By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN
Introduction
The strategic landscape of the Indian Ocean Region is undergoing a profound transformation, driven by intensifying great power competition, evolving maritime threats, and shifting alliance structures. At the heart of this transformation lies the growing convergence between India and Australia—two resident powers whose interests increasingly align in preserving a stable, open, and rules-based maritime order. As global attention shifts toward the Indo-Pacific, the Indian Ocean is no longer a secondary theatre but a central arena of strategic contestation.
Recent geopolitical signals reinforce this shift. The 2026 testimony by U.S. officials emphasizing India’s role as a net security provider, coupled with the relative under-prioritisation of the IOR in United States defence strategy, suggests an emerging redistribution of security responsibilities. This evolving “division of labour” places India and Australia in a pivotal position to shape regional stability. At the same time, China’s expanding footprint—particularly through the Belt and Road Initiative—has intensified strategic anxieties across littoral states.
Against this backdrop, institutionalising India–Australia cooperation is no longer optional; it is a strategic necessity. Beyond ad hoc engagements and symbolic partnerships, both countries must develop durable frameworks that can address shared concerns—ranging from maritime security and supply chain resilience to infrastructure governance and regional capacity-building. The future balance of power in the Indian Ocean may well depend on how effectively Canberra and New Delhi translate convergence into coordinated action.A broader conceptual lens to understand the deepening India–Australia engagement is through the evolution of minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific, where small, flexible groupings are increasingly complementing traditional multilateral institutions. Platforms such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue illustrate how issue-based coalitions can respond more effectively to emerging challenges, ranging from maritime security to supply chain resilience and critical technologies. Within this framework, India–Australia cooperation represents a crucial bilateral pillar that underpins wider regional arrangements. Recent Quad initiatives—including collaboration on critical minerals, undersea cable protection, and humanitarian assistance—highlight a shift toward functional and outcome-oriented cooperation. At the same time, both countries are navigating a complex strategic environment shaped by the relative decline of consensus-based multilateralism and the rise of competitive geopolitics. The limitations of larger regional organisations, such as SAARC and even ASEAN-led mechanisms, have further reinforced the appeal of minilateral approaches that allow like-minded states to act decisively without being constrained by divergent interests. For India and Australia, embedding their bilateral partnership within this evolving architecture enhances both strategic flexibility and collective capacity. It also enables them to shape regional norms and standards in ways that reflect shared values of openness, sovereignty, and rules-based order. Consequently, institutionalising their cooperation is not merely about bilateral alignment but about positioning themselves as central actors in a broader networked security architecture that defines the future of the Indo-Pacific.
China’s Expanding Maritime Footprint and Strategic Implications
Over the past two decades, China has systematically expanded its presence across the Indian Ocean, transforming its role from a distant economic actor to an embedded strategic player. Through large-scale investments in ports, energy corridors, and transport infrastructure, Beijing has established a network of strategic nodes that extend from Southeast Asia to East Africa. These projects, often financed through concessional loans, have created long-term dependencies among host nations.
The case of Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port remains emblematic of this dynamic, where financial distress led to a 99-year lease agreement with China. Similar patterns are visible across the region, raising concerns about debt sustainability, sovereignty, and strategic vulnerability. Beyond economics, China’s increasing naval deployments, surveillance vessel port calls, and dual-use infrastructure projects signal a gradual militarisation of its presence in the Indian Ocean. Recent developments further highlight this trajectory. Reports of Chinese research vessels operating in the Bay of Bengal and Indian Ocean littorals, alongside expanding logistical facilities in eastern Africa, suggest a long-term strategy aimed at securing sea lanes and projecting power. For regional actors, this raises critical questions about freedom of navigation, control over chokepoints, and the potential erosion of a rules-based order.
India’s Strategic Response and the Turn Toward Partnerships
For India, China’s growing presence in the Indian Ocean represents a direct challenge to its traditional sphere of influence and maritime security calculus. Historically, New Delhi has viewed the region as its primary strategic domain—a perception now being tested by external encroachment and evolving regional dynamics. India’s response has been multifaceted. It has accelerated connectivity and development projects across neighbouring countries, undertaken over 100 infrastructure initiatives, and strengthened maritime cooperation through capacity-building and defence partnerships. Initiatives in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and the Maldives reflect India’s effort maintain its relevance and counterbalance Chinese influence. However, structural limitations persist. India’s project delivery timelines, financial constraints, and the politicisation of its engagement in neighbouring countries often undermine its effectiveness. Recognising these challenges, India has increasingly turned toward like-minded partners, including Japan, the United States, and Australia, to enhance its strategic reach and implementation capacity. Recent agreements, such as expanded energy cooperation with Sri Lanka and connectivity projects linking India’s northeast to Bangladesh, demonstrate a shift toward collaborative frameworks. These partnerships not only amplify India’s capabilities but also reduce the risk of unilateral exposure in a highly competitive strategic environment.
Australia’s Strategic Stakes in the Indian Ocean
As a resident power with significant economic and security interests in the Indian Ocean, Australia’s engagement with the region has intensified in recent years. The Indian Ocean serves as a critical artery for Australia’s trade and energy flows, with over half of its seaborne exports transiting through these waters.
Australia’s vulnerability to maritime disruptions is particularly acute. Any blockade or coercion affecting key chokepoints—such as the Strait of Malacca—would have immediate and severe implications for its economy and national security. This reality has driven Canberra to re-evaluate its strategic priorities, placing greater emphasis on the Northeast Indian Ocean Region. An increasingly significant yet underappreciated dimension of Australia’s engagement in the Indian Ocean Region is the growing centrality of critical minerals and supply chain security, which directly intersects with its partnership with India. As global economies transition toward clean energy and advanced technologies, the demand for minerals such as lithium, cobalt, and rare earth elements has surged dramatically. Australia, as one of the world’s leading producers of these resources, occupies a pivotal position in emerging supply chains. Simultaneously, India’s expanding manufacturing base and ambitions in renewable energy, electric mobility, and semiconductor development make it a key consumer and processing hub. Recent bilateral initiatives, including agreements on critical minerals cooperation and resilient supply chains, reflect a shared recognition of this strategic convergence. Moreover, disruptions caused by the COVID-19 and ongoing geopolitical tensions have exposed the vulnerabilities of overconcentrated supply chains, particularly those linked to China. This has prompted both countries to prioritise diversification and resilience as core strategic objectives. By institutionalising cooperation in this domain—through joint investments, technology sharing, and coordinated policy frameworks—India and Australia can reduce dependency risks while enhancing economic security. Furthermore, integrating critical minerals into the broader India–Australia strategic partnership elevates their cooperation beyond traditional defence and maritime concerns, positioning it at the forefront of 21st-century geoeconomic competition. In this sense, supply chain collaboration is not merely an economic necessity but a strategic imperative that reinforces their shared vision of a stable, secure, and resilient Indian Ocean Region.
Policy documents such as Australia’s 2024 National Defence Strategy underscore this shift, identifying India as a “top-tier partner” and highlighting the Indian Ocean as a primary area of military interest. At the same time, uncertainties surrounding U.S. commitment to the region—evident in its limited military presence and evolving strategic focus—have prompted Australia to diversify its security partnerships.
The AUKUS framework, while significant, is largely oriented toward the Pacific theatre. This creates a strategic gap in the Indian Ocean, one that can be effectively addressed through deeper engagement with India. By aligning their strategic priorities, both countries can mitigate vulnerabilities and enhance regional stability.
Toward Institutionalised Cooperation: Opportunities and Challenges
Despite growing convergence, India–Australia cooperation in the Indian Ocean remains under-institutionalised. Existing mechanisms—such as joint naval exercises, dialogue platforms, and cooperation within the Indian Ocean Rim Association—provide a foundation but lack the depth and coordination required to address emerging challenges.
Institutionalisation requires moving beyond episodic collaboration toward structured frameworks with clearly defined objectives, resource commitments, and implementation mechanisms. This could include joint maritime domain awareness systems, coordinated infrastructure investments in third countries, and integrated supply chain resilience initiatives. A critical next step in institutionalising India–Australia cooperation lies in operationalising a joint framework for maritime domain awareness (MDA) and coordinated security architecture across the Indian Ocean Region. Both India and Australia possess complementary capabilities—India with its extensive network of coastal radar systems and information fusion centres, and Australia with advanced surveillance technologies and strong linkages with Pacific and Southeast Asian partners. Integrating these capabilities through real-time data sharing, joint monitoring mechanisms, and coordinated patrols could significantly enhance situational awareness across critical sea lanes. Such cooperation would not only improve responses to traditional threats like piracy, trafficking, and illegal fishing but also address emerging challenges such as grey-zone activities and strategic encroachment by extra-regional powers. Recent initiatives, including India’s Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region (IFC-IOR), provide a strong foundation for this collaboration, but their potential remains underutilised without deeper Australian integration. Additionally, expanding trilateral or minilateral formats involving key littoral states—such as Indonesia, Sri Lanka, and France (given its territories in the Indian Ocean)—could further strengthen this architecture. However, the success of such initiatives will depend on building trust, ensuring interoperability, and aligning strategic priorities across partners. Institutionalising MDA cooperation would thus represent a tangible and actionable step toward transforming India–Australia relations from a declaratory partnership into a functional security provider framework, capable of shaping outcomes in one of the world’s most strategically contested maritime spaces.
Recent developments offer a conducive environment for such efforts. The growing relevance of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, increased frequency of India–Australia bilateral exercises like AUSINDEX, and shared concerns over critical minerals and technology supply chains provide avenues for deeper collaboration. However, challenges remain. Differences in strategic culture, capacity asymmetries, and bureaucratic inertia can hinder progress. Additionally, both countries must navigate their respective relationships with other major powers, particularly the United States, without undermining their bilateral partnership. Ultimately, the success of institutionalisation will depend on political will, sustained engagement, and the ability to align long-term strategic objectives. A joint India–Australia roadmap for the Indian Ocean—backed by concrete commitments—could serve as a transformative step in this direction.
Conclusion
The Indian Ocean Region is emerging as a decisive arena in the evolving global order, where economic flows, strategic competition, and geopolitical alignments intersect. In this dynamic environment, the partnership between India and Australia holds the potential to shape the region’s future trajectory. The imperative is clear: ad hoc cooperation is no longer sufficient. Institutionalised frameworks are essential to ensure continuity, coherence, and strategic impact. By working together as resident powers, India and Australia can uphold a favourable balance of power, deter coercion, and contribute to a stable and inclusive regional order. Yet, this partnership must be grounded in pragmatism and foresight. It must address not only traditional security concerns but also emerging challenges such as supply chain resilience, climate security, and technological governance. The coming years will test whether India and Australia can translate strategic convergence into sustained collaboration.
Looking ahead, the sustainability of India–Australia cooperation in the Indian Ocean Region will depend significantly on their ability to integrate non-traditional security domains into their strategic framework. Issues such as climate change, maritime environmental degradation, and disaster resilience are becoming increasingly central to regional stability, particularly for vulnerable littoral states. The Indian Ocean is witnessing rising sea levels, intensifying cyclones, and ecological stress on critical marine ecosystems, all of which have direct implications for economic security and human livelihoods. Both India and Australia possess considerable expertise in disaster response, climate adaptation, and sustainable resource management, creating a strong foundation for collaborative leadership in these areas. Expanding joint initiatives in humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR), blue economy projects, and climate-resilient infrastructure can enhance their credibility as responsible regional stakeholders. Furthermore, such cooperation offers a less contentious avenue for engagement with smaller Indian Ocean states, allowing India and Australia to build trust and goodwill without triggering geopolitical anxieties. Recent Quad-led initiatives on climate resilience and infrastructure sustainability further reinforce the importance of embedding environmental considerations into strategic planning. By aligning their security objectives with developmental and environmental priorities, India and Australia can contribute to a more holistic and inclusive vision of regional order—one that goes beyond power balancing to address the underlying drivers of instability in the Indian Ocean Region.
If successful, their partnership could serve as a cornerstone of Indo-Pacific stability—demonstrating how middle powers, through coordination and commitment, can navigate great power competition and shape a more balanced and resilient regional order.
About the Author
Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.
