By: Sk Md Assad Armaan, Research Analyst, GSDN

In December 2025, the United States Department of Defense’s Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China introduced a subtle but significant shift in how Beijing’s territorial priorities are understood. For the first time, China’s claims over Arunachal Pradesh referred to by Beijing as “South Tibet” were placed within the language of core interests. This categorization carries major strategic weight. In Chinese strategic doctrine, “core interests” are not negotiable claims; they are issues over which Beijing reserves the right to use all instruments of national power, including military force.

Until now, this category had been reserved for Taiwan, Xinjiang, Tibet, Hong Kong, and certain maritime claims. The inclusion of Arunachal Pradesh signals an important escalation. For India, this development marks a change in the nature of the boundary dispute. What was previously managed as a contested border issue rooted in colonial-era ambiguity is now being elevated by China into a matter of sovereignty, regime legitimacy, and national rejuvenation. This shift has profound implications for India’s security posture, diplomatic strategy, and long-term approach to managing China along the Himalayan frontier. China’s claims over Arunachal Pradesh are not new.

Since the 1950s, Beijing has rejected the McMahon Line and maintained that the region is part of “South Tibet.” However, for decades, this claim was largely reinforced through diplomatic protests, symbolic renaming of places, and limited military signaling. What distinguishes the present moment is not the claim itself, but its elevation within China’s strategic hierarchy. This mirrors China’s approach to Taiwan, where sovereignty claims are framed not as territorial disputes but as unfinished historical missions central to Communist Party authority. Once an issue is placed within this category, compromise becomes politically costly, if not impossible. For India, this marks a decisive narrowing of diplomatic space. The Pentagon’s 2025 report notes that Beijing increasingly frames territorial disputes through the lens of national rejuvenation and regime legitimacy. By categorizing Arunachal Pradesh as a core interest, China is effectively asserting that the issue is central to the Communist Party’s authority and historical narrative. This mirrors the logic applied to Taiwan, where sovereignty claims are linked directly to the survival and credibility of the Chinese state.

This shift narrows diplomatic space. Core interests are, by definition, non-comprisable. Dialogue can manage escalation, but it cannot resolve the underlying claim. For India, this means that border agreements, and disengagement mechanisms while still necessary are no longer sufficient to stabilize the dispute in the long term. In Chinese strategic thinking, core interests justify the use of all instruments of national power, including military force, if sovereignty is perceived to be threatened. By elevating Arunachal Pradesh to this category, Beijing is signaling that future tensions along the eastern sector of the Line of Actual Control may no longer be treated as peripheral or negotiable. Instead, they risk becoming embedded within China’s broader project of regime legitimacy and national rejuvenation.

Militarization Without War

The implications of this reclassification are already visible on the ground. Over the past few years, China has invested heavily in border infrastructure opposite Arunachal Pradesh. Advanced airfields, logistics hubs, civilian infrastructure, and road networks have significantly improved the People’s Liberation Army’s ability to mobilize forces rapidly. Unlike earlier phases of border tension, this build-up is not episodic or reactive; it is structural and permanent. The U.S. Department of Defense’s 2025 report highlights that the People’s Liberation Army is increasingly oriented toward rapid mobilization, joint theatre command integration, and localized conflict along disputed borders.

The Eastern Theatre Command, responsible for operations opposite Arunachal Pradesh, has received sustained investment in airlift capability, logistics infrastructure, and intelligence-surveillance assets. This suggests that preparedness in the eastern sector is no longer contingency planning but a standing operational priority. The Pentagon report highlights China’s emphasis on rapid mobilization, integrated joint operations, and localized conflict readiness along disputed borders. Arunachal Pradesh, with its strategic depth, proximity to the Siliguri Corridor, and terrain advantage for the defender, occupies a critical place in this calculus. By elevating the region to core-interest status, Beijing signals that military preparedness here is not contingency planning but strategic necessity.

For India, this transforms the Line of Actual Control into an arena of constant strategic friction. Even without active conflict, the requirement to maintain high levels of readiness imposes economic, logistical, and political costs. The risk is not immediate war, but sustained pressure where crisis becomes the norm rather than the exception. China’s interest framing also operates in the political and psychological domains. Symbolic actions such as renaming locations in Arunachal Pradesh, issuing standard maps that incorporate Indian territory, and amplifying claims through state media serve a strategic purpose. They normalize China’s claim domestically while testing India’s diplomatic responses internationally. Over time, such symbolic repetition risks shaping international perceptions, particularly among states that seek neutrality in India–China tensions.

If left uncontested, these narratives can gradually shift the framing of the dispute from one of contested sovereignty to one of assumed Chinese legitimacy. For India, the challenge lies in countering narrative erosion without amplifying Beijing’s signaling. These actions are designed to create narratives. By repeatedly asserting sovereignty claims, Beijing seeks to present the dispute as settled in principle, even if unresolved. Over time, such repetition risks shaping international perceptions, particularly among countries that prefer neutrality in India–China tensions. For India, the challenge lies in preventing narrative erosion. Silence risks normalization, while overreaction risks escalation. Maintaining a consistent diplomatic posture that reaffirms sovereignty without amplifying Chinese signaling is now an essential component of India’s China strategy.

Strategic Implications for India’s Security Posture

The elevation of Arunachal Pradesh to core-interest status has direct consequences for India’s defense planning. First, it reinforces the need for permanent force deployment rather than rotational presence along the eastern sector of the LAC. Second, it increases the importance of air power, surveillance in a region where terrain heavily shapes operational outcomes. Third, it complicates India’s broader China strategy. Arunachal Pradesh cannot be treated in isolation from developments in Ladakh, the Indian Ocean, or the Indo-Pacific. China’s approach reflects a pattern of multidirectional pressure where pressure in one theatre is calibrated alongside signaling in others.

Pressure along Arunachal Pradesh cannot be viewed independently from Chinese activity in Ladakh, the Indian Ocean Region, or the Taiwan Strait. Land-based pressure along the Himalayas complements maritime signaling and diplomatic assertiveness elsewhere, creating a cumulative effect on India’s strategic bandwidth. This makes integration between India’s continental defense planning and Indo-Pacific strategy increasingly unavoidable. India must therefore integrate its continental and maritime strategies rather than viewing them as separate domains. Importantly, this also affects civil–military coordination. Infrastructure development, population retention, and economic integration in border regions are no longer developmental choices alone; they are strategic imperatives. A populated, connected, and economically resilient Arunachal Pradesh strengthens India’s deterrence posture without relying solely on military means.

Diplomatic Constraints and the Limits of Engagement

China’s core-interest framing also constrains diplomatic engagement. Border talks, military hotlines, and working mechanisms remain essential for crisis management, but they operate within increasingly narrow parameters. When one party views an issue as existential, compromise becomes politically costly. For India, this raises a difficult question: how to engage without legitimizing an escalated claim. The answer lies in separating crisis management from dispute resolution. While India must continue engaging to prevent miscalculation, it must also prepare for a prolonged period in which the dispute remains structurally unresolved. India’s reluctance to internationalize the boundary dispute stems from a desire to preserve strategic autonomy and prevent external mediation. However, selective signaling through partnerships can still reinforce deterrence without formal internationalization. Quiet alignment with like-minded states serves to raise the geopolitical costs of unilateral revisionism while maintaining diplomatic restraint. This places greater emphasis on coalition diplomacy. While India has avoided internationalizing the boundary dispute, the strategic environment is changing. Without making Arunachal Pradesh a bargaining chip, India can still reinforce its position through partnerships, signaling that unilateral revisionism carries broader geopolitical costs.

A Structural Shift, not a Tactical One

China’s designation of Arunachal Pradesh as a core interest marks a structural shift in the India–China relationship. It transforms a territorial dispute into a question tied directly to Beijing’s vision of national rejuvenation and strategic control. For India, this does not imply inevitability of conflict, but it does mean permanence of pressure. Managing this challenge will require patience, consistency, and strategic clarity. Military preparedness must be matched with political restraint, infrastructure development with diplomatic steadiness, and regional engagement with global partnerships.

Arunachal Pradesh is no longer just a frontier region; it has become a central node in the evolving Asian balance of power. The key question for India is not whether China’s claims can be immediately countered, but whether India can sustain long-term deterrence without allowing escalation to define the relationship. In an era where borders are increasingly shaped by power rather than treaties, sustaining deterrence in such an environment will depend less on dramatic responses and more on India’s capacity for endurance, institutional resilience, and strategic consistency over time. How India responds to this redefinition of Arunachal Pradesh may well shape the future stability of the Himalayan order.

By: Sanya Singh, Research Analyst, GSDN

The rise of China as the manufacturing powerhouse of the world constitutes one of the most dramatic economic transformations of the contemporary world. In less than five decades, China transformed itself from an agrarian and inward-looking economy into the world’s largest manufacturing nation, accounting for nearly a third of global manufacturing output. Chinese factories, today, dominate global supply chains in everything from low-cost consumer goods to high-end electronics, electric vehicles, and renewable energy technologies. This manufacturing surge has reshaped not only international trade patterns but also global power dynamics.

The role of manufacturing in China’s rise exceeds economic growth. Manufacturing formed the backbone of China’s export-oriented development model, a source of employment for hundreds of millions, and the foundation for technological advancement and military modernisation. As global politics becomes increasingly shaped by supply chains, industrial capacity, and technological leadership, understanding how China surged in manufacturing is essential to understanding the basic contours of contemporary geopolitics. This article argues that China’s manufacturing predominance grew through deliberate state-led reforms, strategic global integration, labour and infrastructure advantages, and long-term industrial planning, all transforming economic strength into strategic power.

Historical Context: China Before Economic Reform

Until the late 1970s, China’s economy was dominated by a highly rigid, centrally planned regime under Mao Zedong. Most industrial output was produced under state control, where ideological ambitions took precedence over efficiency and innovation. For the most part, in terms of scale, quality, and technological levels, manufacturing output was low in China, while that country remained relatively closed to international markets. The absence of competition, weak incentives, and partial integration with international trade led to low productivity and stagnation in industrial growth.

It was apparent by the mid-1970s that China had dramatically lagged behind advanced industrial economies and several developing ones. Manufacturing served domestic consumption, rather than export markets, and technological capabilities were severely constrained. In fact, industrial capacity was further weakened by the failure of the Great Leap Forward and disruptions of the Cultural Revolution. This background thus made it plain that without fundamental reforms, China was destined to be an economically peripheral country. The requirement for transformation set the stage for a historic shift in economic strategy.

Deng Xiaoping’s Reforms and the Opening-Up Policy

Deng Xiaoping’s economic reforms, which began in 1978, represented a decisive break from Maoist central planning and laid the foundation for China’s manufacturing rise. Deng refocused priorities in China from ideological purity to economic pragmatism, growth, productivity, and modernization. His famous principle – “It does not matter whether a cat is black or white, as long as it catches mice” caught this pragmatic approach.

These reforms introduced market mechanisms within a socialist framework: state control was gradually relaxed, enterprises were given greater autonomy, profit incentives were introduced, and private entrepreneurship was cautiously allowed. Most importantly, China adopted a gradual and experimental reform strategy, testing policies in limited regions before expanding them nationwide. This avoided economic shocks and ensured political stability.

The Opening-Up Policy encouraged foreign trade, investment, and technological transfer. China opened coastal regions to international markets, invited foreign firms, and integrated into international production networks. These reforms then transformed China into an export-oriented manufacturing economy, where, in return, its rapid industrial growth could be achieved alongside strongly maintained state oversight. Deng’s reforms thus created the institutional and policy foundation for China’s emergence as a global manufacturing powerhouse.

The Role of State and Industrial Policy

Contrary to most developing countries relying on the free-market mechanisms, China followed state-led development. The Chinese state took a central and decisive role in driving the manufacturing surge through proactive industrial policy and long-term planning. In contrast to market-driven development models, China opted for the development state model, wherein the government played an active leading role in guiding industrial development and providing scope for market mechanisms under such controlled settings. Manufacturing had been marked as a strategic national priority, which was to be associated with economic growth, employment, and national power.

It was through the Five-Year Plan that the state identified the priority sectors, set production targets, and coordinated investment across regions. State-owned enterprises were retained and strengthened in strategic industries like steel, energy, transport, and heavy machinery, ensuring control by the state over key inputs. Simultaneously, private and foreign firms were allowed to compete in non-strategic sectors to create scale and efficiency.

The state also supported manufacturing through subsidies, tax incentives, cheap credit from state-owned banks, land access, and export support policies. Local governments were active in developing industrial clusters and infrastructure. This coordinated state-market model gave policy stability, a reduction of risks for investors, and the rapid scaling up of manufacturing with technological upgrading in China.

Special Economic Zones and Foreign Direct Investment

One of the most innovative tools in China’s manufacturing strategy was the creation of Special Economic Zones (SEZs). Special Economic Zones (SEZs) have played a decisive role in China’s manufacturing surge by acting as gateways for foreign capital, technology, and global integration. Since the late 1970s, China has established Special Economic Zones (SEZs) such as Shenzhen, Zhuhai, Xiamen, and Shantou, providing advantages of tax incentives, simplified regulations, flexible labour policies, and export-oriented infrastructure. Deliberately positioned along the coast, these zones are meant to enable trade and attract multinational corporations.

Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flowed into Special Economic Zones (SEZs) as global firms sought low-cost production bases with reliable infrastructure and policy stability. In return, China accesses not only the capital but also advanced technologies, managerial expertise, and international standards of production. China was able to learn from Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) through joint ventures, subcontracting, and supplier relationships in order to gradually move up the manufacturing ladder.

Importantly, Special Economic Zones (SEZs) served as experimental laboratories for market-oriented reforms: successful policies were later extended nationwide, enabling China to scale industrial growth without destabilizing the broader economy. Integrating China into global value chains, SPECIAL Economic Zones (SEZs) transformed in from a peripheral producer into a central hub of global manufacturing.

Labour Advantage and Demographic Dividend

The labour comparative advantages and demographic dividend have strongly supported the rise of manufacturing in China. Throughout the several decades, the Chinese had a large working-age population and surplus rural labour that could be absorbed at relatively low wages into factories. Large-scale rural-to-urban migration supplied the manufacturing hubs with a disciplined and abundant workforce. That allowed firms to keep their operations low in cost and high in volume, with China becoming very competitive, especially in labour-intensive industries like textiles, electronics assembly, and consumer goods.

The demographic dividend, the proportion of the working-age population being much higher compared to dependents-boosted productivity and economic growth. The State simultaneously invested in basic education, vocational training, and skill development, leading to gradual improvement in the quality of labour. The country could thus move progressively from simple assembling work to more complex manufacturing processes.

The combination of low labour costs, workforce discipline, and improving skills let China dominate world manufacturing during its era of rapid growth. Now, this comparative advantage is starting to erode with rising wages and an ageing population, pushing China towards automation and higher-value production.

Infrastructure and Logistics Revolution

The large-scale manufacturing surge in China was led by an equally large-scale state-led infrastructure and logistics revolution. Realizing above all that efficient infrastructure in central to industrial competitiveness, the Chinese government invested massively in ports, highways, railways, airports, and power generation, and in industrial corridors. These investments drastically reduced transportation costs, delivery times, and supply-chain bottlenecks, therefore making large-scale manufacturing feasible and efficient.

Large, modern ports like Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Ningbo developed into some of the busiest in the world, enabling easy integration with sea routes serving international trade. Networks of high-speed rail and expressways linked inland production centres to coastal export hubs, including manufacturing well past a few coastal cities. Reliable electricity supplies, industrial parks, and export-processing zones also facilitate uninterrupted production.

This logistics efficiency enabled just-in-time manufacturing and rapid export fulfilment, which attracted multinational firms seeking reliability and scale. Whereas in most developing countries, a poor infrastructure strategy created a strong backbone for years of sustained manufacturing expansion and dominance in global supply chains.

World Trade Organisation (WTO) Accession and Export-Led Growth

China’s accession to the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 marked a defining moment in its manufacturing rise. For China, membership meant that it had gained predictable and legally secured access to major global markets in particular, the United States and the European Union. With this development, trade uncertainty decreased, investor confidence increased, and the pace at which global manufacturing was relocating to China quickened. Chinese exports also expanded rapidly, with falling tariffs and the stabilization of trade rules in sectors such as electronics, textiles, machinery, and consumer goods.

World Trade Organisation (WTO) integration allowed China to implement an export-oriented growth model in which manufacturing exports emerged as the leading locomotive for economic growth. The large trade surplus translated into huge foreign exchange reserves, bolstering the fiscal and financial capacity of the state. These resources, therefore, were reinvested in infrastructure, industrial upgrading, and technological development, establishing a self-reinforcing cycle of growth within the manufacturing sector. In addition, conformity to the World Trade Organisation’s (WTO’s) regulatory standards compelled China to rationalise its institutional environment and be more competitive. All in all, World Trade Organisation (WTO) accession transformed China from a regional Producer into a cornerstone of the global manufacturing system.

Technological Upgradation and Moving Up the Value Chain

The technological upgradation has been central in the transition of China from a low-cost manufacturing base to high-value production. Starting off with labour-intensive assembling, China gradually developed research and development, automation, and advanced skills so that its dependency on foreign technology decreased. State-led initiatives like Made in China 2025 have a strategic focus on areas such as semiconductors, robotics, aerospace, electric vehicles, and renewable energy.

Through sustained public investment, technology transfer from foreign firms, and the emergence of national champions such as Huawei, Build Your Dreams (BYD), and Contemporary Amperex Technology Co., Limited (CATL), Chinese manufacturers have climbed global value chains, from basic assembly to design, branding, and innovation. Automation and artificial intelligence have further raised productivity, compensating for increasing labour costs. This process has had strategic implications given that control over advanced manufacturing enhances economic resilience, military capability, and geopolitical influence. China’s technological upgrading has therefore heightened global competition, especially with the United States, and has made manufacturing and technology core to contemporary power politics.

Manufacturing, Economic Power, and Strategic Influence

The foundation of China’s economic and strategic power has been its manufacturing strength. Large-scale manufacturing allowed for sustained export-led growth, amassing enormous foreign exchange reserves and fiscal capacity. This economic surplus made available to the Chinese state the wherewithal for heavy investment in infrastructure, technology, and military modernisation, directly linking industrial capacity with national power.

Manufacturing dominance also meant the building of global supply chain dependence, with China acquiring structural leverage over other economies. Many countries rely on Chinese inputs for electronics, pharmaceuticals, renewable energy equipment, and consumer goods, thus enhancing Beijing’s bargaining power in trade and diplomacy. The interdependence has strategic implications, as seen during the COVID-19 pandemic and recent supply chain disruptions.

At the geopolitical level, manufacturing has emerged as a national security asset. Control over advanced manufacturing, such as semiconductors, electric vehicles, and telecom equipment, translates into technological leadership and military advantages. This is why China’s industrial rise has triggered strategic competition with the United States, including trade wars, export controls, and efforts to restrict China’s access to critical technologies. In other words, China’s manufacturing surge turned economic strength into strategic influence, drastically changing the contours of global power.

Challenges, Criticisms, and Sustainable Concerns

Despite the overall success of the model, huge challenges lie ahead. For one thing, rapid industrialisation has brought severe environmental degradation, raising serious questions about sustainability. Increasing wages and an aging population are eating into China’s low-cost labour advantages; thus, some firms have already begun shifting their production to other developing countries. Centrally guided expansion has also been associated with industrial overcapacity and high levels of local government debt, thus lowering efficiency. China also faces intensifying trade tensions, export controls, and supply-chain diversification efforts, especially from the United States and its allies.

In addition, reliance on foreign technology in strategic areas, such as semiconductors, presents strategic vulnerabilities. In all, these issues indicate that whereas China remains a powerhouse in manufacturing, sustaining dominance will need technological innovation, greener production, and structural reforms. Finally, critics question whether China’s state-led model of manufacturing is sustainable in a more complex, innovation-driven global economy. Although state coordination was useful in catch-up industrialization, excessive intervention may suppress innovation, competition, and efficiency in the advanced sectors.

The challenge for China is how to rebalance the role of the state: to provide strategic guidance while allowing market forces to drive innovation. How successfully China navigates this transition determines whether its manufacturing dominance is sustainable in the long term.

Comparative Perspective: Why China Succeeded Where Others Did Not?

Most developing countries that attempted industrialisation failed to achieve the same success as China. China benefited from a particular set of conditions that included: strong state capacity, policy continuity, massive domestic market size, and favourable timing within an era of globalisation. Massive investment in infrastructure, stable industrial policies, and integration into global value chains allowed firms to achieve economies of scale. Unlike fragmented or inconsistent reformers, China maintained a long-term commitment to manufacturing as a national priority.

These, in turn, have prevented countries like India and those in Latin America from fully taking advantage of the forces of globalisation due to infrastructure deficits, regulatory complexity, or political instability. China also had the benefit of timing. Industrialisation occurred at a period when the West was offshoring production as part of globalisation. Most countries had to bear fragmented governance, policy reversal, weak infrastructure, and premature deindustrialisation. The ability to coordinate policy across levels of government and integrate manufacturing with the national strategy sets China apart from most peers.

Conclusion

China’s rise in manufacturing is a product of conscious reforms, state-led industrial policy, global integration, labour, infrastructure advantages, and sustained strategic planning. Manufacturing was the bedrock of China’s economic ascendance and became one of the most important sources of national power. Today, China’s industrial might defines global trade, energizes technological competition, and shapes geopolitical dynamics, especially in the Indo-Pacific.

As global politics increasingly revolves around supply chains, technology, and economic resilience, China’s manufacturing story is a critical lesson for developing economies and policymakers alike around the world. Manufacturing is not just an economic sector; it has been a strategic asset for the reshaping of global power structures. China’s case displays how industrial capacity, allied with long-term vision and state capacity, can change a nation’s standing in the international system.

By: Jaiwant Singh Jhala, Research Analyst, GSDN

The National Defence Authorization Act (NDAA) is a crucial United States law passed annually by Congress that sets defence policy, priorities and funding levels for the Department of War (DoD) and related agencies, authorizing spending for the upcoming fiscal year, with the latest being the FY 2026 NDAA signed by President Donald Trump in December 2025. It is an annual bill for the US Department of Defence and other agencies involved in national security such as Energy, State, Homeland Security, etc. Traditionally passed every year for more than six decades, the NDAA is far more than a budgeting exercise. It articulates United States’ geopolitical objectives, shapes partnership mechanisms, and serves as a barometer for America’s strategic vision globally.

The FY 2026 NDAA, signed by President Trump on December 19, 2025, builds on this by emphasizing “Peace through Strength”, funding the Department of War and national security programs while prioritizing Indo-Pacific alliances. These acts mandate reports on defence cooperation and integrate partners like India into supply chain security. The NDAA is the primary legislative instrument through which the US Congress directs national defence policy. While the language of the Act covers appropriations for military personnel, equipment procurement, research and development, and readiness, it simultaneously enunciates strategic priorities such as including foreign partnerships, alliance frameworks and emerging technology cooperation. In its FY 2026 iteration, the NDAA not only authorises funding for the Pentagon and related national security agencies but also advances policy language reinforcing US strategic competition with China and Russia. A significant component of this strategic emphasis involves strengthening defence alliances and partnerships in the Indo-Pacific region, with a specific emphasis on India.

Implications for India

India, being one of the major emerging global powers and a central player in Indo-Pacific geopolitics, will have extensive implications of this Act such as spanning diplomatic influence, security cooperation, industrial partnerships, and broader balance of power in the region. National Defence Authorization Act deepens engagement with India through the Quad, aiming to counter China’s influence, and supports Taiwan’s defence. The NDAA calls for increased participation of Indian defence forces in bilateral and multilateral exercises with the United States and other partners such as Japan and Australia. This includes deepening cooperation in the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (Quad) framework. NDAA iteration counters China’s influence by bolstering Quad partnerships like US, India, Japan, Australia. The 2026 version urges expanded joint exercises, maritime security, and defence trade with India to ensure a free Indo-Pacific. Such expanded military interaction improves interoperability between Indian and U.S. forces. This is particularly important for combined operations involving humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, or maritime security missions.

There will be explicit support of India in Indo-Pacific strategy. The NDAA articulates a clear sense of Congress that the United States should broaden engagement with India as a core partner in realising a “free and open Indo-Pacific.” This broad language encompasses not only enhanced military cooperation but a shared vision of regional stability and deterrence against coercive policies by China. With a vast coastline commanding critical sea lanes and an expanding military footprint, India’s geographical position makes it a vital partner in United States’s Indo-Pacific strategy for years to come. Provisions promote interoperability, such as integrating defence industrial bases with India, Japan, Australia, and South Korea for supply chain resilience. This responds to threats from unmanned systems and AI subversion by adversaries. Earlier NDAA amendments, like FY 2020 proposals, mandated US reports on India-US defence ties in the Indian Ocean, reinforcing shared interests. Recent acts extend this to AI-enabled weapons and counter-drone capabilities, inviting Indian collaboration. Formalising collaborative mechanisms is also an essential part of the act.

One of the concrete provisions in NDAA calls for the establishment of a joint consultative mechanism between the United States and India to assess and work through impediments to nuclear cooperation, specifically India’s nuclear liability framework. This issue has long been a stumbling block for expanded civil nuclear cooperation, which American firms have viewed as a deterrent to investment without liability protections aligned to international norms. The Act requires the Secretary of State to submit detailed assessments on this mechanism to Congress, ensuring accountability and sustained political attention. Furthermore, the NDAA directs enhanced roles for strategic dialogues, notably the US–India Strategic Security Dialogue, positioning this as a vehicle for general diplomatic and defence cooperation beyond traditional bilateral channels. The Act encourages expanded defence trade including sales and broader technology collaboration, which could translate into access for India to advanced United States military platforms and systems.

India has already emerged as one of the largest importers of US defence equipment, from Apache helicopters to advanced avionics, but the NDAA’s framework now fosters not just sales but potentially co-development and co-manufacture opportunities, in line with India’s Make in India initiatives. This could extend to cutting-edge domains such as naval platforms, next-generation fighter technologies, and advanced missiles, subject to mutually agreeable terms on technology transfer and industrial collaboration. Beyond military exercises and sales, the FY 2026 NDAA reflects a strategic emphasis on defence industrial base cooperation among Indo-Pacific partners. The Act proposes initiatives to strengthen cooperation across defence manufacturing supply chains, research and development networks, and interoperability frameworks. India, placed among priority partners including Australia, Japan, and South Korea, is expected to participate in a Partnership for Indo-Pacific Industrial Resilience, a long-term initiative to secure supply chains and co-create defence industrial capacity. Given global disruptions in defence supply chains in recent years, such cooperation is critical for ensuring that partner nations are not left vulnerable by unilateral dependencies, whether in hardware components, semiconductor technologies, or logistics infrastructure. For India, this opens potential avenues to integrate its own defence industry, including private sector entities, into multinational value chains.

However, significant policy alignment and capability building will be necessary to transform these prospects into real industrial outcomes. One of the geopolitically consequential provisions of the NDAA is the direction for a joint consultative mechanism to assess India’s civil nuclear liability regime. India’s Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage Act (2010) has historically been a barrier to large-scale U.S. nuclear reactor exports due to concerns about supplier liability and risk allocation. By legislating a mechanism to assess and potentially align India’s liability rules with global norms, the NDAA clears a path for deeper nuclear collaboration, both for clean energy and dual-use technology cooperation. While the NDAA does not create binding alliance commitments like NATO treaties, it actively shapes a collective deterrence architecture in the Indo-Pacific by promoting multilateral integration, especially through the Quad. By explicitly calling for cooperation not just bilaterally but within the Quad format, the Act affirms that India’s role is not peripheral but central to collective strategic planning. Given India’s complex relationships, including military ties with Russia, this balancing act will be crucial as the strategic climate evolves.

Nevertheless, the NDAA signals that US views India as a cornerstone partner in its regional strategy, not simply another client state. India’s defence procurement has historically been diversified, with significant equipment sourced from Russia, Europe, and increasingly the United States. The NDAA’s push for closer integration with US defence industries potentially accelerates this diversification. Yet practical challenges remain, such as technology transfer negotiations, supply chain logistics, and interoperability concerns can slow implementation. Successful collaboration in high-tech domains such as AI-enabled systems, secure communications, and hypersonic weapons, would require robust institutional frameworks between Indian and US stakeholders.

Challenges

India’s foreign policy tradition emphasises strategic autonomy, avoiding formal alliances that could constrain independent decision-making. The NDAA’s provisions, while supportive, risk perceptions that India might be drawn closer into American strategic frameworks, potentially complicating its relations with other major powers like Russia. Navigating these expectations will require diplomatic finesse, leveraging US cooperation where it aligns with India’s interests, while maintaining autonomous policy posture in global issues where convergence is limited. The Act’s encouragement of co-development and industrial cooperation faces practical barriers. Trust, intellectual property concerns, and regulatory mismatches can slow joint ventures, especially in sensitive areas like defence electronics or aerospace. Moreover, ensuring India’s defence industrial base can absorb and scale advanced technologies will be a long-term endeavour necessitating consistent policy support from both governments.

In an era where geopolitical competition is intensifying, driven by China’s assertiveness and shifting global power equations, the NDAA underscores a unique moment in India–US relations, with implications that will reverberate for years to come.

By: Tushar Jain, Research Analyst, GSDN

The question of whether the Islamic State (ISIS) is regaining a foothold in Syria continues to draw global attention. More than a decade after the outbreak of the Syrian civil war and over five years since ISIS lost its territorial “caliphate,” the group remains a persistent concern for policymakers, security analysts, and local populations alike. While headlines often suggest a dramatic resurgence, the reality is far more layered and complex. ISIS today is not the same organization that once ruled large parts of Syria and Iraq, yet it has not disappeared from the regional landscape either.

This dual reality creates confusion. On one hand, the group no longer controls cities, collects taxes openly, or governs millions of people. On the other, it continues to carry out attacks, maintain underground networks, and exploit political instability. The persistence of ISIS raises an important question: is the group regaining strength, or is it merely surviving in a weakened but dangerous form?

This article examines whether ISIS is truly re-emerging in Syria, the nature of its current operations, and the political, social, and security conditions that allow it to endure. It also explores the broader regional and international dynamics that shape Syria’s future and influence the long-term trajectory of extremist movements. The aim is to present a grounded and factual assessment without exaggeration or alarmism.

Understanding ISIS: From State-Building to Survival

To understand ISIS’s present condition, it is necessary to revisit its past. Between 2014 and 2016, ISIS reached an unprecedented level of power for a non-state armed group. It controlled vast territories across Syria and Iraq, including major cities such as Raqqa and Mosul. At its peak, ISIS governed millions of people, operated oil fields, imposed taxation systems, ran courts, and maintained police forces. It also developed a sophisticated propaganda network that attracted thousands of foreign fighters from across the world.

This period represented the height of ISIS’s ambition to establish a so-called caliphate. Its governance model relied on extreme violence, ideological indoctrination, and strict social control. However, this same brutality also mobilized an international military response.

By 2019, sustained military operations by the US-led coalition and local partners, particularly the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), dismantled ISIS’s territorial control. The fall of Baghuz marked the symbolic end of the caliphate. Yet, while territory was lost, the organization itself did not vanish.

Instead, ISIS adapted. It shifted from a state-like entity to a decentralized insurgent network. This transformation allowed it to survive military defeat by reducing its visibility and avoiding large-scale confrontations. Understanding this strategic shift is essential to evaluating ISIS’s current threat.

The Current Landscape in Syria

Syria today remains one of the most fragmented states in the world. More than a decade of conflict has left the country politically divided, economically devastated, and socially fractured.

The Syrian government, backed primarily by Russia and Iran, controls most major urban centres and western regions. Kurdish-led forces, supported by the United States, dominate much of northeastern Syria. Turkish-backed opposition groups maintain influence in parts of the north, while various militias and armed factions operate in contested zones. This fragmented control has produced governance gaps that are difficult to manage and easy to exploit.

ISIS operates mainly in central and eastern Syria, particularly in the vast desert region known as the Badia. This area stretches across multiple provinces and offers ideal terrain for insurgent activity. Its remoteness, sparse population, and limited state presence make surveillance and security operations challenging.

From these areas, ISIS conducts ambushes, assassinations, and sabotage operations. Targets often include Syrian government forces, allied militias, and occasionally local leaders accused of cooperating with authorities. These attacks are designed less to capture territory and more to demonstrate survival, weaken morale, and maintain relevance.

Crucially, ISIS does not currently govern towns or cities. Its influence is tactical rather than territorial, reflecting a significant reduction in its overall power.

Nature of ISIS Operations Today

ISIS today operates as a low-intensity insurgency. Its activities are calculated, limited, and designed to minimize risk while maximizing symbolic impact. Typical operations include:

• Attacks on military checkpoints and patrols
• Assassinations of local officials, tribal leaders, or informants
• Planting roadside bombs and improvised explosive devices
• Night-time raids and hit-and-run attacks

These operations rarely result in large territorial gains but serve strategic purposes. They reinforce the group’s image as an active force, help maintain internal morale, and attract attention from supporters and potential recruits.

Unlike during its peak years, ISIS avoids prolonged engagements with heavily armed forces. This reflects both its reduced capacity and a deliberate strategy of survival rather than expansion. The organization has learned from its past losses and now prioritizes endurance over dominance.

Detention Camps and the Risk of Radicalization

One of the most serious long-term challenges in Syria is the situation in detention camps such as Al-Hol and Roj. These camps house tens of thousands of individuals, including women and children linked to ISIS fighters.

Living conditions in these camps are extremely poor. Overcrowding, limited access to education and healthcare, and weak security structures have created an environment ripe for radicalization. Reports suggest that hardline ISIS supporters continue to enforce ideological discipline within the camps, intimidating others and spreading extremist beliefs.

Children growing up in these conditions face severe psychological trauma and lack exposure to alternative worldviews. Many have known nothing but conflict and extremist ideology. Without proper rehabilitation and reintegration programs, these children risk becoming the next generation of militants.

The international community has struggled to address this issue. Many countries are reluctant to repatriate their citizens due to political and security concerns. As a result, the camps remain overcrowded and unstable, representing one of the most serious long-term security threats linked to ISIS.

International Military Presence and Its Limits

The United States and its coalition partners maintain a limited military presence in northeastern Syria. Their objectives include supporting local forces, preventing an ISIS resurgence, and securing detention facilities.

However, this presence is politically sensitive and inherently fragile. Domestic pressures, regional tensions, and shifting foreign policy priorities could lead to a reduction or withdrawal of forces. History has shown that sudden power vacuums in Iraq and Syria often lead to rapid security deterioration.

At the same time, military presence alone cannot resolve the deeper causes of instability. Without political reconciliation, economic recovery, and inclusive governance, military operations serve only as temporary containment measures.

Is ISIS Gaining Strength?

In terms of manpower, finances, and territorial control, ISIS is significantly weaker than it was during its peak. It no longer controls oil fields, major population centres, or significant revenue streams. Its leadership has been repeatedly targeted, and its communication networks face constant surveillance.

However, weakness does not mean irrelevance. ISIS remains capable of carrying out deadly attacks and inspiring violence beyond Syria’s borders. Its ability to adapt, decentralize, and exploit instability ensures its continued presence.

Therefore, while ISIS is not “back” in the sense of rebuilding a caliphate, it is also not defeated in any final or absolute sense.

The Role of Regional and Global Politics

Regional and international politics play a decisive role in shaping Syria’s future and ISIS’s prospects. Competing interests among global and regional powers often undermine coordinated stabilization efforts.

Russia, Iran, Turkey, and the United States pursue overlapping but often conflicting objectives. These rivalries complicate governance, delay reconstruction, and weaken institutional capacity. In such an environment, extremist groups can exploit grievances and insecurity.

Economic collapse further worsens the situation. Sanctions, war damage, corruption, and lack of investment have devastated Syria’s economy. High unemployment and poverty create fertile ground for radicalization, particularly among young people with limited opportunities.

Media Narratives and Public Perception

Media coverage of ISIS often oscillates between alarmism and neglect. Isolated attacks may be framed as signs of resurgence, while long-term structural issues receive less attention.

This distortion can shape public opinion and policy in unhelpful ways. While it is important not to underestimate the threat, exaggeration can also lead to short-term, reactionary decisions rather than sustainable solutions.

A balanced understanding recognizes that ISIS remains a security concern but not an existential threat comparable to its peak years.

Comparing Past and Present Capabilities

At its height, ISIS operated like a proto-state, controlling territory the size of a small country. It managed oil production, taxation systems, courts, and a global propaganda apparatus. Tens of thousands of foreign fighters joined its ranks.

Today, its capabilities are vastly reduced. Fighters operate in small cells, funding is limited, and communication is constrained. Yet, history shows that insurgent movements can persist for decades if underlying grievances remain unaddressed.

Preventing a Future Resurgence

Preventing ISIS from rebuilding requires a comprehensive approach beyond military action:

• Political Stability: Inclusive governance that addresses grievances and restores trust.
• Economic Recovery: Investment, employment, and basic services to reduce desperation.
• Rehabilitation Programs: Education and reintegration for former fighters and affected families.
• Regional Cooperation: Shared responsibility among global and regional actors.
• Long-Term Security Planning: Avoiding abrupt withdrawals that create power vacuums.

Without addressing these structural issues, any military victory will remain temporary.

Conclusion

ISIS today is a shadow of its former self, but shadows can still cast fear. The group is not regaining territorial control in Syria, nor is it close to rebuilding a caliphate. However, it continues to exploit instability, weak governance, and unresolved humanitarian crises.

The true danger lies not in ISIS’s current strength, but in the conditions that allow it to endure. Syria’s prolonged instability, economic collapse, and political fragmentation create an environment where extremist ideologies can survive and adapt.

Defeating ISIS permanently requires more than airstrikes or counterterrorism raids. It demands long-term commitment to governance, justice, and social recovery. Until those deeper challenges are addressed, ISIS may remain weakened—but it will not fully disappear

By: Rudraksh Saklani, Research Analyst, GSDN

As the world polarizes and transitions simultaneously into a newer era of geopolitical reordering, from an erstwhile unipolar world with an evidently overbearing hegemon to an increasingly multi-polar world, where strategic autonomy and diversification of supply chains are becoming the flavours of the season, the shift is conspicuous.

A democratic world order is rather expected to be governed by rules and guided by diversity, equity, inclusivity and sustainability. However, due to the existing international forums (especially the United Nations, Group of 7 etc.) inability to manage conflicts, if not prevent them, the world is in the middle of wars and armed conflicts across the board. Old power structures seem to be faltering and paving the way for realignment and reforms, and old ways of thinking demand a long-due reset. For they are the remnants of a global order of the past which is no longer relevant.

Introductory Backdrop

The Asian continent, in particular, has been in a constant state of violent flux. An inflection point in this regard finds itself in the middle of simmering tensions in East Asia between China and Japan. At the core of the ongoing deadlock is a deepening strategic rivalry. In November 2025, Japanese Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi stated in parliamentary comments that a Chinese assault on Taiwan might pose an “existential crisis” for Japan, highlighting Tokyo’s increasing readiness to openly connect its security to Taiwan’s situation, a sensitive topic in Beijing’s security considerations.

China has subsequently urged Tokyo to withdraw these statements, viewing them as meddling in its domestic matters, while implementing counteractions against Japanese citizens, including visa limitations and asset freezes on a former chief of the Japanese Self-Defense Forces, reflecting Beijing’s readiness to impose even symbolic penalties. What initially seemed like sharp diplomatic language has, consequently, echoed to this day as military signaling, economic responses, and ideological stances not just between Beijing and Tokyo but also across the broader Indo-Pacific and overall geopolitical framework.

Immediate trigger – The Taiwan question

The Taiwanese issue has been central to the geopolitical divisions between China and Japan. For China, a unification in Taiwan has been confirmed as a key national goal, with leaders occasionally describing this unification as an essential endeavor for the rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. As a result, remarks regarding Taiwan’s sovereignty, particularly from nearby countries, have not been taken well by Beijing.

Tokyo’s increasing engagement in strategic declarations and actions related to the situation in the Taiwan Strait and related land and air patrols symbolically herald an upcoming challenge to the territory regarded as a sovereign zone by the Chinese government and is perceived by Beijing as a collaboration between the Taiwanese and US governments. This participation has increased the likelihood of operational errors. Tokyo’s stance is reinforced by domestic Japanese views on Chinese military modernization as a direct threat to Japan’s peace and stability.

Diplomatic fallout

Japan has formally lodged a protest regarding recent events, as Chinese fighter jets are said to have activated their radar systems on Japanese planes in the vicinity of Okinawa, indicating a significant increase in operational risk. Reports of confrontations between the coast guard vessels of each side concerning the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands are still coming in.

Beijing has responded with diplomatic actions, including sanctions on a former Japanese defense official, visa restrictions, frozen assets, and advisories to Chinese citizens against traveling to Japan. This diplomatic spat has now extended into various other domains. Symbolic relationships, like China’s “panda diplomacy” towards Japan, have started to weaken. For example, Japan’s Ueno Zoo has started planning the return of the giant pandas to China in 2026, which many in Japan now view as having been unintentionally politicized due to the current geopolitical climate.

Western media emphasizes increasing tensions as a facet of regional great-power rivalry, whereas Asian experts characterize it as a “stable instability” dynamic where competition endures without direct confrontation—yet carries significant risk.

Historical context through the theoretical lens of International Relations

A historical mistrust exists between Japan and China, stemming from the Second World War and the ongoing territorial conflict over the islands in the East China Sea. Examining the study and evaluation of the tense situation between the two East Asian countries today through the lens of Constructivism in international relations, it is reasonable for the topics of identity as well as historical and social norms to emerge.

The core of this idea suggests that state actions are shaped not only by material power but also by identity, memory, and stories. In China, Japan is portrayed as an aggressor and the Chinese as victims of brutality within a specific historical context, while in Japan, China is increasingly depicted as an authoritarian force that endangers post-war ideals of peace. Although compromises may be essential and reasonable, they become politically costly when historical identity stories take precedence.

Geostrategic analysis

Research performed by Japanese think tanks, including the Japan Institute of International Affairs (JIIA), indicates that mutual distrust is a fundamental characteristic of Japan-China bilateral relations. This is due to the decline of trust between the two nations caused by disruptions in people-to-people exchanges during the pandemic.

For Beijing, the military strategies of Japan and fresh interpretations of the pacifist Constitution are seen as remilitarization, a notion that has been consistently highlighted by China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Chinese state media and editorial commentary often portray Japanese security reforms as alarmingly aggressive. China Daily, for instance, condemned Tokyo’s rise in defense spending and confrontational language, stating that such a strategy might lead to significant economic burdens for Japan by reallocating resources and possibly igniting inflation and financial pressure.

Bilateral tensions are matched by escalating negative public sentiments on each side, creating further obstacles to diplomatic reconciliation. These social-psychological dynamics influence media stories and policy discussions, often resulting in political costs for achieving compromise. Extremist perspectives leverage historical disputes and nationalistic feelings to rationalize more forceful measures, whereas moderates struggle to promote reconciliation without facing political consequences.

Strategic rivalry and economic dimension

The relationship between China and Japan illustrates the interplay of territorial disputes, collective memories, alliances, and dynamics of great power politics. The global impact of events in 2025 extends from New Delhi to Washington, from Brussels to Canberra.

These dynamics are closely linked to the broader U.S.-China strategic competition that influences the geopolitical landscape in the Indo-Pacific. Additionally, there exists a Japanese security alliance with the U.S. that is constitutionally guaranteed yet politically debated. The U.S. stance of strategic ambiguity regarding the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) claim over Taiwan has complicated Japan’s ability to determine what commitments it seeks from Washington. The PRC views Japan’s growing defense alliances with the U.S. and other nations in the Indo-Pacific as a form of containment.

Although diplomatic relations are strained, the economic ties between China and Japan are significant, leading to a blend of tensions and motivations in their interactions. China remains an important trading partner for Japan across numerous sectors and a vital investor in Japan’s industrial and technological systems. Analysts from the Asia Pacific Initiative contend that economic rivalry is progressively viewed through a geo-economic perspective as supply chains undergo changes, semiconductor competition intensifies, and both nations aim to diversify or safeguard essential resources.

As per data from Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the overall trade volume between China and Japan totaled US $292.6 billion in 2024, establishing China as Japan’s primary trading partner (exports roughly 17.6% of Japan’s overall exports, imports about 22.5%). China ranks as Japan’s third largest overall export market. Tourism statistics indicate that China continues to be a major contributor of foreign tourists to Japan, yet the growth has decelerated following the tensions, highlighting how geopolitical tensions are affecting wider economic relationships.

Consequences for the region, the world

Taiwan has now become a fault line as rising tensions heighten worries in Taipei and other Asia-Pacific nations regarding the stability of the Taiwan Strait. Heightened Japanese military activities and statements about defense readiness on islands close to Taiwan mirror wider concerns over Chinese assertiveness. Countries in ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) frequently maintain a balance in their relationships with both powers. Japanese soft power and economic relations are viewed as a counter to China’s assertiveness, and Japan’s stance—both symbolically and materially—could enhance Tokyo’s influence over regional nations as a result of these tensions.

The flare-ups, in the meantime, increase pressure on South Korea and small Pacific nations to define their defense and diplomatic positions—often considering Chinese Communist Party (CCP) diplomacy alongside wider security assurances from the U.S. and its partners. Conversely, the U.S. firmly supports Japan in several of these conflicts—such as the recent radar lock dispute—as a component of its larger Indo-Pacific strategy. Recent affirmations regarding the U.S.-Japan alliance indicate Washington’s desire to deter China without engaging in direct conflict. Japanese analysts point out that Trump-era tariff policy represents a significant geopolitical risk for Tokyo, introducing economic unpredictability.

Representing the Global South and being one of the world’s rapidly growing major economies, India approaches these developments with strategic interest, pragmatic realism, and geopolitical prudence. Tokyo’s strong position aligns with Delhi’s apprehensions regarding China’s regional assertiveness and expansionist ambitions, likely enhancing informal cooperation via frameworks such as the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD). On the other hand, India simultaneously engages economically with both powers, necessitating cautious adjustment.

Russia’s Eurasian agenda and Japan-Russian territorial talks have been factors within Japan’s security thinking in the past. A strengthened Japan-U.S. alliance might make Russia’s politics in the Far East trickier. Europe views the escalation from the perspective of economic stability and the implications of NATO-level security.

Africa’s strategic partnerships with Chinese investment and infrastructure would sustain, yet the great-power competition might increase the distraction of Chinese resources and priorities. The South Asian economies that are connected with the Chinese market might experience the secondary effects of the changes in investment patterns across the globe.

Environmental impact

A clash between China and Japan would significantly impact the environment, particularly the delicate marine ecosystems in the East China Sea and the Western Pacific. Military operations, missile firings, and potentially harmful impacts on critical marine infrastructure would threaten fishing stocks, coral reef systems, and marine organisms due to oil spills and chemical leaks. Escalating tensions over common fishing areas would additionally result in resource depletion.

On land, destructive infrastructure and sabotage may result in the pollution of air and water sources with hazardous materials, while long-term consequences could include diminished fish populations, food insecurity, and disruption of endeavors related to global warming and ocean governance in East Asia, which is already reeling under challenges from climate change.

Potential technological disruptions and role of seas and the ocean

It would also significantly disrupt global technology ecosystems, considering both nations’ importance to advanced manufacturing, semiconductors, robotics, and essential materials. Japan is crucial to the worldwide tech supply chain (so is Taiwan), providing high-precision components, semiconductor production equipment, specialty chemicals, sensors, and advanced machinery. China is, in contrast, a leading center for electronics assembly, processing, and extensive manufacturing integration.

An increase in military activity would probably lead to export restrictions, sanctions, cyber actions, and the use of supply chains as a weapon. Semiconductor manufacturing would be one of the initial victims, as Japan provides essential components to chipmakers in Taiwan, South Korea, and the U.S. Global disruptions may postpone chip production, impacting automobiles, AI technologies, consumer electronics, and defense systems. The risks associated with cyber security would increase as state-sponsored cyber activities aim at infrastructure, satellites, data centers, and communication systems. Aside from hardware, technological decoupling (or de-risking) would speed up. Companies would need to replicate supply chains, elevating expenses and hindering innovation. Eventually, this disintegration would compromise efficiency and heighten inflationary pressures.

The maritime arena is central to the tensions between China and Japan. The East China Sea, encompassing the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, represents not just a territorial conflict but a strategic area where sovereignty, energy security, and international law converge. Control over adjacent waters impacts resource access, military mobility, and essential sea lines of communication (SLOCs). Japan relies on continuous maritime routes for its energy and trade, making it a trading nation tied to the sea. China, limited by the first line of defence (chain of islands) perceives maritime expansion as crucial for overcoming strategic encirclement and securing naval access to the Pacific. Consequently, both nations are increasingly dependent on coast guards, naval patrols, submarines, and aerial resources in crowded waters, heightening the chances of incidents and escalation.

The surrounding seas and ocean—in particular, the Sea of Japan, the Philippine Sea and the Western Pacific—also link these tensions with wider Indo-Pacific dynamics. Submarine deployments, carrier movements, and freedom-of-navigation operations heighten deterrence but also amplify the risks of miscalculation.

Way forward

Consequently, East Asia is presently facing a profound security dilemma. This indicates that as one party strengthens its security, it inadvertently reduces the security of the other, resulting in a cycle of escalating measures. While an all-out conflict isn’t a current objective and today’s era is anyways not of war, the chances can still not be ruled out due to the underlying factors linked to a state of alienation.

To address this instability, it is necessary to establish engagement channels, enhance confidence, and implement a strategic distrust decoupling, concerning economic cooperation. Regardless, it is clear that tensions between China and Japan have transcended an Asia-focused context and are now regarded as “global variables” in the new geopolitical landscape of the 21st century.

About the Author

Rudraksh Saklani is postgraduate in History from the University of Delhi with graduation in the same discipline. He possesses solid analytical and communication skills honed through intense academic training and has diverse internship experience, including with the Ministry of Panchayati Raj, Government of India. His research internship experience at The Indian Journal for Research in Law and Management has allowed him familiarization with law and management-related contemporary themes and case studies. He is an alumnus of The Army Public School, Dhaula Kuan, New Delhi where he scored perfect 10 CGPA in Class X and 92% in Class XII and was the Head Boy of the school. 

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