By: Khushbu Ahlawat, Consulting Editor, GSDN
Introduction
The Indo-Pacific today stands at the centre of intensifying geopolitical rivalry, maritime contestation, and strategic recalibration. Southeast Asia, situated at the crossroads of critical sea lanes and great-power competition, has emerged as a decisive arena shaping the regional balance of power. For India, the region is not merely an economic partner but a strategic hinge connecting the Indian Ocean to the Pacific. As uncertainties deepen—ranging from maritime disputes in the South China Sea to supply chain vulnerabilities and shifting alliance politics—New Delhi has begun to recalibrate its engagement with Southeast Asia in more structured and security-oriented terms.
Under the Act East Policy, India’s approach has evolved from diplomatic outreach and economic integration to the systematic institutionalisation of defence diplomacy. This shift is visible in the expansion of defence cooperation agreements, the regularisation of joint military exercises, the appointment of defence attachés, and the growing emphasis on defence exports and industrial collaboration. Rather than episodic engagement, India is embedding itself within the region’s evolving security architecture.
The February 2026 visit of the Indian Prime Minister to Malaysia should be understood within this broader strategic trajectory. It was not an isolated diplomatic event, but part of a sustained effort to position India as a credible, reliable, and long-term security partner in Southeast Asia. This transformation is unfolding at a time when confidence in traditional defence suppliers—the United States, China, and Russia—has been tested by geopolitical volatility, procurement restrictions, and strategic assertiveness. Consequently, regional states are diversifying partnerships, creating strategic space for India’s expanding defence ecosystem to play a more consequential role in Southeast Asia’s security landscape.
Historical Evolution: From Look East to Act East
India’s strategic engagement with Southeast Asia did not emerge overnight; it evolved through phases shaped by shifting geopolitical realities and domestic transformation. The Look East Policy, launched in the early 1990s under Prime Minister P.V. Narasimha Rao, marked India’s first systematic effort to reconnect with Southeast Asia after decades of relative detachment during the Cold War. Anchored in the broader context of economic liberalisation, the policy was initially economic and trade-driven, aimed at integrating India with the dynamic markets of Southeast Asia and strengthening ties with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
However, as Asia’s strategic landscape began to transform—with China’s rise, maritime disputes intensifying, and the Indo-Pacific emerging as a geopolitical construct—India’s engagement required recalibration. This shift became explicit in 2014 when Prime Minister Narendra Modi upgraded the framework to the Act East Policy. The change was not merely semantic; it signalled a transition from passive engagement to proactive strategic participation.
Under Act East, Southeast Asia was no longer viewed solely through an economic lens. Defence and security cooperation gradually emerged as central pillars of engagement. India expanded its participation in ASEAN-led security platforms, strengthened maritime cooperation in the South China Sea and beyond, institutionalised Defence Policy Dialogues and military exchanges, and invested in capacity-building initiatives for regional armed forces. The articulation of the Indo-Pacific vision further deepened this trajectory. By linking the Indian Ocean and the Pacific as a single strategic theatre, India aligned its maritime priorities with Southeast Asian security concerns. In doing so, New Delhi repositioned itself not merely as an economic partner, but as a stakeholder in the region’s long-term security architecture, laying the foundation for today’s institutionalised defence diplomacy.
Strategic Imperatives and the Architecture of India’s Defence Diplomacy in Southeast Asia
Southeast Asia occupies a pivotal place in India’s strategic imagination—not merely as a neighbouring region, but as a geopolitical fulcrum shaping the future of the Indo-Pacific order. Its geography connects the Indian Ocean to the Pacific, while its sea lanes carry the lifeblood of global commerce. For India, these waters are not distant maritime corridors but arteries of national prosperity and energy security.
The economic dimension alone underscores the region’s importance. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) accounts for approximately 11 percent of India’s global trade, and nearly 55 percent of India’s overall trade—including critical oil and energy imports—transits through Southeast Asian sea lanes. Any disruption in these waters would have direct consequences for India’s economic stability and strategic autonomy.
Yet, the region is increasingly marked by volatility. Escalating tensions in the South China Sea, sharpening US–China rivalry, and the systemic aftershocks of the Russia–Ukraine war have unsettled established security alignments. Traditional defence suppliers—the United States, Russia, and China—are facing varying degrees of scepticism among Southeast Asian states.
Several developments have influenced regional procurement behaviour:
- The Russia–Ukraine war has raised doubts about the sustainability and reliability of Russian military supply chains.
- China’s growing assertiveness in the South China Sea has heightened threat perceptions in countries such as Vietnam, Malaysia, and Indonesia.
- Perceived US unpredictability, particularly visible through end-use restrictions during the 2025 Thailand–Cambodia clash, has reinforced concerns about overdependence.
In this environment of strategic hedging and diversification, a subtle vacuum has emerged—one that opens space for alternative partners such as India and South Korea. India’s response has not been opportunistic but increasingly institutional and structured.
The Three Pillars of India’s Defence Diplomacy
India’s defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia rests on three interlinked pillars, beginning with the consolidation of institutional mechanisms.
1. Institutionalised Strategic Agreements
New Delhi has gradually moved beyond symbolic Memoranda of Understanding (MoUs) toward operational and sustained frameworks of engagement. These include:
- Defence Cooperation Agreements
- Defence Policy Dialogues (DPD)
- Joint Defence Cooperation Committees (JDCC)
- Joint Defence Industry and Logistics Committees (JDILC)
- Defence Industry Letters of Intent
These mechanisms provide continuity, policy coordination, and structured review processes—ensuring that defence cooperation is not episodic but embedded within bureaucratic and strategic systems.
A prominent example is the India–Vietnam Defence Partnership towards 2030, which outlines long-term collaboration in capacity-building, maritime security, and defence industry cooperation. Such frameworks demonstrate India’s shift from ad hoc military engagement to sustained strategic planning, reinforcing its credibility as a dependable security partner in Southeast Asia.
Through this layered architecture, India is not merely expanding presence—it is building permanence.
2. Joint Military Exercises and Interoperability
A defining feature of India’s expanding defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia is the steady institutionalisation of joint military exercises. These engagements serve multiple purposes: enhancing interoperability, building operational familiarity, fostering trust among armed forces, and increasing the visibility of Indian defence capabilities in real-time environments. Unlike formal agreements that operate at the policy level, military exercises translate intent into practice.
India’s defence cooperation with Malaysia is structured through the Malaysia–India Defence Cooperation Committee (MIDCOM), complemented by exercises such as Harimau Shakti (Army), Samudra Laksamana (Navy), and Udara Shakti (Air Force). With Myanmar, engagements such as IMBAX, IMNEX, and humanitarian assistance and disaster relief (HADR) exercises have strengthened operational coordination. Thailand participates in MAITREE and Ex-Ayutthaya, while Vietnam’s cooperation is anchored in the Defence Partnership towards 2030 and operationalised through VINBAX. Singapore hosts the long-standing SIMBEX naval exercise and Exercise Bold Kurukshetra, reflecting a high degree of trust and interoperability. Indonesia conducts Garuda Shakti and Samudra Shakti with India, and Cambodia participates in CINBAX, where Indian equipment has also been showcased.
These exercises are not isolated drills; they are platforms through which defence exports and industrial cooperation gain visibility. For example, Malaysia has sourced avionics support for its Su-30MKM aircraft, Myanmar has received sonars, radars, and the transfer of INS Sindhuvir, and Vietnam was gifted INS Kirpan in 2023 as a symbol of maritime solidarity. Indonesia procured a 40mm naval gun system, while Singapore has engaged in radar systems components cooperation. Cambodia received an infantry weapon training simulator as a gift.
Among these developments, the export of the BrahMos missile system to the Philippines stands out as a watershed moment. It marked India’s entry into high-value, strategic weapons exports in Southeast Asia, signalling both technological credibility and political trust.
3. Defence Exports and Industrial Collaboration
India’s defence diplomacy has increasingly been reinforced by its growing export profile. In 2024–25, India recorded approximately US$ 2.76 billion in defence exports—a 12.04 percent increase from the previous year—demonstrating the expanding global competitiveness of its defence industry.
At the centre of this push is the BrahMos missile system. In 2022, India signed a US$ 375 million agreement with the Philippines for three missile batteries, marking its first major export of a strategic missile platform. Interest from Indonesia, Vietnam, and Thailand indicates the potential for further expansion. The BrahMos deal was not merely a commercial transaction; it reflected Southeast Asia’s confidence in India as a reliable supplier capable of delivering advanced systems without excessive political conditionalities.
Beyond flagship platforms, India is pursuing deeper industrial integration. Samtel Avionics’ collaboration with Malaysia to support Su-30MKM systems represents an important step toward supply-chain resilience. India is also promoting indigenous radar systems, naval guns, and other platforms suited to regional requirements. The gifting of naval assets such as INS Kirpan to Vietnam underscores India’s willingness to combine strategic signalling with material support.
Collectively, defence exports and industrial partnerships have transformed India’s role from that of a participant in regional security dialogues to an active contributor to Southeast Asia’s defence capacity-building. This shift strengthens not only India’s strategic footprint but also its domestic defence ecosystem, aligning foreign policy objectives with industrial growth and technological advancement.
Institutional Consolidation, Industrial Expansion, and Strategic Implications
As India’s defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia matures, its sustainability increasingly depends not merely on high-profile agreements or arms transfers, but on the consolidation of institutional mechanisms that ensure continuity, coordination, and strategic depth. Defence engagement must be embedded within durable bureaucratic structures that outlast political cycles and episodic geopolitical shifts. In this regard, India has begun strengthening the administrative architecture underpinning its regional outreach.
One significant step has been the expansion of Defence Attaché postings across Southeast Asia, including the Philippines, with plans to establish a presence in Cambodia by March 2026. Defence attachés perform a dual strategic function: deepening military-to-military engagement while facilitating defence exports and industrial partnerships. Their presence institutionalises engagement at the operational level, ensuring that defence diplomacy is sustained through continuous coordination rather than limited to summit-level symbolism.
India is also leveraging structured platforms such as Defence Policy Dialogues (DPDs), Joint Defence Cooperation Committees (JDCC), and Joint Defence Industry and Logistics Committees (JDILC). These mechanisms enable systematic review of cooperation, identification of capability gaps, and exploration of industrial collaboration. Joint Defence Industry Cooperation frameworks provide the pathway from transactional exports to co-production, technology transfer, and joint research. However, without structured follow-through and industry integration, these platforms risk remaining procedural rather than transformative.
The strengthening of these mechanisms directly intersects with opportunities for India’s domestic defence ecosystem. India’s expanding defence diplomacy is simultaneously an external strategic instrument and an internal industrial growth strategy. Private-sector firms such as Bharat Forge, Tata Advanced Systems, and Mahindra Defence are increasingly positioned to benefit from export-led expansion. At the same time, India’s defence start-up ecosystem—particularly in UAVs, AI-enabled systems, and advanced electronics—can leverage Southeast Asia’s demand for cost-effective and adaptable technologies. Small and medium enterprises (SMEs) stand to gain through deeper supply-chain integration.
The showcasing of Indian equipment during the Cambodia–India Bilateral Army Exercise (CINBAX) 2024 symbolised a critical transition. India is gradually moving beyond a DPSU-centric export model toward a broader, private-sector-driven defence ecosystem. To consolidate these gains, New Delhi must increase private-sector visibility during joint exercises, institutionalise structured consultation with industry stakeholders, promote co-production and technology transfer, and operationalise Joint Defence Industry Cooperation mechanisms more effectively.
At the strategic level, India’s defence diplomacy advances three core objectives. First, it reinforces strategic autonomy by reducing overdependence on major power blocs while offering Southeast Asian states an alternative partner. Second, it strengthens India’s Indo-Pacific credibility by translating normative commitments into sustained operational engagement. Third, it contributes to supply chain diversification amid intensifying US–China competition, positioning India as a stable and politically less restrictive supplier.
Crucially, India’s approach complements ASEAN centrality while avoiding overt bloc politics. This calibrated posture enhances its attractiveness as a security partner. Defence diplomacy, therefore, is not merely an instrument of influence—it is a mechanism for long-term strategic integration within Southeast Asia’s evolving security architecture.
Conclusion
India’s institutionalisation of defence diplomacy in Southeast Asia marks a structural transformation in its regional strategy, yet its long-term success will depend on how effectively it addresses persistent constraints. What began as economic engagement has evolved into a multidimensional security partnership model built on defence agreements, joint exercises, industrial collaboration, and high-value exports. Through this framework, New Delhi is embedding itself within Southeast Asia’s evolving security architecture and positioning itself as a credible, non-coercive alternative amid intensifying Indo-Pacific rivalries.
However, structural challenges remain significant. Slow bureaucratic processes, financing limitations for buyers, production scalability constraints, and competition from established suppliers risk undermining India’s strategic momentum. In a region where reliability and timely delivery shape procurement decisions, procedural delays can erode credibility.
To consolidate its gains, India must streamline decision-making, expand defence export financing mechanisms, strengthen supply-chain resilience, and scale manufacturing capacity. Ultimately, the durability of India’s defence diplomacy will depend not only on strategic intent but on consistent execution. If ambition is matched with institutional efficiency and industrial competitiveness, India can emerge as a dependable security partner and long-term strategic stakeholder in Southeast Asia.
About the Author
Khushbu Ahlawat is a research analyst with a strong academic background in International Relations and Political Science. She has undertaken research projects at Jawaharlal Nehru University, contributing to analytical work on international and regional security issues. Alongside her research experience, she has professional exposure to Human Resources, with involvement in talent acquisition and organizational operations. She holds a Master’s degree in International Relations from Christ University, Bangalore, and a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from the University of Delhi.
