By: Trishnakhi Parashar, Research Analyst, GSDN

In the ever-shifting sands of South Asian geopolitics, recent unfolding events suggest that Bangladesh, in one way or another, is gradually distancing itself from its traditionally close ties with India and becoming more and more comfortable engaging with once-foe, Pakistan. Muhammad Yunus has assumed charge as the head of Bangladesh’s interim government following the nation’s longstanding prime minister, Sheikh Hasina, with whom he had maintained a complicated relationship, stepping down from power on August 05, 2024. Not even a year has passed since her exile, the new leader and his administration appears to have already outlined a clear roadmap for dealing with their neighbourhood. His early statements and actions about India, perhaps reveal a mindset that raises strategic concerns about his approach towards its immediate neighbour— so a recently discussed defence deal between the Bangladesh Armed Forces and the Pakistan Air Force, comes as no real surprise.

Not so long ago, a notable visit by high-ranking Bangladeshi defence officials, led by Lieutenant General S M Kamrul Hassan, Chief of General Staff of the Bangladesh Armed Forces, took place at the Pakistan Air Force Headquarters in Islamabad, where the Bangladeshi delegation held a meeting with Pakistan Air Force Chief Marshal Zaheer Ahmad Baber Sidhu. The visit was intended to tighten defence ties and explore new potential areas for collaboration, mostly in defence manufacturing and technological developments.

This deal, to a large extent attempted to solidify the military cooperation between the two Air Forces using cooperative training programs. Harmonizing approaches to work together, such as joint military training and exchange programmes, ranging from basic instruction to operational level. In fact, from February 07-11, 2025 in the northern Arabian Sea near Karachi, Pakistan Navy organised multinational naval exercise “The Aman-25”, where Bangladesh sent a major naval warship BNS Samudra Joy, highlighting more than mere symbolic flag waving.

Sources indicate that the deal covers collaboration on areas such as, Modular and Unmanned Mission Trainers (MUMT–UMT), the unseen architects/simulator systems for real world operations— alongside Tactical Air Data Link System (TDLS), an advanced encrypted communication system for defence aircraft, ships, and ground forces. Moreover, both air forces are in talks of testing Flight SRNL-based Augmented Reality (AR) and Virtual Reality (VR) systems designed to replicate real-time combat scenarios. These systems mostly used by global elite units— to build resilient networks, provides/enabling rapid data sharing, and awareness of the frontline to optimize mission execution.

Space and simulated warfare along with cybersecurity has been emerging as one of the progressive aspects in the Pakistan-Bangladesh Air Force deal. Beyond traditional aerial assets, the talks reportedly also touched on cooperation in cybersecurity frameworks.

Above all, Dhaka reportedly also has an intent to purchase JF-17 fighter jets from Pakistan to modernize its air force. The JF-17 — “Thunder” said to be a lightweight, fourth-generation multirole fighter jet, made capable of carrying a wide range of weapons, which includes air-to-air, air-to-surface, and anti-ship missiles, plus guided and unguided bombs, fitted with a 23 mm GSh-23-2 twin-barrel autocannon, jointly developed by Pakistan and China. These jets cost about US$ 25-32 million per unit, depending on different model, provides a more budget-friendly option than any Western-build fighters, that generally start from US$ 70-80 million per unit, making JF-17 an attractive option for states seeking to align defence modernization and economic affordability.

Moreover, Dhaka is not only receiving equipment and jets, but also operational expertise from Islamabad— knowledge that it had honed with the help of Chinese experts. Pakistan is offering malware-resistant protocols and offensive cyber warfare training. Technology and knowledge sharing are integral in this collaboration between the two the countries for shaping security dynamics.

India, as an immediate neighbour to both the states, having stable relations is very significant, at the same time achieving it is anything but simple. Pakistan’s current and ongoing involvement with Bangladesh, is a significant shift in regional dynamics, seemingly complicating India’s security, and has undeniably drawn attention from Indian defence and diplomatic circles. These developments suggest a carefully calculated reconfiguration in the region, mostly directing to counterbalance India’s influence. Indeed, for India, growing defence partnership between Pakistan and Bangladesh, particularly under China’s shadow— is understandably concerning, but India needs to examine and understand all the potential future implications in order to prepare proactive policy measures.

This deal could have major implications for India— not only because two contemporary “adversarial to India” states are collaborating in defence domain, but also because there is a high probability of more hidden parties to it, who do not want India to grow regionally or internationally. Anyway, with everything going on in Bangladesh, and also having a leader who is not so fond of India, the country could have been inclined to implement a hardline stance against India, similar to what the Maldivian leaders did in 2023-24.

It is noticeable that a shared hostility toward India serves as one of the binding glues between the two states. The regime change in Bangladesh a year ago paved the way for reshaping alignment with Pakistan, regardless of its past record. Pakistan has been seeking to maintain a friendly relationship with Bangladesh, though such efforts were reciprocated in a limited and cautious manner. However, during Sheikh Hasina’s tenure, relations with Pakistan, hovered in a grey zone, neither evidently warm, and nor particularly hostile.

But, under the present leadership of Muhammad Yunus, their general outlook for regional politics has moved from opposing Pakistan to a more cooperative mode. By evaluating the activities of both the states, one could easily sense a change in the wind, which leading up to the unavoidable question/concern about India’s course of engagement with the whole matter.

Historically, Pakistan has not only been considered but also proved to be an adversarial state— fought four major wars, needless to say sponsoring terrorist attacks and engaging in conspiracy against India. Evan, Bangladesh has a history of supporting insurgent groups in India’s Northeast region, such as- The United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA), Kamatapur Liberation Organisation (KLO), and other such separatist organisation. For many years, Bangladeshi territory functioned as a safe haven for such anti-India groups — allowing them to shelter, train, and operate against India. But during the 15-year rule of Sheikh Hasina, no such organisations operated from Bangladesh.

With Bangladesh, India hasn’t faced any war-like situation, thanks to their leaders even though a few of them were often critical of India and, turned a blind eye as their land was used for certain anti-India activities, but never went for upfront military action. Now, with current situation, there is high possibility that Bangladesh could once again be used as a base for anti-India activities. Pakistan has long targeted Northwest India, and now the prospect of potential Pakistani presence close to Northeast India and West Bengal is a big-time concern for New Delhi.

Even from the economic perspective, Pakistan-Bangladesh partnership might be unsettling for India. Bangladesh is India’s one of the biggest trading partners in the region and India is the second biggest export partner, nearly 12% Bangladesh’s imports come from India. In FY24, India’s major exports to Bangladesh amounted to roughly US$ 11.06 billion, major commodities comprise engineering goods (US$ 2.19 billion), cotton yarn, fabrics, made-ups, handloom products, etc. (US$ 1.86 billion), petroleum products (US$ 1.25 billion), organic and inorganic chemicals (US$ 651.33 million), followed by other commodities (US$ 2.39 billion). Now with emerging partnerships with states like China, Pakistan and Turkey, Bangladesh is in the position to diversify its economic imports and explore new trade dynamics.

India has always maintained a non-interference in Bangladesh’s sovereign decisions, including the choice of defence alliance. However, most of its allies have posed significant challenges to India’s security, other than Pakistan, states such as China and Turkey are strong/influential competitor of India in various domains. China already has close relation with Bangladesh, but with India had a turbulent past and persistent strategic competition. Moreover, now increasing defence cooperation with Turkey, including the procurement of Turkish Bayraktar drones, rifles and machine guns acquired by Bangladesh, adds another new level of complexity to the security of India.

Recent reports point out to the formation of a strategic alliance among Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI) of Bangladesh and Turkey—with the common intention of countering India, manages finances, arms and weapons but most importantly pumps radical Islamic ideology throughout South Asia. In fact, Justice and Development Party (AKP) — Turkey’s ruling party has started to support the Muslim Brotherhood, across the world. This particular trilateral alliance is taking advantage of the power vacuum and Bangladesh’s strategic location to expand their sphere of influence.

Equally concerning is the maritime dimension — Pakistan-Bangladesh collaboration in the Bay of Bengal possess a risk of eroding India’s naval authority and tightening the strategic squeeze in India’s maritime security. Furthermore, to share experience and expertise in naval platforms, modern combat systems and advance defence technologies, Turkey also has extended support to establish two defence production facilities in Chittagong and Narayanganj, strategically close to India. So, here a serious question arise: is Turkey now is attempting to checkmate India in the South Asia, as China has with its ‘String of Pearls’?

Another major implication for India in the Pakistan-Bangladesh Air-force deal is Pakistan’s increasing defence production sector—an emerging potential supplier that India cannot underestimate. At the forefront of this effort is Global Industrial & Defence Solutions (GIDS), the largest, state-owned defence corporation, offering products for military applications. Apart from Bangladesh, Islamabad is planning to export weapons and defence equipment to Sudan and multiple African States. However, Pakistan’s alliances are highly questionable at the global level. Pakistan has long been accused of providing shelter and support to many terrorist organisations, which continue to pose a serious threat to India, and actively attempt to destabilize the region.

It is also evident that advanced weapons and cutting-edge defence technology are never safe in Pakistan’s hands. In 2004, A.Q. Khan, former Pakistani scientist, also known as the “father of Pakistan’s nuclear program” confessed to having supplied confidential nuclear technology and design to so called rogue states, such as- Iran, Libya and North Korea. For India, therefore the problem is not about weapons flowing into neighbourhood but about the credibility of Pakistan as an arms supplier itself.

Over the past couple of years, India has invested substantially in its relationship with Bangladesh, whether in trade, connectivity or energy. Anyway, India is now expected to very carefully set a new course with Dhaka. A combination of economic partnerships, cultural diplomacy, and strategic dialogue will likely to be employed to mend the current strained ties.

India perhaps also need to focus and work more closely with ASEAN nations to increase its regional network, thereby reducing its dependence on any single partner/ally. India-Pak relation is undoubtedly very complicated and delicate, but now we are yet to examine where India-Bangladesh ties stand.  Dhaka alienating New Delhi completely will have strong implications for India. The strategic friendliness between Dhaka and Islamabad might still be in its early stages, but it highlights a trend or perhaps “a reality” that India can no longer afford to ignore. “You can change friends but not neighbours”, said Atal Bihari Vajpayee… indeed a timeless reminder for Indian foreign policy makers.

About the Author

Trishnakhi Parashar is an enthusiastic and dedicated learner with a Master’s degree in International Relations/Politics from Sikkim Central University. Her academic journey is further enriched by a certification in Human Rights and Duties, a Postgraduate Diploma in Human Resource Management from Tezpur University, and a Diploma in International Affairs and Diplomacy from Indian Institute of Governance and Leadership.

Having begun her career at Tech Mahindra, Trishnakhi transitioned into the research field to pursue her deep-rooted passion for international affairs. She is currently interning at Global Strategic and Defence News, where she continues to refine her analytical skills. Her core interests include international relations, terrorism, diplomacy, and geopolitics—fields she explores with rigor and critical insight. Trishnakhi is committed to meticulous research and driven by a determination to contribute meaningfully to global discourse. With a vision to carve out her own niche, she aspires to leave a lasting impact on contemporary international issues.

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