabilities can prove decisive. The editorial also underscores the need for affordable and scalable ISR platforms, particularly in large numbers. This is essential because, in a prolonged conflict, the ability to sustain surveillance and reconnaissance operations becomes as important as initial deployment. Additionally, integrating cyber and electronic warfare capabilities into these enabling layers can provide India with a strategic edge, allowing it to disrupt adversary systems while protecting its own.
Another crucial aspect is the development of a layered C4ISR architecture (Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance). This integrated system not only enhances India’s operational capabilities but also limits the effectiveness of adversary actions. By creating redundancy and resilience within these layers, India can ensure continuity of operations even in contested environments.
Reforming the Defence-Industrial Base and Strategic Way Forward
The success of India’s multi-domain deterrence strategy ultimately hinges on the strength of its defence-industrial base. India’s industrial ecosystem is not yet structured to deliver the speed, scale, and innovation required for modern warfare. Addressing this gap requires comprehensive reforms that go beyond incremental changes.
First, India must prioritize industrial capacity building by fostering greater collaboration between the public and private sectors. Private industry, with its efficiency and technological dynamism, can play a crucial role in accelerating production and innovation. Providing long-term contracts, ensuring policy stability, and reducing regulatory barriers can incentivize private participation and drive growth in the defence sector.Recent developments in India’s defence architecture reinforce the urgency of transitioning toward a fully integrated multi-domain deterrence framework. The Government of India’s declaration of 2025 as the “Year of Defence Reforms” signals a decisive policy push toward jointness, technological modernization, and institutional restructuring. Central to this effort is the long-awaited implementation of Integrated Theatre Commands (ITCs), which aim to unify the Army, Navy, and Air Force under single operational commanders for specific threat theatres. This restructuring is expected to eliminate inter-service silos and significantly enhance operational efficiency in multi-domain warfare scenarios. Complementing this, the June 2025 reform empowering the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) to issue binding joint operational directives marks a watershed moment in India’s military evolution, effectively transforming “jointness” from a conceptual aspiration into an actionable command structure. Simultaneously, India is investing in advanced technological ecosystems, including artificial intelligence, hypersonic systems, cyber warfare, and space-based capabilities, which are increasingly central to modern deterrence strategies. Initiatives such as integrated battlefield surveillance systems and network-centric warfare platforms are enhancing India’s C4ISR capabilities, enabling faster and more precise decision-making on the battlefield. Moreover, the emphasis on indigenous defence production under the broader vision of Atmanirbhar Bharat reflects a strategic shift toward self-reliance, aiming to reduce dependency on foreign suppliers while building resilient supply chains. Taken together, these reforms indicate that India is not merely adapting to changing warfare dynamics but actively reshaping its military doctrine to align with the demands of 21st-century conflict—where integration, speed, and technological superiority are the ultimate determinants of deterrence credibility.
Second, procurement reforms are essential. The current system must evolve to become more flexible, transparent, and outcome-oriented. This includes focusing on capability development rather than platform acquisition, streamlining decision-making processes, and aligning procurement with strategic objectives. Importantly, the system must be able to adapt quickly to changing technological and operational requirements.
Third, India must invest in critical enabling capabilities through targeted budget allocations. This includes funding for advanced research, development of indigenous technologies, and creation of infrastructure to support multi-domain operations. Learning from China’s example, India should also build sufficient stockpiles and production capacity to sustain operations during prolonged conflicts. Finally, doctrinal and institutional reforms are necessary to ensure effective implementation. The integration of the armed forces through theatre commands, combined with technological integration, can enhance coordination and operational effectiveness. Equally important is the need for a clear strategic vision that aligns military, industrial, and political objectives.
Conclusion
India’s strategic trajectory today is defined not by incremental adaptation but by the necessity for transformational change. The shift toward multi-domain deterrence encapsulates a broader reimagining of how power is generated, integrated, and projected in the 21st century. It demands that India move beyond legacy frameworks and embrace a future where deterrence is built on speed, synergy, and technological superiority rather than sheer scale alone. This transition, however, is as much about mindset as it is about material capability—requiring political will, institutional cohesion, and a culture of innovation that permeates both the military and the defence-industrial ecosystem. Crucially, India must recognize that deterrence in the modern era is not static but dynamic. It is continuously shaped by emerging technologies, evolving doctrines, and shifting geopolitical realities. As adversaries invest heavily in artificial intelligence, cyber warfare, and space militarization, India cannot afford a reactive posture. Instead, it must anticipate, adapt, and lead—leveraging its growing technological base, expanding industrial capacity, and strategic partnerships to build a resilient and future-ready force. Ultimately, the success of India’s multi-domain deterrence strategy will lie in its ability to integrate diverse capabilities into a coherent whole, where every domain reinforces the other. This is not merely about preparing for war but about preventing it—by presenting a posture so credible and cohesive that adversaries are dissuaded from aggression. In doing so, India will not only safeguard its national interests but also emerge as a stabilizing force in an increasingly fragmented and contested global order.
About the Author
Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.
