By Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN
Introduction
The nuclearization of South Asia has fundamentally reshaped the strategic, political, and security dynamics between India and Pakistan. Emerging from distinct historical experiences but deeply interconnected threat perceptions, both states pursued nuclear weapons in response to regional wars, external alliances, and shifting global power structures. China’s nuclear test, repeated India–Pakistan conflicts, and perceived security asymmetries accelerated nuclear decision-making in New Delhi and Islamabad, culminating in overt nuclear tests in 1998. Since then, nuclear deterrence has coexisted with recurrent crises, including Kargil, Twin Peaks, and Mumbai, highlighting the paradox of strategic stability alongside persistent sub-conventional conflict. Divergent nuclear doctrines—India’s emphasis on minimum credible deterrence and no-first-use versus Pakistan’s first-use posture and full-spectrum deterrence—continue to shape escalation risks. Confidence-building measures and nuclear risk-reduction mechanisms have sought to manage tensions, while the United States has played a critical third-party role in crisis management. Together, these dynamics underscore the enduring challenges of deterrence stability, crisis control, and regional security in nuclear-armed South Asia.
Overview of India and Pakistan’s nuclear histories:
Zia Mian, Co-Director of the program on science global security at Princeton University, said that the idea in Pakistan of acquiring nuclear weapons began in the early 1950s when Pak signed a military alliance agreement with the US as part of which Pakistan became an ally of the US in the cold war against USSR and return the US will provide economic aid and military advice to bring into the modern age. In this way, the US plots the modern American idea of nuclear technology, i.e., nuclear weapons in warfare. Raj Chengappa, the Editorial Director of the India group today, Jayita Sarkarv, and Feroz Khan, who is the Director of Arms Control and Disarmament affairs, said that in 1964, China tested nuclear weapons, and in the 1965 Indo-Pak war when China sided with Pak. This made India compelled to move forward with nuclear weapons. This showed that the two nuclear neighbors i.e., IND and Pak compelled India to develop nuclear weapons in order to ensure security. The Strong debate started that India was building weapons, and Homi Bhabha was very active about this. But Shastri was against nuclear weapons. Basically, India sees nuclear weapons as a limited but necessary capability to protect itself.
The NPT came into force in 1970 to promote the peaceful benefits of nuclear energy, advance nuclear disarmament, and stop the spread of atomic weapons and technology. Neither India nor Pakistan joined the NPT. In 1969, Indira Gandhi ordered to go ahead with nuclear weapons, and in 1971, after the Ind-Pak war occurred, Bangladesh was created. India detonated its first nuclear weapon on May 18, 1974, in what it referred to as a “peaceful nuclear explosion,” also called Smiling Budha. The examination was conducted in Pokhran, Rajasthan. The United States and Canada responded negatively to the test; the United States provided the heavy water required to generate the plutonium utilized in the experiment, and Canada provided the CIRUS Reactor. According to Vipin Narang, Who is the Associate Professor at MIT, India’s nuclear test showed the world that nuclear technology imported for peaceful uses was being used by nuclear-weapon states, as defined by the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), for their weapons programs. This triggered anger in Pakistan because of the considerable loss. As we know, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto always dreamed of increasing bombs in Pakistan, and after the defeat of Pak in 1971, he wanted to turn his dream into reality. Pakistan criticized New Delhi for trying to distinguish between military and non-military applications of a nuclear test. Pakistan began developing nuclear weapons in response to its 1971 war with India. India’s Test of nuclear weapons is also a wake-up call for the International Community, which compelled them to take non-proliferation more seriously. Later, The Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) was founded by the international community in November 1974 due to India’s peaceful nuclear explosion.
INDIA AND PAKISTAN’S NUCLEAR TESTS
In 1998, the BJP government in India decided to conduct a series of nuclear tests in Rajasthan specifically; most were believed to be militarized. India has been working on their nuclear arsenals, and now they need to be tested. This is why India condemned the CTBT treaty because this treaty aimed to ban nuclear explosions. India believed that the Soviet Union and the United States were no longer required to test their arsenals to prove their reliability because they had already done a lot. It was said that India’s nuclear test in 1998 was against CTBT,but legally India never signed CTBT. Agni-I, Prithvi-II, Agni-III, Agni-V, Agni-V, and Prahar were the names of the nuclear tests, Mansoor Ahmed, Post Doctoral Fellow at Harward University, said that Pakistan conducted five nuclear explosions in the underground Tusko hills in Western Baluchistan and Kharan in 1998. These tests were in response to India’s test in Rajasthan in 1998. Abdali ballistic missile, Ghaznavi and Shaheen-I, Shaheen-II, and Shaheen-III were some tests. At the International forum, it was argued that deterrence capability would be compromised if Pakistan conducted another test.
At that moment, the immediate concern was to avert dangerous arms competition and to stop the zero-sum game. When the US started to engage with both nations, the basic objective was to restrain weapons and missile delivery programs. The nuclear tests conducted by India were another down because of fear of sanctions.
INDO-NUCLEAR DEAL SIGNED
On October 1, 2008, the Indo-U.S. civil nuclear agreement became official. The agreement allowed India to conduct nuclear trade with the United States and other Nuclear Suppliers Group members. In exchange for access to American dual-use nuclear technology, it also promised to allow American businesses to construct nuclear reactors in India. Pakistan objected to the agreement, saying that Pakistan likewise deserved an NSG waiver because India was given preferential treatment. Pakistan increased its production of Fissile material in response to the agreement.
INDIA AND PAKISTAN NUCLEAR POSTURE
According to the Nuclear Weapons Convention, even today, India has nuclear weapons, but it continues to be at the forefront of disarmament efforts, so India’s nuclear ambivalence persists. Pakistan was clear and purposeful about weapons because they wanted to build to fight against stronger neighbors and establish a sense of deep identity as a regional power. This showed that Pakistan has a “FIRSTUSE POLICY,” “FULL SPECTRUM DETERRENCE,” and India has a “NO FIRST USE POLICY,” “MINIMUM DETERRENCE,” “CONVENTIONAL FIGHTING CAPABILITY”, “GLOBALLY VERIFIED NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT,” AND “COMMAND AND CONTROL.” For Islamic Pakistan, it’s not just planning to use military weapons, but necessary for them to defend themselves at any cost against India, which seeks hegemony, the political consensus which consists of strong elements, i.e., Hindutwa inclinations.
CBMS AND A SERIES OF AGREEMENTS SIGNED
In order to avoid war, tension, and mistrust and establish peace and security, this led to the building of CBM and NRRM, which aimed to diffuse tensions and reduce nuclear wars. Several agreements were signed: The non-Attack of Nuclear Facilities Agreement by Rajiv Gandhi and Benazir Bhutto in 1988, the Prior Notification of Military Exercises in 1991, and the Ballistic Missile Flight-Test Pre-Notification Agreement in 2005. So, both sides pledged to notify each other in the event of a nuclear accident. But lack of trust between the two nations led to several attacks like the Mumbai crisis, the Kashmir issue, etc. So CBMSs and NRRM must be followed seriously in order to stop war and tensions.
US ROLE IN MANAGING CRISES BETWEEN INDIA AND PAKISTAN
South Asian Crises usually involved abnormalities, threats, level of asymmetries, violent non-state actors, and war. Attack on India Parliament After India had signed MOU at Lahore Summit, the Mumbai attack after a backchannel meeting by Musharraf and Manmohan Singh, attacks on Indian military posts after Modi visited Lahore, etc., were some crises.
BRASSTACKS CRISES
In 1986-1987, the Brasstacks crisis happened in which The PM, Rajiv Gandhi, the prime minister of India, seemed to have preferred a significant exercise to highlight India’s rising military capability. Several Indian authorities failed to predict that Pakistan would react dramatically to a large-scale exercise. During the final stage of the Brasstacks Exercise, India and Pakistan worked together to manage crises. By alerting both parties to the hazards of misinterpretation and offering its “good offices” at the height of the crisis, Washington made minor contributions to crisis management.
KARGIL CONFLICT
In 1999, the Kargil conflict occurred in which intense fighting occurred along LOC, and both sides feared that it would end in a nuclear war. During the Kargil Conflict, the US actively managed the situation. Washington determined that Pakistan was the aggressor from the beginning of the crisis. Thus, the Clinton administration’s diplomatic efforts were concentrated on getting Islamabad and Rawalpindi to withdraw their troops to the Pakistani side of the Line of Control. Clinton contributed personally to these initiatives. Washington remained steadfast
in its evaluation of Pakistan’s contribution to the crisis. It was, however, concerned that Indian authorities may intensify the dispute by conducting military operations beyond the LoC. Therefore, the administration made a concerted effort to convince New Delhi that it understood its worries and would exert pressure on Rawalpindi to maintain the status quo.
TWIN PEAKS CRISES
In 2001-2002, Twin peaks crises happened in which the first “peak” was brought on by a failed suicide bombing attempt on the Indian Parliament by members of the terrorist organizations: Jaish-e-Mohammad and Lashkar-e-Taiba, both of whom have bases in Pakistan. And the second “peak” of the crisis occurred in May 2002 when suicide bombers killed 39 persons, largely women and children, at an Indian Army post in Kaluchak, Kashmir. In order to reduce the escalating tension between India and Pakistan, this resulted in regional(IND) and international pressure(US) on Islamabad to impose stringent measures against these violent nonstate actor organizations.India’s willingness to act against groups based in Pakistan without waiting for U.S. intervention. India’s major objective in managing this unfolding crisis was not only to urge the international community to pressure Pakistan but also to compel Islamabad to curb terrorist infiltration into Indian territory.
MUMBAI CRISES
With direct support from the international community, both India and Pakistan emerged from the Kargil crisis and Twin Peaks incidents with a stronger framework for promoting communication and resolving disputes. In 2008, the Mumbai crisis happened in which the terrorists arrived in Mumbai via the sea and split into at least three groups to carry out simultaneous attacks at various locations throughout the city. The terrorist organization, Lashkar-e-Taiba, was responsible for the attacks. Before India or Pakistan adopted dangerous reaction plans, the U.S. crisis management team swiftly contacted both nations’ presidents. By speaking
With each state making it apparent to both sides that resolving the Mumbai crisis would be in the security interest of South Asia as a whole, the United States struck a balance in its strategy. Additionally, Washington urged all parties to negotiate a peaceful solution to their differences, including Kashmir’s main issue. The U.S. crisis management team has made great progress and grown more mature in its knowledge of the many dynamics that arise during crises between India and Pakistan and how to help handle them rapidly before resorting to military force.
Additionally, Pakistan remained a crucial front-line state for collaboration as the United States carried out its war on terrorism in Afghanistan. Washington need Islamabad to support both the effective participation of Afghanistan in the peace process as well as the transit of its military hardware through Pakistan. As a result, the U.S. commitment to effective crisis management between India and Pakistan was assured. The international community, in particular the United States as a skilled third-party crisis manager, should continue to deepen its awareness of the underlying issues that underlie crises in South Asia and support initiatives that will help to speed up long-term resolution. As a counterbalance to the ongoing problems between India and Pakistan, China may also play an important role in the future.
CONCLUSION
South Asian conflicts have changed in three important ways as a result of nuclear weapons, particularly the decisions made by Pakistan and India to test them in 1998. They first made room for low-intensity undercover military adventuring (e.g., the Kargil incursion and surgical strikes). They also ensured global awareness and vested third-party interest in preventing a nuclear conflict between India and Pakistan. Finally, the necessity of enhancing crisis management and preventive methods was made more pressing by South Asia’s quickly growing and mature nuclear programs and the escalation dangers associated with nuclear-armed states. Strengthening CBMs will help to resolve the prevailing crises in order to prevent future crises.
About the Author
Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.
