By: Anuraag Khaund
The day of January 08, 2025 saw India’s Foreign Secretary Vikrant Misri meeting Taliban’s Foreign Minister Mawlawi Amir Khan Muttaqi in the city of Dubai in the United Arab Emirates (UAE). This meeting was a viewed as a dramatic beginning to the new year of 2025 on the foreign policy front given the latter being the first kind of engagement between New Delhi and the new regime in Afghanistan at such a high level despite previous attempts such as the stationing of a ‘technical team’ in the Indian embassy in Kabul in 2022 and interactions with high-profile Taliban members such as Acting Defence Minister Mullah Yaqub, son of former leader Mullah Omar and JP Singh, joint secretary of Pakistan-Afghanistan-Iran division of the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). The meeting in Doha saw both the sides taking stock of the Indian humanitarian assistance in the country with Misri underscoring India’s ‘readiness to respond to the needs of the Afghan people’, especially in health and rehabilitation of refugees as well as New Delhi’s commitment to continue its development and humanitarian activities on Afghan soil.
While there exists no doubt regarding the above outreach as an exercise on the part of India maintaining a balance between its interests and the reality of the current situation in Afghanistan, also noteworthy is the timing of the same. The Misri- Muttaqi meeting comes in the heels of exacerbated tensions along the Af-Pak border after the conduction of airstrikes by Islamabad inside Afghan territory aimed at dismantling alleged hideouts of the Tehreek-e Taliban Pakistan (TTP) outfit in the eastern Afghan province of Paktika on December 24 last year. The strikes, resulting in the death of 46 civilians, including women and children as per the Taliban were responded by the latter in the forms of attacks on multiple points along the Pakistani side of the border targeting centres of ‘malicious elements and their supporters who organised and coordinated attacks in Afghanistan’. India was quick to react soon after by releasing a formal statement condemning the civilian casualties in the conflict while also highlighting Pakistan’s ‘old habit to blame its neighbours for its own internal failures’ – an apparent reference to the Pakistani deep state’s old strategy of harbouring utilizing militants to foster instability in neighbouring countries which had come back to haunt it. This formal condemnation can be seen as an attempt by New Delhi at exploiting the rift between the Taliban and its erstwhile patron at a time when seismic changes are being witnessed in South Asia much to the detriment of India’s security concerns.
One such major development has been the recent blossoming of strategic convergence between Pakistan and Bangladesh, especially in the aftermath of the overthrow of Sheikh Hasina government on August 2024. This convergence was first witnessed in the meeting between Lt Gen SM Kamr-ul Hssan, principal staff officer (PSO) as well as second-in-command of the Bangladesh Army and Pakistani Army Chief Gen. Asim Munir on January 16, 2025 for the enhancement of bilateral defence cooperation including the training of Bangladeshi officials by Rawalpindi. This was followed by the docking of ships from Karachi on the Chittagong Port twice as the first step towards the establishment of direct maritime links for fostering bilateral trade. More worryingly for India, the interim Yunus administration has removed the earlier clause of mandatory inspection of Pakistan-origin goods or cargo arriving in Bangladesh as well as the security verification of Pakistani nationals or individuals with Pakistani origin setting foot in the country. Such unfettered access could be exploited by inimical and anti-India elements to target the North-Eastern (NE) part of India bordering Bangladesh by exploiting existing unrest in states such as Manipur while also funnelling material support to NE based separatist outfits and not to mention the trafficking of drugs and penetration by terrorist elements in the region.
An example back in time would be the 2004 Chittagong Arms Haul involving the transportation of Chinese and Singapore origin weapon consignments received at Chittagong port to the camps of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) on Bangladeshi soil for later distribution to rebel groups inside India. Far more alarming was the suggestion for a Nuclear Treaty between Islamabad and Dhaka in order to boost the latter’s nuclear capability against India−an idea which has found much reception amongst the anti-India and ultra-nationalist segments of Bangladeshi strategic circles.
From this perspective, New Delhi’s act of exhibiting tacit solidarity with the Taliban can be seen as a response to Islamabad’s attempts at finding common cause with Dhaka aimed at Indian security and regional interests. However, the current engagement with the ruling dispensation in Kabul goes beyond the Pakistan factor to include other aspects of India’s strategic calculus. Foremost, is the need to maintain a foothold in post-US Afghanistan especially in the face of increasing Chinese presence as well as overtures to the Taliban regime. Beijing became the first country to not only appoint an ambassador to its embassy in Kabul post-2021 but also accept the credentials of the Taliban-appointed envoy to China in 2024−actions which were justified in terms of normal diplomatic protocol and rotational procedures rather than outright recognition.
Moreover, the increasing Western-led attempts at isolating the Taliban and actions such as the freezing of Afghan overseas assets worth US$ 9 billion by the US has only served to push the regime towards further alignment with China whereby the latter is invited to exploit the reserves of strategic minerals like lithium and copper as well as oil within Afghanistan in return for economic aid and investment. Such conditions could create a relationship of dependency which could be exploited by Beijing to India’s detriment.
In response, New Delhi has begun shedding its hesitation while becoming more receptive towards the idea of pragmatic outreach towards the new regime in Kabul. This was witnessed in the tacit acceptance of the ‘Taliban appointed’ acting consul in the Afghan Consulate based in Mumbai which can be interpreted as a signalling of willingness to engage. The focus on resuming development and humanitarian activities addressing health and refugee rehabilitation as well as fostering ties through cricket is a positive step in direction which would underline India’s credential as a ‘key regional and economic player’ as described by Muttaqi himself.
Especially important in this regard is the vexed issue of resuming Visa services for Afghan students and patients seeking education and healthcare respectively on Indian soil which was raised by the Taliban delegation in Doha. While such a decision cannot be taken easily given the compulsions and complications of security and other concerns, yet efforts should be made, in conjunction with security considerations, to restore India’s position as a favoured destination for education and health services in order to maintain and deepen the goodwill among the Afghan populace. Moreover, the Taliban itself has been willing to ‘strengthen political and economic cooperation’ with India as expressed in Doha which is an indication of the reciprocal sentiment as well as reception of the group towards New Delhi’s continued involvement in the country.
From the Taliban’s perspective, active engagement with India will not only bring economic and other benefits, but also push back against the narrative of the group being isolated and its identity of being a mere proxy of Pakistan with no autonomy of its own while also maintain pressure on Islamabad through its alignment with New Delhi. While Muttaqi’s claim of ‘present-day (Taliban ruled) Afghanistan not posing threat to any nation (including India)’ cannot be taken at face value, yet it is imperative to maintain continued Indian engagement in order to prevent the current regime from falling completely under the influence of China and by extension, its ‘iron ally’ Pakistan.
Another focal point of the interaction in Doha was the issue of promotion of trade, especially through the Iranian port of Chabahar marked by Indian investment and involvement. For long, the Chabahar has been touted as providing landlocked Afghanistan a pathway to access international markets and connectivity as an alternative to the Gwadar which was also welcomed by the Taliban. Despite the port’s importance especially in terms of facilitating multimodal connectivity initiatives such as the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) as well as providing Afghanistan an opportunity to join the same, yet the project remains un-utilized to its full potential. This especially true of India, along with Iran and Russia who are the main stakeholders of the INSTC and have shared interests in a stable and secure Afghanistan. In the case of Iran and Russia, the long-drawn conflicts in Ukraine and Gaza and US-led sanctions have resulted in adverse implications and strains on their economic sustainment and well-being. Hence, the kickstarting of Chabahar and its integration with an activated INSTC would not only provide some possible economic relief to both Tehran and Moscow, but also allow some sort of alleviation of economic crisis in Afghanistan thereby ensuring a semblance of stability. This has required urgency in the wake of the rise of extremist organisations such as the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) on Afghan soil with repercussions for the security of not only Kabul, but the wider Eurasian region and world. The Misri-Muttaqi meeting has brought the spotlight back on the importance of Chabahar and New Delhi should seize this momentum to take it up with both Tehran and Moscow given the shared interests as outlined above.
In the case of Iran, Afghanistan’s participation in Chabahar would provide some respite to already strained relationship between Kabul and Tehran over issues such as the conflict over the Helmand river and ‘undocumented Afghan migrants’ on Iranian soil. Moreover, an Iran reeling from its conflict with Israel over Gaza and the wider Middle East could ill afford an unstable Afghanistan in its border which makes resolution of outstanding issues as well as the buttressing of the relative calm inside the neighbouring country a priority. The importance of Iran in India’s Afghanistan calculus also stems from concerns over the increasing Turkish- Bangladeshi relationship which was witnessed in the deployment of Turkish drones along the border with India as well as the acquisition of Turkish manufactured tanks by Dhaka. Keeping in view Ankara’s recent closeness with Pakistan as well as the recent thawing of ties between Dhaka and Islamabad, one can see the beginnings of a Turkey- Pakistan- Bangladesh trilateral convergence foreshadowing negative implications for Indian security and strategic interests. Meanwhile, the Turkey-Iranian ties have come under strain as a fallout of the regional competition in Syria and South-Caucasus (Armenia-Azerbaijan conflict) with the fall of the Iran-backed Assad regime in 2024 and the capture of Nagorno Karabakh by Turkey-backed Azerbaijan in 2023 from Armenia, a strategic partner of Tehran. Hence, New Delhi could advantage of this fissure and rope in Iran to form a strategic convergence of its own aimed as a bulwark against if not undercutting the Turkey-Pakistani influence over the happenings inside Afghanistan. Moreover, the recent tensions between Iran and Pakistan over the latter’s harbouring of anti- Iranian groups such as Jaish al-Adl and the conduction of Iranian airstrikes inside Pakistani territory in 2024 would incentivise Tehran to find common cause with Delhi in restraining Islamabad’s sway over the Taliban and the region at large.
Finally, the India-Taliban meet in Doha also comes in the backdrop of the resurgence of the strategic Wakhan Corridor. The latter is a 350 km and 34 km wide narrow of strip of land in Afghanistan’s Badakhshan province stretching eastward to China’s Xinjiang province, with Tajikistan’s Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous region lying in the north and Pakistan’s Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and Pakistan Occupied Kashmir (POK) in the south thereby becoming the focus of five countries namely Afghanistan, China, Tajikistan, Pakistan, and India respectively. The corridor came under the control of Taliban in 2022 which has shaped the dynamics involving the major surrounding countries. From Beijing’s perspective as well as for the Taliban, the corridor provides a direct route of connectivity and trade between Afghanistan and China while also providing a pathway for Kabul and the neighbouring Central Asian countries to become a part of the China Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC). For Pakistan, along with the CPEC, the route has the potential to provide direct overland access to Tajikistan and the markets of Central Asia. But, the complications of Taliban presence and issues of terrain, geographic location and infrastructure costs have not yet allowed the strip to be utilized strategically by any of the key players.
However, actions such as Muttaqi’s emphasis on the Wakhan’s potential to emerge as a trade hub and the announcement of the construction of the Little Pamir road between Badakhshan and China highlight the Taliban’s willingness to utilize the Wakhan by inviting collaboration from powers such as China. While Beijing appears hesitant to accept this offer because of potential ramifications upon the security of Xinjiang, yet the possibility of Taliban joining the BRI and becoming a part of the CPEC would throw up challenges to India’s own ambitions regarding Chabahar and the INSTC while also affecting India’s apparent leverage with the regime.
Along with the extension of CPEC, another major Indian concern with respect to the Wakhan Corridor is its potential usage by anti-India elements or Pakistani proxies to funnel drugs and weaponry to J& K based militants as well as attempt to enter Indian territory via the corridor given its proximity with occupied Gilgit Baltistan. While Pakistan has denied allegations of plotting to capture the Wakhan in the aftermath of the Af-Pak border clashes and even reiterated the latter as part of Afghan territory, yet any Chinese influence over the corridor or its inclusion in initiatives such as the CPEC would provide Islamabad opportunity to utilize the strip of land for funnelling instability into India, under the tacit approval of Beijing and a pliant regime in Kabul. Hence, New Delhi along with its partners Iran and Russia should double down on efforts to present the Chabahar and the INSTC as a viable and much better alternative. Or at least, it should be ensured that India is kept abreast of the developments in the area through its channels of communication with the Taliban regime while holding the latter to its claim of not being a threat to any country. However, such actions are critically dependent on the level and depth of continued Indian multi-faceted engagement with the regime in Kabul.
In the aftermath of the Misri-Muttaqi meeting in Doha, concerns were raised over the event’s possibility of alienating the goodwill associated with India among the anti-Taliban factions currently based outside such as the National Resistance Front (NRF) in Tajikistan composed of members such as former Afghan Vice President Amrullah Saleh. The overemphasis on outreach to the Taliban while ignoring the need to cultivate ties with other players such as the NRF have led scholars to wonder whether India is repeating the same mistake of putting all of its eggs in one basket (Taliban) as it did previously with the Ashraf Ghani government. Such questions have taken urgency in the backdrop of speculations regarding Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) director general Muhammad Asim Malik’s visit to Tajikistan and calling upon President Emomali Rahmon and possibly the NRF to forge an anti-Taliban alliance.
Hence, New Delhi will have to play its cards right and establish and maintain communication with all parties while ensuring that it is not pushed into unfavourable equations with any. On their part, the NRF and others must exhibit an understanding attitude towards the compulsions and complications driving India’s current strategy in Afghanistan while also keeping in mind New Delhi’s past record of humanitarian and developmental assistance during the pre-2021 period.
For now, the Taliban in Kabul is a reality which India has to be deal with. Non-engagement is not an option if New Delhi wishes not to let the ghost of the Pakistan-controlled Afghanistan of 1996 haunt its security and strategic interests.
About the Author
Anuraag Khaund is pursuing PhD in International Politics from the School of International Studies, Central University of Gujarat. He has published opinion pieces in The Diplomat, Deccan Herald, Kashmir Observer and Modern Diplomacy. His interests include International Relations and Geopolitics with a focus on Eurasia, East, West, South and Southeast Asia. In addition to geopolitics, he also looks at the intersection between civilizational histories and current global politics. The author can be contacted at khaundanuraag@gmail.com
