By: Sonalika Singh, Consulting Editor, GSDN
The Australia–United Kingdom–United States (AUKUS) security partnership, announced in September 2021, was presented as a transformative strategic alignment designed to reinforce stability in the Indo-Pacific and ensure a long-term technological and military edge for its members. At its core lies an unprecedented commitment to provide Australia with nuclear-powered, conventionally armed submarines and to deepen collaboration in advanced defence technologies. Yet, several years after its unveiling, mounting concerns about industrial feasibility, strategic reliability, sovereignty, and geopolitical shifts have prompted a pressing question that, Is AUKUS still a potent alliance, or has its promise outpaced its deliverability?
AUKUS emerged from a rapidly changing strategic environment. The Indo-Pacific has become the central arena of global power competition, shaped by China’s expanding maritime reach, growing naval capabilities, and assertive posture in contested waters. For Australia, a geographically vast nation with a limited population and defence manpower, nuclear-powered submarines promised a generational leap in deterrence and maritime reach. For the United Kingdom, AUKUS represented a concrete expression of its “Global Britain” ambition. For the United States, the pact offered a means to reinforce allied burden-sharing while strengthening its strategic posture in a region critical to 21st-century geopolitics. In principle, AUKUS aligned the interests of all three nations around a shared vision of maintaining a favourable balance of power.
However, the potency of any alliance is measured not by its declaration but by its execution. Pillar I of AUKUS for the submarine programme has become the focal point of both ambition and anxiety. Under the agreed pathway, Australia is expected to acquire three to five Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines from the United States beginning in the early 2030s, followed by the construction of a new SSN-AUKUS class developed jointly with the United Kingdom and built in Australia by the early 2040s. The projected cost, estimated at up to US$368 billion through the mid-2050s, reflects the scale and complexity of the undertaking.
Yet serious doubts persist regarding whether the United States possesses the industrial capacity to deliver submarines to Australia without compromising its own naval readiness. American shipyards are already struggling to meet domestic demand, producing attack submarines at a rate significantly below strategic requirement. Workforce shortages, supply chain constraints, and post-pandemic disruptions have compounded delays. If Washington faces a shortfall in its own fleet, the political and strategic calculus of transferring submarines to Australia becomes fraught. U.S. law requires certification that any such transfer would not diminish American undersea capabilities a condition that may prove difficult to satisfy in an era of intensifying great-power competition.
These constraints have given rise to a troubling possibility: submarines intended for Australia may instead remain under U.S. control, operating from Australian bases but flying American flags, commanded by American crews, and serving primarily U.S. strategic objectives. In such a scenario, Australia risks being perceived less as a sovereign operator of advanced capabilities and more as a forward operating hub for U.S. power projection. This perception carries significant implications for national autonomy, domestic political legitimacy, and regional diplomacy.
The uncertainty surrounding U.S. reliability has been amplified by broader shifts in American foreign policy. The resurgence of “America First” rhetoric and a more transactional approach to alliances have unsettled long-standing assumptions among U.S. partners. Statements by political leaders emphasizing reduced dependability have prompted debate in Australia about the risks of overreliance on a single security guarantor. While alliance ties between Canberra and Washington remain deep and institutionalized, strategic planners increasingly acknowledge the necessity of hedging against uncertainty. The possibility, however, remote delayed or withheld submarine transfers underscores the importance of sovereign capability and diversified defencepartnerships.
Domestic debates within Australia reflect these anxieties. Critics argue that AUKUS may entrench dependence on foreign defence industries while diverting resources from more immediately deployable capabilities such as long-range strike systems, drones, cyber defences, and missile technology. Others warn of a potential capability gap as the ageing Collins-class submarines approach retirement, raising the spectre of a period during which Australia may lack a credible undersea deterrent. Supporters counter that rotational deployments of U.S. and U.K. submarines from HMAS Stirling will provide interim capability and strengthen interoperability, even as Australia develops its own nuclear-powered fleet.
Sovereignty concerns also extend to basing arrangements. Expanded U.S. and U.K. submarine presence on Australian soil enhances deterrence but raises questions about operational control and strategic autonomy. Critics worry that Australia could become entangled in conflicts not of its choosing if foreign-operated assets based on its territory are used in military operations. Proponents respond that such integration is the essence of alliance cooperation, and that shared basing arrangements have long underpinned collective security.
From a regional perspective, AUKUS has elicited mixed reactions. Some Indo-Pacific partners, including Japan and India, view the pact as a stabilizing force that strengthens deterrence against coercion. Others, particularly in Southeast Asia and the Pacific Islands, have expressed concerns about nuclear proliferation risks, environmental safety, and the militarization of the region. The Treaty of Rarotonga, which enshrines a nuclear-free Pacific, has heightened sensitivities regarding nuclear propulsion, even though AUKUS submarines will not carry nuclear weapons. For many Pacific Island nations, security priorities such as climate change, economic resilience, and disaster preparedness remain more urgent than great-power military competition, creating a disconnect between strategic narratives and regional needs.
Despite these concerns, AUKUS is not solely defined by submarines. Pillar II, focusing on advanced technologies, may ultimately prove more consequential. Cooperation in artificial intelligence, quantum computing, cyber capabilities, undersea surveillance, hypersonic systems, and electronic warfare promises to accelerate innovation and enhance interoperability across allied forces. Unlike the decades-long timeline of submarine construction, these initiatives can yield tangible benefits in the near term, strengthening situational awareness, decision-making speed, and deterrence capabilities. By integrating defence industrial bases and sharing sensitive technologies at an unprecedented level, AUKUS represents a new model of alliance cooperation tailored to an era of rapid technological change.
The economic dimension of AUKUS also merits consideration. The partnership is expected to generate thousands of skilled jobs in Australia, particularly in shipbuilding, engineering, and advanced manufacturing. Investments in infrastructure, such as the expansion of shipyards in Adelaide and Perth, aim to establish a sovereign industrial base capable of sustaining nuclear-powered submarines. However, the financial burden is substantial, and long-term funding commitments may constrain other defence and social spending priorities. The opportunity cost of AUKUS what Australia forgoes in alternative capabilities remains a subject of vigorous debate.
Historical experience underscores the risks inherent in large-scale submarine programmes. Australia’s past efforts have been marked by delays, cost overruns, and shifting strategic requirements. The cancellation of the French submarine contract in favour of AUKUS not only strained diplomatic relations but also highlighted the volatility of defence procurement decisions. Repeated changes in submarine design and partnership have contributed to capability gaps and eroded confidence in long-term planning. AUKUS, therefore, must overcome not only technical and industrial challenges but also a legacy of procurement instability.
At the same time, it is important to recognize the strategic logic that continues to underpin AUKUS. The geographic position of Australia makes it a critical node in Indo-Pacific security architecture, enabling access to key sea lanes and facilitating allied operations. For the United States, enhanced access to Australian bases strengthens its ability to project power and maintaina forward presence. For the United Kingdom, participation reinforces its relevance as a global security actor. These converging interests suggest that AUKUS serves enduring strategic purposes beyond the immediate question of submarine delivery.
Critics who argue that AUKUS primarily advances U.S. strategic dominance may not be entirely incorrect; alliances often reflect asymmetries of power. Yet such asymmetries do not negate mutual benefit. Australia gains access to technologies and capabilities that would otherwise be unattainable, while the United States and United Kingdom benefit from a more capable and integrated ally. The challenge lies in ensuring that these benefits are balanced and that Australia retains meaningful operational sovereignty over its defence assets.
The future potency of AUKUS will depend on several factors. First, the United States must revitalize its submarine industrial base to meet both domestic and allied requirements. Second, Australia must develop the workforce, regulatory frameworks, and infrastructure necessary to operate nuclear-powered vessels safely and effectively. Third, the partnership must maintain political support across changing administrations in all three countries. Fourth, AUKUS must address regional concerns through transparency, confidence-building measures, and engagement with Pacific and Southeast Asian partners.
There is also a growing discussion of contingency options. Some analysts advocate exploring alternative submarine designs, such as France’s Suffren-class, which may be better suited to Australia’s operational needs and available on shorter timelines. Others propose investing more heavily in asymmetric capabilities, including unmanned underwater vehicles and long-range precision strike systems, to mitigate risks associated with submarine delays. Such debates do not necessarily signal the failure of AUKUS but rather reflect prudent strategic planning in an uncertain environment.
Ultimately, the question of whether AUKUS remains potent cannot be answered solely by assessing current delays or political controversies. Alliances are dynamic institutions that evolve in response to shifting strategic landscapes. AUKUS was conceived as a multi-decadal endeavour, and its success will be measured over generations rather than election cycles. Even if submarine delivery timelines slip, the partnership has already deepened technological integration, expanded allied presence in the Indo-Pacific, and signalled a long-term commitment to regional security.
Nevertheless, potency requires credibility. If promised submarines fail to materialize under Australian sovereign control, the alliance risks reputational damage and diminished deterrent value. Regional partners may question the reliability of Western security guarantees, while domestic critics may view AUKUS as an expensive miscalculation. Conversely, successful delivery combined with tangible progress in advanced technologies would reinforce confidence in allied cooperation and strengthen the strategic balance in the Indo-Pacific.
Therefore, AUKUS remains a potent alliance, but its strength lies more in its strategic trajectory than in its current capabilities. The partnership continues to align the interests of three major maritime democracies, foster technological innovation, and enhance deterrence in a contested region. Yet its credibility hinges on overcoming industrial bottlenecks, preserving Australian sovereignty, and sustaining political commitment across changing geopolitical conditions. Whether AUKUS ultimately fulfils its promise or becomes a cautionary tale of overambitious defence planning will depend not on rhetoric, but on delivery.
About the Author
Sonalika Singh began her journey as an UPSC aspirant and has since transitioned into a full-time professional working with various organizations, including NCERT, in the governance and policy sector. She holds a master’s degree in political science and, over the years, has developed a strong interest in international relations, security studies, and geopolitics. Alongside this, she has cultivated a deep passion for research, analysis, and writing. Her work reflects a sustained commitment to rigorous inquiry and making meaningful contributions to the field of public affairs.
