By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN
Introduction
Germany’s declaration of Zeitenwende in 2022 marked a historic rupture in its post–Cold War strategic culture. Triggered by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the term signified more than increased defence spending—it reflected a fundamental reassessment of Germany’s economic dependencies, security assumptions, and global positioning. For decades, Berlin relied on a stable transatlantic alliance, energy interdependence with Russia, and deep commercial engagement with China. As these pillars weakened, Germany was compelled to rethink its strategic priorities in an increasingly fragmented and competitive international order.
Within this recalibration, India has emerged as a central partner. Once viewed primarily as an economic market and development collaborator, India is now positioned at the intersection of Germany’s security, trade diversification, technology resilience, and demographic strategy. As the world’s fastest-growing major economy and an influential actor in the Indo-Pacific, India offers Berlin both geopolitical relevance and economic opportunity.
This article argues that India’s elevation in German foreign policy is not incidental but structural. It reflects converging strategic interests shaped by shifting global power balances, supply-chain realignments, and domestic transformations within both countries. In the evolving architecture of Europe-Asia relations, the Indo-German partnership may well become one of the defining axes of the emerging multipolar order.
Zeitenwende and the Recalibration of German Strategy
When Olaf Scholz declared a Zeitenwende—a historic turning point—days after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, he signaled more than a defence spending hike. The speech marked a structural reorientation of German foreign and security policy. For decades, Berlin’s strategy rested on three pillars: security under the U.S. umbrella, energy interdependence with Russia, and trade interdependence with China. The war in Ukraine shattered the first two assumptions and destabilized the third. Germany’s internal debate—long influenced by its post-war aversion to hard power—shifted toward strategic autonomy, supply-chain resilience, and defence industrial revitalization.
Under Friedrich Merz, this recalibration has accelerated. Constitutional adjustments to Germany’s debt brake rules have enabled expanded defence allocations, and Berlin has signaled intent to raise defence expenditure toward 3.5 percent of GDP. Scholars such as Guntram Wolff and Claudia Major argue that Germany’s Zeitenwende represents not merely militarization but a broader geopolitical awakening—an acceptance that economic power alone no longer guarantees strategic influence. It also reflects Berlin’s recognition that geoeconomic vulnerabilities—whether in energy, rare earths, or advanced manufacturing—carry direct strategic consequences. Within this framework, India emerges not as a peripheral partner but as a pivotal actor in Berlin’s Indo-Pacific calculus. The shift from a China-centric Asian policy toward diversified engagement has elevated New Delhi from economic stakeholder to strategic partner in shaping a multipolar order.
Strategic Autonomy, the EU Framework, and the Multilateral Dimension
A critical yet often understated dimension of the Indo-German partnership lies in its embedding within the broader European Union framework and the evolving discourse on “strategic autonomy.” Germany does not act in isolation; as the EU’s largest economy and political anchor, Berlin’s recalibration toward India inevitably shapes Brussels’ wider Indo-Pacific posture. The EU’s 2021 Indo-Pacific Strategy already signaled recognition of the region’s centrality to global growth and maritime security. Within this framework, India occupies a unique position as both a democratic partner and a balancing power in Asia. For Germany, strengthening bilateral ties with New Delhi simultaneously reinforces EU-India institutional engagement, particularly through the proposed EU-India Free Trade Agreement and cooperation on connectivity initiatives such as the EU’s Global Gateway strategy.
This alignment reflects a deeper normative convergence. Both India and Germany emphasize rule-based order, supply-chain resilience, and reform of multilateral institutions, even if their approaches sometimes diverge tactically. Berlin increasingly views India as a credible interlocutor with the Global South, especially at forums such as the G20, where India’s leadership has underscored development finance, digital public infrastructure, and climate equity. From a strategic studies perspective, this partnership exemplifies what scholars term “minilateral multilateralism”—flexible coalitions of like-minded states that operate within, but also beyond, traditional alliance structures.
Moreover, Germany’s pursuit of strategic autonomy—reducing overdependence on single suppliers for energy, technology, or critical minerals—finds resonance in India’s own quest for strategic autonomy in foreign policy. While India maintains diversified partnerships across competing blocs, Germany’s engagement offers New Delhi advanced technological collaboration without the alliance conditionalities often associated with other Western powers. Thus, the Indo-German axis strengthens not only bilateral ties but also contributes to a broader rebalancing within EU-Asia relations, positioning both countries as co-shapers of a more plural, networked global order.
Security Convergence: Defence Industrial Synergy in the Indo-Pacific
Security cooperation has become the most visible manifestation of the Indo-German strategic upgrade. The relaxation of Germany’s historically restrictive arms export regime—once a hallmark of post-war restraint—has opened space for deeper defence collaboration. A landmark €8 billion submarine co-production agreement between Thyssenkrupp Marine Systems and Mazagon Dock Shipbuilders Limited reflects this transformation. For India, the deal strengthens its Make in India initiative and reduces long-standing dependence on Russian-origin platforms, particularly as Moscow’s reliability has come under strain following the Ukraine war. For Germany, the agreement secures access to one of the world’s fastest-growing defence markets while reinforcing Europe’s rearmament drive under the Zeitenwende framework.
Security engagement now extends well beyond hardware transactions. The 2024 deployment of the German frigate German frigate Baden-Württemberg to the Indo-Pacific—alongside participation in multilateral naval drills—signaled Berlin’s sustained maritime commitment rather than symbolic presence. Germany’s involvement in exercises such as MILAN 2024 hosted by the Indian Navy, as well as coordinated activities with Quad partners, illustrates growing interoperability. Additionally, Berlin’s decision to dispatch maritime patrol aircraft for Indo-Pacific rotations and to deepen cooperation under the EU’s Coordinated Maritime Presences framework underscores a longer-term strategic posture.
Institutionally, the posting of a liaison officer to India’s Information Fusion Centre–Indian Ocean Region has strengthened real-time maritime domain awareness cooperation—particularly relevant amid rising tensions in the South China Sea and expanding Chinese naval deployments in the Indian Ocean. Analysts such as C. Raja Mohan argue that Europe’s expanding Indo-Pacific footprint reflects recognition that the strategic center of gravity has shifted eastward. Germany’s embrace of India therefore represents not merely bilateral pragmatism but a calibrated European response to systemic shifts in Asian security dynamics.
Trade Diversification and the China Question
For decades, China was Germany’s indispensable Asian partner. Bilateral trade reached nearly US$275 billion in 2024, dwarfing Indo-German trade volumes of roughly US$50 billion. German manufacturing—especially automotive and machinery sectors—remains deeply embedded in the Chinese market. Yet escalating EU-China trade tensions, concerns over unfair industrial subsidies, and supply-chain vulnerabilities have compelled Berlin to rethink its dependencies.
India’s rise as the world’s fastest-growing major economy offers a compelling alternative. As Germany’s largest trading partner in Europe, India accounts for a quarter of India’s trade with the European Union. The prospective EU-India Free Trade Agreement could unlock new market access and regulatory harmonization. Over 2,000 German firms already operate in India, spanning automotive manufacturing, chemicals, engineering, and renewable energy.
Economic scholars such as Dani Rodrik argue that “geoeconomics” now shapes global trade—where resilience and strategic diversification matter as much as efficiency. Germany’s pivot toward India exemplifies this logic. While Berlin is unlikely to decouple from Beijing, it is clearly hedging. Chancellor Merz’s high-profile business delegation underscores that diversification, not disengagement, defines Germany’s contemporary Asia policy. India’s expanding manufacturing ecosystem—bolstered by Production-Linked Incentive schemes—positions it as a viable node in global supply chains seeking a “China+1” strategy.
Technology, Energy Transition, and Industrial Transformation
Beyond defence and trade, technological collaboration increasingly anchors the Indo-German partnership in tangible industrial projects. The 2024 Indo-German Intergovernmental Consultations placed semiconductors, critical minerals, and trusted telecom networks at the forefront of cooperation. Germany’s push for supply-chain resilience under the EU Chips Act aligns with India’s semiconductor manufacturing incentives, creating scope for joint fabrication, packaging, and research ecosystems. German firms such as Infineon Technologies have expanded partnerships in India’s electronics value chain, while industrial leaders like Siemens and Bosch are deepening investments in digital mobility, smart manufacturing, and AI-enabled automation. Bengaluru’s growing role as an R&D hub for German Mittelstand firms illustrates how India is no longer merely a back-office destination but a co-innovation partner.
Energy transition cooperation has also acquired strategic urgency. Under the Green and Sustainable Development Partnership, Germany has committed €10 billion to India’s climate and infrastructure transformation. Joint task forces on green hydrogen—aligned with India’s National Green Hydrogen Mission—aim to integrate production standards, certification systems, and export pathways to European markets. Germany’s Energiewende experience in grid modernization and renewable integration offers regulatory and technological lessons as India scales solar parks and offshore wind capacity at globally competitive costs. Simultaneously, collaboration on battery storage, e-mobility corridors, and critical raw material sourcing reflects shared concerns over Chinese dominance in clean-tech supply chains.
From a political economy perspective, this partnership embodies what Joseph Nye describes as “smart power”—the fusion of economic leverage, technological capability, and normative alignment. For Berlin, anchoring industrial transformation within a democratic and rapidly digitizing India mitigates overdependence risks. For New Delhi, German capital and engineering expertise accelerate domestic manufacturing ambitions. In an era defined by geoeconomic competition, Indo-German technological synergy is not peripheral cooperation—it is strategic co-production shaping the architecture of resilient globalization.
Demography, Mobility, and the Geopolitics of Talent
Perhaps the most structurally transformative pillar of the partnership lies in demography. Germany faces acute labour shortages driven by rapid population aging and industrial expansion in high-skill sectors. The implementation of the 2023 Skilled Immigration Act reforms and the rollout of the “Opportunity Card” system have further liberalized pathways for non-EU professionals, signaling Berlin’s recognition that migration is now an economic necessity rather than a political choice. Estimates continue to suggest that nearly 400,000 skilled migrants annually are required to stabilize Germany’s workforce and sustain industrial competitiveness. India, by contrast, enters the next two decades with a demographic dividend—producing large cohorts of engineers, IT specialists, healthcare workers, and STEM graduates each year.
The 2022 Migration and Mobility Partnership Agreement between Germany and India significantly expanded annual visa quotas and streamlined recognition of qualifications. Indian professionals are increasingly visible in Germany’s Mittelstand firms, automotive R&D centers, and digital start-ups. Major employers such as SAP and BMW have expanded recruitment pipelines targeting Indian tech and engineering talent. Simultaneously, Indian nurses and healthcare professionals are being integrated into Germany’s strained care sector through structured training partnerships.
The Indian diaspora—now estimated at over 300,000—has become a socio-economic bridge, while Indian students form the largest cohort of foreign students in German universities, particularly in engineering and applied sciences. Yet demographic convergence unfolds within political constraints. The electoral rise of the far-right Alternative für Deutschland underscores domestic anxieties surrounding immigration. Managing integration, credential recognition, and public acceptance will test Berlin’s political balancing act. Nevertheless, as geopolitical risk fragments supply chains, human capital mobility is emerging as strategic infrastructure. Aligning Germany’s demographic deficit with India’s workforce surplus creates not just labour flows, but durable interdependence—embedding talent mobility at the heart of Indo-German strategic alignment.
Conclusion
India’s elevation within Germany’s Zeitenwende is neither symbolic nor temporary. It reflects converging structural imperatives: Germany’s need for diversified trade, defence industrial revitalization, technological resilience, and demographic renewal; India’s need for advanced technology, capital inflows, and credible European partners amid shifting U.S. dynamics.
The broader geopolitical context amplifies this convergence. Uncertainty in transatlantic relations and intensifying great-power competition have encouraged Europe and India alike to hedge strategically. A consolidated Indo-German partnership could anchor broader EU-India cooperation, reinforcing multilateralism in an era of fragmentation and strengthening rule-based economic governance across the Indo-Pacific and Europe.
Ultimately, Germany’s strategic reset positions India not merely as a market or diplomatic partner, but as a cornerstone of Berlin’s 21st-century foreign policy architecture. If the Zeitenwende marked Germany’s awakening to geopolitical reality, its deepening embrace of India signals how that awakening is being operationalized. In a world defined by contested interdependence, Indo-German alignment offers a pragmatic blueprint for resilient partnership between two democracies navigating systemic transformation.
About the Author
Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.
