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January 9, 2026

Is AUKUS still Effective?

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By: Drishti Gupta, Research Analyst, GSDN

AUKUS logo: source Internet

The AUKUS trilateral security partnership uniting Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States was launched in September 2021 as a cornerstone of Indo-Pacific security. Its objectives were to bolster deterrence against China, enhance defence integration, and promote advanced technological cooperation, particularly in nuclear-powered submarines, cyber, quantum, and AI systems.

Four years later, the alliance’s effectiveness remains under scrutiny. While AUKUS has succeeded in realigning strategic attention to the Indo-Pacific, its implementation has been slow and politically sensitive. This article assesses whether AUKUS remains an effective deterrent and strategic instrument by examining three key dimensions: strategic impact, technological integration, and geopolitical legitimacy.

The Strategic Genesis of AUKUS

AUKUS was conceived in response to China’s rapid military modernization and increasingly assertive behavior. Between 2010 and 2024, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) expanded from 210 to over 360 major warships, surpassing the U.S. Navy in numbers. Beijing’s militarization of the South China Sea, near-daily air incursions around Taiwan, and island-building campaigns prompted Australia, the U.K., and the U.S. to adopt a forward defence posture.

For Australia, AUKUS represented the most significant defence decision in its modern history—abandoning its French diesel-submarine deal to pursue nuclear-propelled vessels. For the U.K., AUKUS served as a vehicle to project its “Global Britain” ambitions beyond Europe. For the U.S., it institutionalized “minilateralism”—small, flexible alliances to share strategic burdens in the Indo-Pacific.

Strategic Effectiveness: Deterrence and Force Integration

The first “pillar” of AUKUS focuses on nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) arguably the partnership’s most visible, yet contentious, component.

  • Under the “Optimal Pathway” (2023), Australia will purchase three to five U.S. Virginia-class SSNs by the early 2030s and begin producing eight new “AUKUS-class” submarines in Adelaide by the 2040s.
  • The estimated total cost is US$368 billion over 30 years, equivalent to nearly 1.2% of Australia’s GDP annually.

Strategically, the AUKUS SSNs promise long-range endurance, stealth, and power projection, enabling Australia to operate far into the South China Sea. Yet, the submarines’ deterrent effect will not materialize until the mid-2030s, leaving a decade-long capability gap.

Moreover, China’s submarine fleet already includes 80 vessels, of which at least 10 are nuclear-powered. By 2035, it is projected to outnumber the combined submarine fleets of the AUKUS partners in the region.

That said, AUKUS has achieved near-term deterrence through expanded joint naval patrols, intelligence sharing, and rotational U.S. and U.K. submarine deployments to Australia’s west coast. These moves have already increased allied maritime presence in the Indo-Pacific, signaling resolve without provoking open confrontation.

Technological Cooperation: Pillar Two Progress

The second pillar of AUKUS technological and industrial collaboration is less visible but equally crucial. It encompasses:

  • Cyber and artificial intelligence (AI) for autonomous systems and intelligence analysis.
  • Quantum computing for secure navigation and communication.
  • Undersea, hypersonic, and electronic warfare capabilities.

By 2025, over 70 joint research projects are active across these domains. Pillar Two aims to transform AUKUS from a procurement pact into a technology accelerator, aligning military-industrial ecosystems. The U.S. International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) restricts the transfer of sensitive defence technology, frustrating both British and Australian partners. Delays in harmonizing export controls have limited progress in AI and cyber collaborations.

Moreover, industrial capacity constraints threaten execution. The U.S. Navy’s shipbuilding backlog already delays its own Virginia-class submarines by up to two years. Australia’s domestic industry, still developing nuclear engineering expertise, faces a workforce deficit of nearly 20,000 skilled workers needed for AUKUS implementation.

Despite these setbacks, AUKUS’s technology-sharing framework represents an unprecedented step in Anglo-American defence cooperation. It effectively redefines what some scholars call a “plurilateral defence alliance” a flexible, non-treaty partnership oriented around capability fusion rather than formal obligations.

Geopolitical Impact: Regional Reactions and Strategic Signaling

The Indo-Pacific response to AUKUS has been mixed.

  • Japan and India both members of the Quad have cautiously supported AUKUS, viewing it as a deterrent to unilateral Chinese assertiveness.
  • ASEAN nations, notably Indonesia and Malaysia, have expressed unease over the nuclear implications, fearing erosion of the Treaty of Bangkok (1995), which enshrines a nuclear-free Southeast Asia.
  • China has denounced AUKUS as an “Anglo-Saxon containment coalition,” accusing it of destabilizing the region and violating non-proliferation norms.

Yet, AUKUS has already altered Beijing’s threat perception. The People’s Liberation Army Navy has expanded surveillance in the South Pacific and reinforced facilities on Hainan Island, indicating AUKUS’s psychological deterrence effect.

However, AUKUS also polarizes the Indo-Pacific. By strengthening one bloc while excluding regional organizations like ASEAN, it risks fragmenting security governance and undermining inclusive mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit.

The Future of AUKUS: Is It Still Effective?

Effectiveness depends on whether AUKUS fulfills its strategic purpose deterring China and ensuring Indo-Pacific stability without overextending its partners.

  1. As a Deterrent Mechanism
    1. Short term: AUKUS enhances deterrence by presence and signaling rather than capability.
    1. Long term: Its real test will be in the 2030s when AUKUS submarines are operational.
  2. As a Technology-Sharing Framework
    1. AUKUS has begun redefining Western defence-industrial cooperation, with joint AI and quantum projects already influencing doctrine.
    1. The alliance’s viability will depend on whether it can translate innovation into deployable defence assets.
  3. As a Regional Construct
    1. AUKUS’s exclusivity remains a structural weakness. It could become more effective if it interfaces with multilateral forums such as the Quad or ASEAN to balance deterrence with inclusivity.

Ultimately, AUKUS is neither obsolete nor fully realized. It remains a strategic signal of resolve a declaration that maritime democracies will share the burdens of Indo-Pacific security. Its success, however, hinges on sustained political commitment, industrial capacity, and regional diplomacy.

Conclusion

As of 2025, AUKUS remains strategically relevant but operationally constrained. It has reinforced Western unity, reoriented Australian defence strategy, and complicated China’s military calculus. However, its effectiveness as a defence instrument remains incomplete hampered by timelines, technology transfer barriers, and geopolitical skepticism.

In essence, AUKUS’s success lies less in what it delivers now and more in what it promises for the 2030s: a framework capable of uniting technological innovation with credible deterrence. Its endurance will depend on whether the partners can sustain funding, political will, and regional legitimacy over the next decade. If those conditions hold, AUKUS will not only remain effective it may define the next phase of Indo-Pacific security architecture.

About the Author

Drishti Gupta is a postgraduate in International Relations with a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from Delhi University. She brings a strong foundation in global affairs, diplomatic studies, and strategic policy analysis. Drishti has held multiple research positions with reputed organisations such as Global Strategic & Defence NewsThe Geostrata, and Defence Research and Studies India, where she has contributed to key research projects on cybersecurity, foreign policy, and India’s evolving defence posture. Her academic and professional journey is marked by a deep interest in international diplomacy, global governance, and national security. She has completed certified programs on Global Diplomacy (University of London), Power and Foreign Policy, and Political Economy of Institutions, alongside the McKinsey Forward Program for professional development.

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