By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN
Introduction
The relationship between the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is often described through the evocative metaphor of being as close as “lips and teeth.” Forged in the crucible of war and ideological solidarity, the alliance has endured for over seven decades. Yet beneath the symbolism lies a far more complex and evolving strategic equation—one shaped by regime survival, nuclear brinkmanship, great power rivalry, and shifting geopolitical calculations in East Asia.
What began as a revolutionary partnership rooted in Marxist-Leninist solidarity has gradually transformed into a cautious, transactional, and at times uneasy coexistence. China’s intervention in the Korean War cemented the alliance in blood, but the decades that followed revealed structural asymmetries, ideological divergences, and diverging national interests. In the post–Cold War order—and particularly under the leadership of Xi Jinping and Kim Jong Un—the relationship has entered a new phase: one defined less by revolutionary fraternity and more by strategic hedging.
This article reassesses the China–DPRK relationship through a historical, theoretical, and contemporary lens. It examines how a partnership born of shared anxieties has evolved into a strategic dilemma for Beijing, and whether North Korea today is more of a buffer, bargaining chip, or liability in China’s grand strategy.
Origins of the “Lips and Teeth” Alliance: War, Ideology, and Strategic Buffering
The foundations of Sino–North Korean relations were laid in 1949, when the Chinese Communist Party established the PRC and formalized ties with the newly founded DPRK. However, it was the Korean War that transformed diplomatic recognition into a strategic alliance.
When United Nations forces crossed the 38th parallel in October 1950, Mao Zedong ordered the deployment of the Chinese People’s Volunteers. The intervention was framed domestically under the slogan “Resist America, Aid Korea, Defend the Homeland.” For Beijing, the war was not merely about ideological solidarity but about preventing hostile forces from reaching the Yalu River. As Thomas Christensen argues, China’s entry into the war reflected a classic security dilemma: the fear that U.S. encroachment would threaten its vulnerable northeastern industrial base.
The 1961 Sino–North Korean Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance institutionalized the alliance, committing both sides to mutual defense. Yet even during this period of high ideological affinity, tensions simmered. Kim Il Sung’s consolidation of power involved purging pro-Chinese factions in the 1950s, revealing Pyongyang’s suspicion of external influence—even from its closest ally.
Historically, the Korean Peninsula has occupied a central place in Chinese strategic thinking. From the tributary system of imperial China to Cold War buffer politics, Beijing has consistently viewed Korea as a geopolitical shield. As scholar Shen Zhihua notes, China’s Korea policy has always been guided less by ideology and more by security imperatives.
Divergence in the Reform Era: From Revolutionary Brotherhood to Strategic Distance
The ideological convergence that defined the early decades began to fracture with Deng Xiaoping’s reform and opening policies in the late 1970s. While China embraced market reforms and integration into the global economy, North Korea doubled down on Juche—its doctrine of self-reliance.
The divergence became unmistakable in 1992, when Beijing normalized diplomatic relations with the Republic of Korea. For Pyongyang, this was perceived as a betrayal. For Beijing, it was a pragmatic recalibration aligned with its economic modernization goals. The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 further altered the strategic landscape. North Korea lost a principal patron and became increasingly dependent on China for trade, food, and energy. Yet dependence did not translate into compliance. Instead, Pyongyang pursued nuclear weapons as the ultimate guarantor of regime survival. North Korea’s withdrawal from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 2003 marked a turning point. China faced a dilemma: support international nonproliferation norms or shield its ally to prevent regime collapse. Beijing opted for a middle path, hosting the Six-Party Talks (2003–2009), which included the United States, the Republic of Korea, Japan, Russia, and North Korea.
Although the talks produced intermittent breakthroughs—most notably the 2005 Joint Statement committing Pyongyang to abandon nuclear weapons—the process ultimately collapsed. North Korea’s first nuclear test in 2006 underscored the limits of Chinese influence. Patricia Kim argues that China’s approach during this period was guided by three priorities: preventing war, preventing regime collapse, and preventing nuclear proliferation—in that order. Stability trumped denuclearization.
The Xi Era: From Blood Alliance to Conditional Partnership
The rise of Xi Jinping in 2012 marked a shift in tone and emphasis. Unlike his predecessors, Xi initially maintained a visible distance from North Korea. Notably, he visited Seoul before Pyongyang—a symbolic departure from tradition that signaled Beijing’s expanding economic and diplomatic priorities. Between 2013 and 2017, North Korea conducted multiple nuclear and missile tests, including intercontinental ballistic missile launches. These actions frequently coincided with high-profile Chinese diplomatic events, intensifying frustration in Beijing and raising questions about Pyongyang’s strategic sensitivity to Chinese interests. In 2017, an editorial in the Global Times suggested that China would remain neutral if North Korea initiated conflict with the United States—an unprecedented public warning that reflected mounting impatience. During this period, China also supported tougher UN sanctions following Pyongyang’s sixth nuclear test, signaling that historical solidarity would not translate into unconditional protection.
Yet geopolitical dynamics soon compelled recalibration. In 2018, amid summit diplomacy between Kim Jong Un and then-U.S. President Donald Trump, Kim visited Beijing multiple times to coordinate positions. China reasserted itself as an indispensable stakeholder in Korean Peninsula affairs.
The COVID-19 pandemic further complicated ties. Border closures caused bilateral trade to plummet by over 80 percent in 2020–21. However, trade gradually resumed, reaffirming China’s role as North Korea’s dominant economic partner. More recently, amid intensifying U.S.–China rivalry, Beijing’s tolerance for Pyongyang’s provocations appears to have increased. North Korea’s weapons testing surge in 2022–2023 coincided with deepening Sino–Russian coordination. China and Russia have opposed additional UN sanctions, reflecting a broader realignment against U.S. influence.
Sanctions, Survival, and Strategic Paradox: China’s Diminishing Leverage over a Nuclear North Korea
Economically, the People’s Republic of China continues to account for the overwhelming majority of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea’s external trade, theoretically granting Beijing substantial leverage. Yet recent developments reveal the limits of this influence. Although China voted in favor of stringent UN sanctions after Pyongyang’s 2016 and 2017 nuclear tests, enforcement has been inconsistent. Cross-border railway freight through Dandong resumed in 2022 after COVID closures, and reports of ship-to-ship transfers in the Yellow Sea suggest continued circumvention of sanctions. In 2023–2024, bilateral trade rebounded sharply, indicating Beijing’s preference for stabilization over strangulation.
The nuclear dimension further constrains China’s policy options. North Korea’s 2022 record number of missile launches—including solid-fuel ICBM tests—demonstrated rapid qualitative advancement. In response, China and Russia blocked additional UN Security Council sanctions, reflecting broader strategic alignment amid intensifying U.S.–China rivalry. Beijing also strongly opposed the continued deployment of the U.S. THAAD system in South Korea, arguing it undermines China’s strategic deterrent.
Thus, China confronts a structural paradox: it formally supports denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, yet in practice it places greater weight on preserving regime stability in Pyongyang. For Beijing, a sudden collapse of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea could trigger refugee flows across the Yalu River, jeopardize control over nuclear materials, and potentially invite U.S. and South Korean military forces closer to China’s border. These risks are viewed as immediate and tangible. By contrast, North Korea’s incremental nuclear advancement—while strategically troubling—remains a managed liability. Excessive coercion could destabilize the regime; insufficient pressure, however, normalizes and entrenches Pyongyang’s de facto nuclear status.
From Revolutionary Buffer to Strategic Variable: North Korea in China’s Great Power Calculus
Is the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea still a strategic buffer for the People’s Republic of China? The Cold War logic—preventing U.S. troops from approaching the Yalu River—remains relevant, but today it is layered with economic, diplomatic, and systemic considerations. China’s trade with the Republic of Korea vastly surpasses that with Pyongyang, underscoring Beijing’s stake in broader regional stability. Yet amid intensifying U.S.–China rivalry, North Korea retains utility as a geopolitical variable. Missile crises in 2022–2024 coincided with heightened tensions in the Taiwan Strait and South China Sea, effectively stretching Washington’s strategic bandwidth and reinforcing Pyongyang’s indirect value in Beijing’s competitive calculus.
At the same time, influential scholars such as Shen Zhihua and Zhu Feng have urged policy recalibration, arguing that unconditional shielding of Pyongyang risks undermining China’s global image and long-term regional interests. The debate intensified after China and Russia vetoed additional UN sanctions in 2022 following North Korea’s ICBM launches.
Officially, Beijing continues advocating the “dual suspension” formula—freezing North Korean tests in exchange for scaling back U.S.–South Korea military exercises. However, North Korea’s deepening ties with Russia in 2023–2024 further complicate China’s leverage, reinforcing the perception that Pyongyang is no longer merely a buffer—but an increasingly unpredictable strategic variable.
Stability Above All: China’s Strategic Patience and the Future of the Korean Peninsula
The future of the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea–People’s Republic of China relationship is likely to unfold along three plausible trajectories—each anchored in Beijing’s overriding priority: stability over transformation.
The first and most visible scenario is managed instability. China has tacitly tolerated North Korea’s record-breaking missile launches in 2022 and continued ICBM and satellite-related tests in 2023–2024, while jointly vetoing additional UN Security Council sanctions with Russia. Rather than escalate pressure, Beijing resumed cross-border trade through Dandong and restored transportation links after COVID-era closures, signaling that economic stabilization outweighs punitive isolation. As Patricia Kim observes, Beijing’s hierarchy remains “no war, no collapse, no nukes”—in that order.
The second scenario is crisis-driven cooperation. A dramatic escalation—such as a seventh nuclear test or heightened confrontation with the Republic of Korea and the United States—could revive multilateral diplomacy. China’s historical role in hosting the Six-Party Talks demonstrates its capacity to recalibrate when instability risks spiraling beyond control.
The third, and most alarming, is regime instability. Deepening military cooperation between Pyongyang and Moscow in 2023–2024, including reported arms transfers to Russia, has introduced new uncertainties. Scholars like Jia Qingguo warn that collapse would mean refugee surges across the Yalu River and unsecured nuclear materials—scenarios Beijing considers strategically intolerable.
Denuclearization, though consistently invoked in official statements and diplomatic communiqués, functions more as a strategic aspiration than an immediate policy imperative for Beijing. In practice, China’s hierarchy of concerns is clear: prevent war, prevent regime collapse, prevent refugee flows, and avoid strategic encirclement by U.S. forces. Nuclear rollback, while desirable, ranks below these urgent stability calculations.
After North Korea’s record missile launches in 2022 and subsequent ICBM tests in 2023, China refrained from endorsing additional UN sanctions and instead, alongside Russia, vetoed further punitive measures. At the same time, cross-border trade through Dandong resumed following pandemic closures, signaling Beijing’s reluctance to economically suffocate Pyongyang. From China’s perspective, a destabilized North Korea could mean millions of refugees crossing the Yalu River and the possibility of U.S. and South Korean troops moving northward in a contingency scenario. Stability, therefore, is not passive tolerance—it is a deliberate risk-management strategy. Denuclearization remains the rhetoric; stability remains the operating principle.
Conclusion
The China–North Korea relationship endures not because it is immutable, but because it remains strategically useful—albeit increasingly uncomfortable—for Beijing. What began as a “lips and teeth” alliance forged in the fires of the Korean War has evolved into a carefully managed equilibrium defined by asymmetry, mistrust, and converging but not identical interests. The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea is no longer simply a revolutionary comrade; it is a geopolitical variable embedded in China’s broader contest with the United States and its allies.
For the People’s Republic of China, North Korea functions simultaneously as buffer, bargaining chip, and liability. It provides strategic depth against U.S. military presence in Northeast Asia, yet its accelerating nuclear and missile programs complicate China’s regional diplomacy and global image. Beijing’s repeated vetoes of additional UN sanctions alongside Russia, coupled with the quiet resumption of cross-border trade, underscore a consistent hierarchy of priorities: prevent war, prevent collapse, and only then pursue denuclearization.
The paradox is enduring. Excessive pressure risks destabilizing the regime; insufficient pressure entrenches a nuclear-armed neighbor. In a shifting global order marked by great-power rivalry and strategic fragmentation, Beijing’s calculus is unlikely to change dramatically. Denuclearization may remain rhetorical; stability remains imperative. Ultimately, the China–DPRK equation is not a relic of Cold War solidarity but a living test of China’s strategic maturity—how it manages risk, balances competition, and navigates the fine line between influence and entanglement on the Korean Peninsula.
About the Author
Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.
